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Abstract 
In 1956, the City of Detroit began plans for the Detroit Medical Center—the 
largest urban renewal project in the nation. This hospital campus, motivated by leadership 
at four inner-city hospitals, sought to use public funding to raze the surrounding 
“blighted” neighborhood to attract private patients, thus providing a new industry for a 
city in economic decline. This strategy was ultimately unsuccessful and instead further 
contributed to both the city’s economic decline and the continued poor health of Detroit’s 
residents. This dissertation argues that the development of the Detroit Medical Center, 
which largely used federal funding for its completion, was built for what the city planners 
and officials hoped for rather than for the city that existed. In doing so, planners and 
officials ignored pleas from activists and demographic trends, pouring money into a 
project that did not serve the community that utilized this institution. This, in turn, further 
taxed the city’s municipal hospital, Detroit Receiving, as the city continued to experience 
economic decline and the population of poor and indigent patients grew. Even as the 
violence of the Detroit Riots in 1967 highlighted both the extreme unease of Detroit’s 
black community and the central importance of adequate medical provision for Detroit’s 
most vulnerable populations, the city was ultimately unable, or unwilling, to prioritize the 
needs of its residents. This stigma associated with medical provision for Detroit’s 
indigent population even resulted in the continued failure of the individual hospitals of 
the Detroit Medical Center to merge into one integrated medical center, which external 
marketing consultants had deemed essential for the success of the Detroit Medical 
Center. 
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Ultimately, the development of the Detroit Medical Center contributed to the 
economic decline of the city of Detroit. Rather than investing in its immediate 
community, Detroit Medical Center planners continued to make choices and spend 
money in attempts to court suburbanites and private patients. This resulted in continued 
financial strain on the city when these investments were not recuperated because most of 
the center’s patients and clientele always remained near the hospitals of the Detroit 
Medical Center – an area of concentrated poverty. By not investing in its community 
through the largely publicly-funded Detroit Medical Center, the city of Detroit did not 
ensure adequate health provision for its neediest residents. This contribution to the 
creation of a perpetually unhealthy, and poor populace. A community must be healthy to 
work, to become educated, to be engaged consumers; the city of Detroit was not 
interested in making its residents healthier, and this is demonstrated by its actions during 
the development of the Detroit Medical Center. Because of this, the Detroit Medical 
Center never fulfilled its potential, and caused the city even further financial stress. In the 
end, this development is a symbol of what could have been but never was.  
As a study of the ways in which a struggling city attempted to use medical care as 
an engine of economic recovery, this dissertation provides a case study for historians 
interested in health and medicine in American urban cities and encourages planners and 
contemporary urbanists to consider the consequences of not providing adequate health 
provision to a city’s most vulnerable residents. 
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Detroit is just like everywhere else, only more so—a lot more so. —Jerry Herron1 
 
There are other cities that get by on their good looks, offer climate and scenery, views of 
mountains or oceans, rockbound or with palm trees. And there are cities like Detroit that 
have to work for a living. –Elmore Leonard2 
 
 
Introduction 
  
The person that history has deemed founded Detroit, Antoine de la Mothe 
Cadillac—yes, like the car—doomed the city. While it sounds glib, we Detroiters believe 
that there is irrefutable proof that an Indigenous elder who could divine the future did 
everything they could to warn Cadillac about the red dwarf that haunted the city. But 
rather than acquiesce to the dwarf’s requests once the Frenchman finally met this spirit, 
Cadillac hit and taunted the dwarf. As a result, the Nain Rouge ensured that bad luck 
followed Cadillac for the rest of his life—and the city he founded—for all of eternity.3 
This Detroit folk tale has provided the city a scapegoat for all Detroit’s ills and 
“bad luck.” Each spring, locals gather for the Marche du Nain Rouge in hopes of taunting 
and scaring the dwarf out of the city, hoping the next year will be better than the last.4 
But the “bad luck” Detroit has experienced—war, riots, economic decline, arguably the 
worst NFL team in the history of the league5⸻is not “bad luck” at all, but rather the 
result of deliberate and specific actions by city officials, planners, and funders. This is not 
                                                            
1 Jerry Herron, “Dispatches from Detroit,” The Journal of Law in Society 15:1 (Fall 2013). 
2 Elmore Leonard, quoted in Marc Gunther, “Detroit’s Battle-Tested Admen Cope,” CNN: Money—
Assignment Detroit 
https://money.cnn.com/2009/12/04/news/companies/detroit_ads.fortune/?section=magazines_fortune (accessed April 
15, 2019) 
3 Marie Caroline Watson Hamlin, Legends of Le Detroit. (Detroit: Thorndike Nourse, 1884), pp. 22-29.  
4 Interestingly, the March has started to gain protesters who see this as an allegory for a quickly gentrifying 
downtown area as folks try to taunt and displace “someone” who has “lived” in Detroit for centuries. 
5 OK, maybe not this one, although the Fords’ decision to keep Matt Millen as General Manager for as long 
as they did is certainly inexplicable and indefensible. 
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to say that certain intangibles did not contribute to these negative outcomes, but to chalk 
it all up to raw deals and bad luck does a disservice to the residents of the city because it 
removes the opportunity to apply a critical lens and learn from these actions. 
This dissertation is the culmination of many of my life experiences, but two parts 
of my identity have shaped how I came to this work more than any other: being born in 
Detroit and being raised as a nurse’s kid. As a child, it did not take long for me to realize 
that my city was different. Urban ruins, brownfields, and other symbols of decline and 
poverty were more visible in Detroit than other cities my family visited; in many cases 
those things existed in other cities, but they seemed better at hiding them. When I asked 
why, I tried to answer the best I could based on what I saw on the news and the answers 
from my white working-class family. My family moved out of the city to Downriver,6 
and their own experiences shaped their truth about the decline of city. I held this 
understanding until my sophomore year of college, when I was introduced to two things 
that blew my mind: the concept of the social construction of race and Thomas Sugrue’s 
The Origins of the Urban Crisis. Sugrue’s work (perhaps more meaningful to me coming 
from a fellow Detroiter) challenged my long-believed notions of Detroit’s decline, 
namely that Detroit was thriving until the Detroit Riots drove all white residents and 
businesses (and therefore all the wealth) out of the city. Using demographic and 
                                                            
6 Downriver is an area made up of eighteen smaller communities immediately south of Detroit, or “down” the 
Detroit River. It is a community of working-class suburbs. Its oldest communities, like Ecorse and Lincoln Park, were 
founded in the 1920s, but most of this community came from expansion due to white flight after World War II. It is not 
often this community that is meant when people discuss “suburban Detroit;” that focus is mostly on wealthier, middle 
class Oakland County. What makes the case of Downriver so interesting is that it experiences economic struggles 
similar to those of the city of Detroit, but it is (still, although it’s growing more diverse) majority white. Downriver is 
not a part of this dissertation at all, but because of the peculiarity of the economic similarities but racial differences 
with the city proper, it would provide a wealth of opportunities to ask questions similar to this dissertation. 
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economic data, Sugrue demonstrated that manufacturing jobs started moving out of 
Detroit immediately following World War II, and the increased competition over these 
jobs highlighted Detroit’s racial tensions and promoted racist policies. These important 
lessons helped me to reconcile my own past and experience and slowly begin to know 
how to ask historical questions and understand that racism was a significant contributing 
factor to Detroit’s current state. 
These teachings came in tandem with something I already understood well: 
different people received different standards of health care. In my family growing up, we 
were expected to share details about our day around the dinner table. My mom was a 
nurse and, to her immense credit, talked about her job as though she was talking to 
colleagues and not her young children. This covertly taught my sister and me difficult 
concepts about disease, reimbursement, and health insurance. Toward the end of her 
career she worked more in administration, and so these conversations became less about 
the medical concerns of individual patients and more about her frustrations with the 
systems in which she operated. These complaints were more frequent with cases of 
patients receiving public aid and other markers of poverty. It became clear to me that 
health care was not a right but a privilege in our current system, and poorer patients had 
more difficulty accessing this privilege.  
Growing up curious about both the city’s current state and my mom’s experiences 
trying to help her patients, it has always seemed to me that these two things—the 
economic health of cities and the physical health of its residents—were linked. Therefore, 
when trying to find a dissertation topic, I was struck by the press release I found in the 
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City of Detroit’s archives about the development of the new Detroit Medical Center 
[DMC]. I was very familiar with this campus—my sister and I were both born there—but 
I never questioned its history. When I learned that this medical campus was the result of 
the largest urban renewal project in the nation at the time it was designed, I grew curious. 
I knew the negative connotations of urban renewal, in part because of my earlier 
exposure to Sugrue’s work. But I also knew that Detroit was still a city struggling—the 
summer I did the bulk of my archival research, Detroit filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. It 
was the largest municipality ever—both in size of city and amount in debt—to do so.7 
Research on the current state of my city and the poor economic and physical health of its 
residents made the DMC a natural case study to help me understand the paradox of a 
facility that was supposed to save the city and the reality that the city seemed in more 
trouble than before it was built. 
This dissertation uses the DMC to ask questions about the origins of the current 
state of Detroit and the ways that struggling cities use medical care, both as an engine of 
economic recovery but also as an essential service for its most vulnerable residents. 
Examination of the development of the DMC from its official proposal brought forth to 
Detroit City Council in 1956 through its incorporation as a nonprofit in 1985 provides a 
lens through which to analyze the actions of not only city officials and planners, but also 
the activists and community this hospital development served.  
                                                            
7 Monica Davey and Mary Williams Walsh, “Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles into Insolvency,” The New 
York Times. July 18, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-
bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed April 1, 2019). 
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In the chapters that follow, I argue that the development of the DMC, which 
largely used federal funding for its completion, was built for the city that planners and 
officials hoped for rather than for the city that existed. In doing so, planners and officials 
ignored pleas from activists and contemporary demographic trends, pouring money into a 
project that was meant to attract patients with resources rather than local residents, some 
of whom were displaced by its very construction. This, in turn, further taxed the city’s 
municipal hospital, Detroit Receiving, as the city continued to experience economic 
decline and the population of poor and indigent patients grew. Even as the violence of the 
Detroit Riots in 1967 highlighted both the extreme unease of Detroit’s black community 
and the central importance of adequate medical provision for Detroit’s most vulnerable 
populations, the city was ultimately unable, or unwilling, to prioritize the needs of most 
of the city’s residents. This stigma associated with medical provision for Detroit’s 
indigent population even resulted in the continued failure of the individual hospitals of 
the DMC to merge into one integrated medical center, which external marketing 
consultants had deemed essential for its success.  
It is impossible to discuss the economic decline of the city of Detroit without 
including the role of the DMC. Rather than investing in its immediate community, DMC 
planners continued to make choices and spend money in attempts to court suburbanites 
and private patients—a task that became more difficult as competing hospitals often drew 
these patients first.8 Their policies resulted in continued financial strain on the city when 
                                                            
8 The competing hospitals in question include Henry Ford Hospital, a private hospital located a few miles 
Northwest of the hospitals of the proposed DMC, and in later decades, the University of Michigan Medical Center in 
Ann Arbor, Michigan. Henry Ford Hospital was a private hospital established by the Ford Motor Company for its 
employees in the early twentieth century. The State of Michigan wholly financed the construction of the modern 
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these investments were not recuperated because most of the center’s patients and clientele 
always remained near the hospitals of the DMC—an area of concentrated poverty. By not 
focusing on the local community through the largely publicly funded DMC, the city of 
Detroit did not ensure adequate health provision for its neediest residents. This 
contributed to the creation of a perpetually unhealthy and poor populace. A community 
must be healthy to work, to become educated, to be engaged consumers. Leaders in the 
city of Detroit were not interested in making its residents healthier, and this is 
demonstrated by its actions during the development of the DMC. Because of this, the 
DMC never fulfilled its potential and caused the city even further financial stress. 
Ultimately then, this account of the hospital complex reveals a vision of what could have 
been but never was.  
Because of its place as a city whose rise and decline came more sharply and 
suddenly than other American cities, Detroit has long served as a focus of study for 
historians. The aforementioned The Origins of the Urban Crisis is not only the definitive 
work on Detroit history but arguably of American urban history. In it, Sugrue explores 
housing and job discrimination in Detroit after World War II, arguing both that Detroit’s 
decline began much earlier than many thought (immediately following WWII and not 
beginning in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to the Detroit Riots). Sugrue also 
                                                            
University of Michigan Medical Center in the 1970s. These characteristics made these two hospitals’ paths to success 
through the courting of suburban, private-paying patients less difficult than the DMC’s. Neither of these hospital 
campuses are discussed in depth in this dissertation, knowing a bit about their histories helps to contextualize this 
dissertation. The most comprehensive history of Henry Ford Hospital is available on its website; my instinct is that 
because this has always been a private hospital, it is difficult for historians to access the records necessary to write an 
independent history of this hospital. For more information, see https://www.henryford.com/about/culture/history/hfhs. 
A celebratory history on the planning and development of the University of Michigan Medical Center is available. See: 
Frederick W. Mayer, A Setting for Excellence, Part II: The Story of the Planning and Development of the Ann Arbor 
Campus of the University of Michigan. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017). 
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charges that homeownership (and the policies surrounding it) was a bigger factor in the 
racial segregation of Detroit—and its subsequent economic decline—than almost any 
other.9 Other works on Detroit’s history, like David M. P. Freund’s Colored Property: 
State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America and Sidney Fine’s Violence 
in the Model City: The Cavanagh Administration, Race Relations, and the Detroit Riot of 
1967 make similar arguments, centering housing, state and federal policies, and the 
discrimination against black Detroiters to explain the economic decline of the city of 
Detroit.10  
While there is plentiful secondary literature in urban history to contextualize my 
dissertation, I had more difficulty finding secondary literature in the history of medicine. 
One reason I was drawn to this work is because of the dearth of scholarship in this area in 
our field—not just in the city of Detroit, for which I have found no secondary literature at 
all, but in American cities generally after World War II. However, in earlier periods, 
historians of medicine have done admirable and important work about health and 
medicine in American cities. Understanding the need for a careful examination of the 
way that race, policy, and institutions intersected to affect the lives of sick people—but 
also how sick people shaped the way that New York City thought about race, policy, and 
its institutions—Charles Rosenberg essentially invented a new historiography that we 
know as the social history of medicine through the publication of The Cholera Years.11  
                                                            
9 Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
10 David M.P. Freund, Colored Property: State Policy & White Racial Politics in Suburban America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007) and Sidney Fine, Violence in the Model City: The Cavanagh 
Administration, Race Relations, and the Detroit Riot of 1967 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2007). 
11 Charles E. Rosenberg, The Cholera Years: The United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866, 2nd Edition. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
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The decision to center his study in a densely populated city was no accident. Beyond the 
obvious reason that this population density provided the ideal environment for the spread 
of cholera to epidemic levels, he demonstrated the reaction to this epidemic affected the 
way that the city treated immigrants, sanitation, and housing. The city, in a sense, was 
another historical actor in Rosenberg’s study.  
 Since the publication of that work nearly six decades ago, many other historians 
have published excellent works in a similar style to this work that also center the 
American city, including Nancy Tomes, Vanessa Northington Gamble, Samuel Kelton 
Roberts, Jr., and Susan Craddock.12 While all these exceptional works provide a greater 
examination of the ways in which disease and health provisions changed life in American 
cities, these studies stop before the mid-twentieth century.  
Very few historians of medicine have worked on issues related to health and 
medicine in American cities beyond this time period, but the ones that have all 
demonstrate their belief that the history of medicine has a distinct and needed role in 
providing guidance to contemporary health policy issues. The three most influential for 
me in writing this dissertation were Keith Wailoo’s Dying in the City of the Blues: Sickle 
Cell Anemia and the Politics of Race and Health, James Colgrove’s Epidemic City: The 
                                                            
12 Examples include: Susan Craddock, City of Plagues: Disease, Poverty, and Deviance in San Francisco, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Vanessa Northington Gamble, Making a Place for Ourselves: The 
Black Hospital Movement, 1920-1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Samuel Kelton Roberts, Jr., 
Infectious Fear: Politics, Disease, and the Health Effects of Segregation, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina 
Press, 2009);  Nancy Tomes, The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women, and the Microbe in American Life, Reprint Edition, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
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Politics of Public Health in New York, and Beatrix Hoffman’s Health Care for Some: 
Rights and Rationing in the United States Since 1930.13  
In Dying in the City of the Blues, Wailoo uses sickle cell anemia—a disease 
primarily affecting black populations—in Memphis, a city from whose riches and 
creativity the entire country has benefitted, to explain how politicians, hospitals, and 
researchers used this disease to reach their own goals. Wailoo’s narrative provided a 
model for this dissertation by exploring how federal policies and national movements 
played out on the local level. However, Wailoo’s work, while placed in urban America 
and doing exceptional work in analyzing how race affects the ways that disease is both 
treated and exploited, does not fully engage with the specific policies and aspects of 
urban life that drew me to this case study—policies of urban renewal, displacement, and 
economic revitalization. 
Colgrove’s Epidemic City engages with local policy more than Wailoo’s work, 
but only the policies the New York City Department of Health dealt with directly and 
explicitly from 1965 to 2005. Colgrove explains masterfully how the changing social 
meaning of health led to public health solutions to the city’s economic problems like 
poverty, housing, and substance abuse. Additionally, he chronicles how the economic 
recession of the 1970s resulted in staffing difficulties at the Health Department, forcing 
layoffs and forcing the remaining public health workers to further prove themselves as 
worthy professionals for their survival in a struggling city. This contextualization was 
                                                            
13 Keith Wailoo, Dying in the City of the Blues: Sickle Cell Anemia and the Politics of Race and Health, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); James Colgrove, Epidemic City: The Politics of Public Health 
in New York, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011); and Beatrix Hoffman, Health Care for Some: Rights and 
Rationing in the United States Since 1930, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
 10 
 
helpful in this dissertation, especially in the examination of Detroit Receiving, the city’s 
municipal hospital. However, while Colgrove explores the effects of local policies on 
public health and health delivery, he does not further engage with the motivations for 
these city policies. Colgrove’s work seems to place urban public health as reactionary, 
when, in the DMC case, it was clear that health services and the development of health 
delivery systems could be drivers of urban policies. 
Hoffman’s work gets closest to answering some of the questions I address in my 
dissertation, but her study remains focused on the nation at large. In Health Care for 
Some, Hoffman tracks federal legislation that sought to expand health care coverage for 
Americans but proves that these policies always ensured the legal lack of health care 
access for America’s most vulnerable populations—the poor and the non-white. Because 
the United States has avoided defining health care as a right owed to its citizens, it 
remains a luxury good, rationed only for those who the federal government has deemed 
worthy. Hoffman carefully traces legislation that is crucial to the story in Detroit, like 
Hill-Burton, which supported hospital construction and development in areas of need in 
the United States beginning in 1946. Hoffman argued that this program centralized 
medical care in hospitals, and, in the eyes of policy makers, provided a viable alternative 
to universal health care in the United States. However, the legal refusal of care at 
hospitals and emergency rooms in both Southern and Northern States—like at the DMC 
and later, Detroit Receiving—show that policymakers excluded coverage in the 
development of these regulations. Continuing her study through the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare, Hoffman demonstrates convincingly why the 
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United States’ health care system is so fractured, expensive, and exclusionary. This study 
was crucial in providing the national context for this dissertation’s local case study. 
In addition to this lack of research in the history of medicine in cities during the 
postwar period, my search for secondary literature also demonstrated that there was little 
analysis about the cyclical relationship between health services and city policies, or how 
hospitals and medical centers played a central role in urban renewal across many cities in 
the United States. One scholar looking to remedy this is Merlin Chowkwanyun. 
Chowkwanyun explores questions about the community health and social movements in 
American cities, noting that racist policies often result in further health inequalities. In his 
work on community health reform and race riots in Cleveland, Chowkwanyun notes that 
urban renewal policies that resulted in the development of the Cleveland Clinic were a 
motivator in that city’s civil unrest—similar to my argument in this dissertation about the 
DMC and Detroit Receiving.14 Chowkwanyun, however, does not follow the full 
trajectory of this institute’s development.  
This dissertation intervenes in the historiography of medicine and health in the 
postwar period by intertwining construction for health provision and an analysis of urban 
renewal. In that process, it centers race as an essential factor and provides an analysis of 
how the public policies affected vulnerable populations in Detroit.  
 Chapter one explores the initial medical center development plan presented to 
City Council in 1956, and the reaction from black activists when they realized that this 
development excluded black residents from the economic prosperity a new DMC offered. 
                                                            
14 Merlin Chowkwanyun, “Cleveland vs. the Clinic: the 1960s Riots and Community Health Reform,” 
American Journal of Public Health 101 (November 2018).  
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Both white planners and black activists, however, saw the true power of the DMC as a 
site of future education, training, and employment. Little attention was paid to the ways 
this development could also function as a site of improved access and care for Detroit’s 
growing indigent population. By chronicling the 1956 proposal in the context of a city 
already exhibiting signs of economic decline and deindustrialization, this chapter argues 
that, despite the focus on hospitals, planners were still operating within the more 
traditional goals of urban development: slum clearance and economic revitalization. The 
initial medical center plan’s emphasis on educational opportunities was to be offered 
through an expanded Wayne State University School of Medicine, which would, in turn, 
use the four hospitals of the DMC to train residents. Neither city planners nor black 
activists from the Detroit Urban League seemed to recognize that adequate health 
provision for Detroit’s neediest populations should be an important facet of urban 
renewal, and thus, a path to economic stability for Detroit residents.  
While this is perhaps what we would expect from white city planners during the 
mid-twentieth century, the Detroit Urban League’s lack of concern is perhaps more 
surprising. Scholars from many fields—not just history—have been slow to reject the 
“black experience” as a monolith, often writing about black Americans as having all 
shared social, cultural, and economic experiences.15 In the history of medicine, this is no 
different, although some works expertly engage with the intersections of race class, and 
gender (although these works are typically not about American urban history).16 It is, 
                                                            
15 Kenneth W. Goings and Raymond A. Mohl, The New African American Urban History, (New York: 
SAGE Publications, 1996). 
16 Examples include: Patricia D’Antonio, American Nursing: A History of Knowledge, Authority, and the 
Meaning of Work, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2010); Wendy Kline, Bodies of Knowledge: Sexuality, 
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unfortunately, not surprising that the history of medicine works that best achieve this are 
by historians who identify as black themselves.17 This is a failing both of our field’s lack 
of diversity and the continued lack of accessibility of academia more broadly, but also of 
white-identified historians who either largely ignore these important stories in the history 
of medicine or whose own biases result in a narrative unworthy of the rich tapestry of 
experiences of black Americans.18 This first chapter adds to works that do engage the 
diverse experiences of black folks in the history of medicine.19 
Chapter two focuses on Detroit’s long-standing “hospital of last resort,” the city 
hospital Detroit Receiving. Initially located about a mile south of the proposed DMC, this 
hospital sought to provide care to all those in need regardless of their ability to pay—a 
population that was growing due to the demographic and economic changes the city 
experienced after World War II. The faith the city placed in the DMC development as a 
means for economic revitalization meant that funding and other boosterism were strongly 
directed at the new medical center at the expense of Detroit Receiving. Although external 
consultants had noted that this development would be more successful if the city worked 
to integrate its municipal hospital as the emergency trauma hospital of the new DMC, 
planners and officials never acted upon this request for fear of the negative connotation 
                                                            
Reproduction, and Women’s Health in the Second Wave, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Rebecca M. 
Kluchin, Fit to Be Tied: Sterilization and Reproductive Rights in America, 1950-1980, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2009). 
17 Examples include Gamble, Making a Place for Themselves; Roberts, Jr., Infectious Fear, and Wailoo, 
Dying in the City of Blues. 
18 Graham Mooney’s forthcoming book project, Harm City: Health and Injustice in Urban America, may 
also prove to be a contribution to this field from a white-identifying historian of medicine. 
19 As a white woman working on this history, I know there will be inherent blind spots that my own 
experiences and identity bring to this work. However, I acknowledge that it is my responsibility to both work for the 
continued expanded inclusiveness of our field and incorporate this important perspective into my own work as someone 
who has chosen to study the history of urban America. 
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this hospital’s patients would bring the rest of the DMC. However, it is precisely the 
enthusiasm over the DMC development that was a contributing factor in the city’s 
decline. This chapter argues that continuing to ignore the problems of Detroit Receiving 
did not make them go away; instead, they became more severe. The primarily indigent 
patient population of this hospital grew, and the financial struggles incurred because of 
this population growth ultimately became insurmountable for the city. This chapter 
makes this claim by first introducing Detroit Receiving Hospital’s mission, history, and 
increasing struggles within the changing demographics of the city. Then, through an 
exploration of a psychiatric patient crisis at the hospital, this chapter demonstrates how 
Detroit Receiving’s patient population made the city and the DMC believe this hospital 
was an undesirable addition to the development, despite its increasingly intractable issues 
with declining physical facilities. It then explores a neighboring urban renewal project, 
University City Development, and the formalization of a relationship between Wayne 
State School of Medicine and Detroit Receiving Hospital—a relationship the city needed 
to maintain for its goals of increasing enrollment at the school to be successful. However, 
the relationship between Detroit Receiving and Wayne State was always at risk because 
hospital and school administrators and city planners repeatedly ignored structural and 
overcrowding issues at Detroit Receiving. These physical insufficiencies placed the 
hospital at constant risk of losing its accreditation. Finally, this chapter explores how by 
the mid-1960s, the city finally realized a new hospital was necessary, but officials were 
unable to prioritize this hospital over plans for the DMC Development and University 
City. This was despite Detroit Receiving’s crucial role in the success for both projects. 
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Ultimately, the inability of city officials to prioritize a new Detroit Receiving resulted in 
uncertainty about this project’s timeline and whether it could happen. 
Chapter three centers Detroit Receiving in the analysis of the lead-up, progress, 
and aftermath of the violent incidents in July of 1967 that would become commonly 
known as the Detroit Riots. There is a long legacy of black activism conflating poor 
health access with advocacy for things like improved housing and jobs. Thus, when 
analyzing the Detroit Riots, it is important to consider the poor health services provided 
to indigent patients by the city as a potential motivator for this event. However, Detroit 
Receiving holds a complicated place in the history of this event. Its neglected and 
decrepit facility became a symbol for the position of poor, black, disgruntled residents, 
while its central role in the treatment of victims during this event resulted in an elevated 
respect for this institution unlike anything during its history. Although the enthusiasm for 
the plan was short-lived—as was the centering of the needs of these black patients in the 
future decisions of the city—the aftermath of the Detroit Riots was directly responsible 
for the city’s approval of a new Detroit Receiving Hospital within the confines of the 
DMC. To demonstrate this, the third chapter first explores the landscape of national black 
health activism leading up to the 1960s in Detroit. It then chronicles the Detroit Riots, 
paying careful attention to the experiences of physicians and nurses at Detroit Receiving; 
the accounts of other participants in the violence have largely been lost to history. And 
then finally, the chapter includes the aftermath of this event as it relates to Detroit 
Receiving. While the city had finally approved a new facility within the DMC, federal 
urban renewal funds had run out, and the city was heavily in debt. To address these 
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financial concerns, Detroit’s new mayor, Coleman A. Young, appealed directly to 
Michigan native President Gerald Ford. While able to secure funding for a new Detroit 
Receiving Hospital, it was too late; the city could no longer afford to operate this 
institution, and it was sold at a significant loss to the non-profit organization that oversaw 
the DMC. 
The final chapter steps back and explores the attempts at consolidation between 
the institutions of the DMC. Consultants since 1960 had told planners that hospital 
administration at the individual sites that would become the DMC would be more 
successful if they would merge under one unifying body and absorb Detroit Receiving 
Hospital. The hospitals of the DMC struggled with this task for twenty-five years because 
the environment in which they operated was more competitive than collaborative. This 
chapter argues that the already-competitive environment created by these federal policies 
were exacerbated by continued racist and classist sentiments about indigent patients who 
would continue to frequent Detroit Receiving, and ultimately, the DMC. It does so by 
contextualizing this struggle for consolidation within federal policies that prioritized 
regionalism in health planning and the development of academic health centers through 
virtually unchecked biomedical research and development funding through the 1970s. 
The administration of the hospitals of the DMC and city officials were still unable to 
reconcile the fact that the world-class medical center they built was not patronized by 
their preferred (white, suburbanite, private paying) patient population, and instead was 
most utilized by those living within a five-mile radius of the development (predominantly 
black, indigent patients). This disappointment and continued attempts to remedy it further 
 17 
 
eroded trust between these institutions, as they saw treating indigent patients a continued 
liability for their hospitals. In order to succeed, the hospitals of the DMC needed to enter 
enthusiastically into mutual benefit arrangements, resulting in the sharing of not only 
burdens, but profits. The competitive environment that resulted in part from federal 
policies and in part from the continued economic decline of the city made these 
institutions increasingly skeptical of each other and delayed the full incorporation of the 
DMC until 1985. The delay in consolidation meant a delay in reaping the intended 
benefits of the DMC development, like profits, and increasing the number of medical 
trainees. This postponement contributed to the continued economic hardships of the 
DMC, which continue to this day. 
While this dissertation does address an important gap in the historiography of 
medicine in American cities, it has its limits. One such limitation is the lack of firm 
health statistics and financial data. I learned while completing this dissertation that a 
financially strapped city perhaps does not prioritize keeping complete and full archives. 
The few health statistics and financial data I did find were in the collections of activist 
groups like the Detroit Urban League, which kept random health department reports, 
seemingly based on when the group participated in a groundswell of activism. For this 
reason, the data I do have is sporadic, and I tried to use these metrics effectively 
throughout this dissertation. That said, the internal memos of city employees and meeting 
minutes of city organizations and boards included conversations about general trends in 
both the health of residents and the city’s economic struggles, and these sources allowed 
me to piece together this narrative. 
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Another limitation is the lack of women in this narrative. Women were not absent 
in archives—named women served as administrators, hospital supervisors, and city 
workers—but this dissertation includes few. There was, however, an absence of women 
in the archival records of the activist groups in this narrative. Of course, it does not mean 
there were not women activists; there is great meaning in the archives’ absences. 
Additionally, there are gender dynamics that are entirely underexplored in this 
dissertation. Wayne State University’s priorities for health education were firmly with the 
medical school that taught primarily male physicians—not its thriving nursing school, 
which taught primarily women. In fact, the actors in this dissertation seem wholly 
uninterested in the nursing school, even during the expansion of Wayne State University 
to train future health employees at the DMC. Women served as nurses at the hospitals of 
the DMC, and labor conditions favored the male physicians; this was doubly true for the 
black women who worked as lower-status LPNs rather than RNs. In addition, it was 
typically white women who held administrative posts at these hospitals. However, an 
examination of these gender dynamics is not fully within the scope of this dissertation, so 
I reluctantly set aside the limited materials found to date. Women, of course, play an 
important role in the story of Detroit’s past and future, and in the workings of the DMC. I 
look forward to examining this further in future studies. 
Despite these limitations, it is my hope that this dissertation provides a new model 
of inquiry for historians of medicine, urban historians, and public health scholars. While 
employing historical methods, this dissertation is interdisciplinary at its core, and asks 
questions that can inform current discussions on how to remedy economic struggles in 
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cities like Detroit. In debates about how to provide for city residents, well-meaning 
planners and officials often cite housing, education, or jobs as residents’ most pressing 
needs. As this dissertation makes clear, however, health provision is the primary 
requirement of residents. Until policies are enacted that define health care as a right and 
provide basic standards of health delivery, municipalities will continue to struggle. This 
dissertation provides the historical context for such a debate, demonstrating that a city’s 
inability to prioritize the health of its most vulnerable populations is detrimental to its 
economic health.
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Chapter 1 
 
Blight is Bad for Business: The Potential for Economic Stability through the 
Development of the Detroit Medical Center 
 
In 1940, Detroit was the fourth largest city in the United States, and was growing 
faster than any other American metropolitan area.20 Its large manufacturing companies 
established the United States’ model of employment-based health insurance to attract and 
keep workers in the era of wartime wage freezes.21 This resulted in a large, prosperous 
workforce where employees could afford the products they spent hours on the line 
making. 
Today, Detroit is the fastest shrinking city in the United States.22 Post-war federal 
programs that favored suburbanization fostered “white flight” from the city, while state 
and local policies helped create dense, homogenous residential zones at its core.23 These 
populations, mostly of color, found it nearly impossible to move out of the inner city.24 
The migration of the middle class to the suburbs, exacerbated by racial tension and 
freeway construction, contributed to the loss of manufacturing jobs in the 1950s.25 As a 
                                                            
20 Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Shroeder, and Matthew 
Sobek. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0 (Machine-readable database) [hereafter cited as IPUMS-
USA]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010. 1940 United States Census Data.  
21 Jennifer Klein, For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America’s Public-Private 
Welfare State, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 205. 
22 IPUMS-USA, 1980-2010 United States Census Data. 
23 Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis. 
24 Freund, Colored Property. 
25 Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis. 
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result, the city’s tax base eroded even earlier than when the full, outwardly visible effects 
of deindustrialization were realized in the 1970s and 80s.  
In 1957, there were 6,200 factories in the Detroit area, which employed nearly 
587,000 people residing in Detroit city limits according to statistics from the Detroit 
Board of Commerce.26 That number was down from just ten years earlier—between 1947 
and 1957, Detroit lost an estimated 75,000 manufacturing jobs, as automakers built 
twenty-five new plants outside of city limits.27 This transfer of jobs to the suburbs, and 
therefore population, also signaled a racial shift. This racial shift also carried with it an 
economic shift—in 1960, black families earned only fifty-four percent of what white 
families did in the city of Detroit. And in most of these black families, both parents 
worked; in white middle-class families, it was common for only the father to work 
outside of the home.28 City officials knew that these changing demographics could also 
result in a loss of economic prosperity for the city. Detroit was built on the auto industry 
and the blue-collar labor that supported it, but the city truly came to prominence during 
the wartime labor efforts.29 In an attempt to remain out of combat but support our allies, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt promised that America would support the war effort by 
building planes, vehicles, and other necessities; no city was more important in this 
indirect fight than the city of Detroit, which became the “arsenal of democracy.”30 The 
                                                            
26 Proposed Statement Prepared for Hearing Before Common Council on Medical Center Redevelopment, 
January 15, 1960. Box 75, Folder: Temporary Committee Hospital/Medical Services, 1951- 1960. Detroit Urban 
League Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
27 Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, p. 126. 
28 “Proposed Statement on Medical Center Redevelopment,” January 15, 1960. 75, Temporary Committee 
Hospital/Medical Services, 1951- 1960. Bentley Library. 
29 Gregory Hooks and Leonard Bloomquist, “The Legacy of World War II for Regional Growth and Decline: 
The Cumulative Effects of Wartime Investments on U.S. Manufacturing, 1947-1972.” Social Forces 71:2 (December 
1992), pp. 303-337. 
30 Ibid. 
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patriotism associated with manufacturing led to a rapid growth of war materials and 
employment. When the war ended, these jobs were not as needed, and layoffs became 
common.31 City officials understood the implications of the war’s end and began to 
forecast the consequences of the factories leaving city limits. They knew that they needed 
an alternative industry that would allow the city to power through the uncertain future 
ahead.  
Once federal urban renewal funds became available after World War II, several 
ideas were put forth by local government officials as a potential focal point for the city’s 
potential prosperity including a research park, a downtown plaza, and an alternative 
energy think tank. But no project had more enthusiasm behind it than the DMC. This 
project sought to rehabilitate a “blighted” neighborhood by joining the services and 
expanding the physical structures of four voluntary hospitals in the city center.  
Using successful health centers at Columbia University in New York City and 
Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore as their models, the postwar administrators at four 
voluntary hospitals in Detroit’s inner core believed that a revamping of their surrounding 
neighborhoods would improve their ability to properly provide business services to 
patients.32 Despite the Depression, Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center had 
experienced growth through the years 1929-1941, boasting more than twelve institutions 
under the purview of the medical center, anchored by a reputable medical school. This 
institution credited its survival—and its ability to thrive—to the formal affiliation 
                                                            
31 Ibid. 
32 Richard A. Ryan, “Detroit’s Medical Center: A Dream Coming True,” Detroit News, p. 6B, 9 Oct. 1967. 
Box 15, Folder 15-7 Children’s Hospital Groundbreaking Ceremony; Correspondence Feb-Jun 1967 Children’s 
Hospital of Michigan Records, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, Detroit, Michigan.  
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between its medical school and its hospitals.33 Early promotional materials for Columbia-
Presbyterian Medical Center called this institution the “Fortress in the Heights,” noting 
its preparedness for not only disease but also against the social ills of the neighborhood.34  
It was this spirit that DMC planners hoped to replicate. By the leadership at these 
four voluntary hospitals in a “blighted” area joining with the local medical school and 
city government to form an “integrated” medical center—sharing services, costs, and 
profits as did their model institution—DMC officials were hopeful that they could 
weather the storms as well as did Columbia, despite the DMC partnering with a public 
institution. 
The administration at these hospitals feared, however, that population loss and a 
racial concentration of black Detroiters in the city core were contributing to a “blighted” 
neighborhood surrounding some of the city’s busiest hospitals.35 Federal urban renewal 
dollars were the primary source of funding that would make the DMC possible, and 
traditional thinking about urban renewal—meaning slum clearance—framed the ways 
that its planners and officials  about the project. The planners emphasized the importance 
of training programs and providing professional jobs on this hospital campus, and thus 
the transformation of the neighborhood was central to planners’ vision of a prosperous 
                                                            
33 Seventy-Five Years of Healing on the Heights: Columbia University Medical Center Celebrates the 75th 
Anniversary of Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, 1928-2003. Glenn A. Peterson, ed. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Samuel Kelton Roberts writes about the “medicalization of blight” in Infectious Fear, where urban renewal 
was intrinsically viewed as a public health effort through the removal of unhealthy, dangerous slums. During the 
development of the DMC, this was not a prominent conversation among Detroit planners. However, it is important to 
note that this was a contemporary concern for urban planners. The planners in Baltimore also created segregated, 
unhealthy areas through their “medicalization.” The medicalization of blight, where planners—even imperfectly—take 
health into the consideration of urban planning decisions is in contrast to the “traditional thinking” about urban renewal 
that happens in Detroit, where despite this funding resulting in the construction of a hospital campus, the focus remains 
primarily about economics rather than health. 
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Detroit—largely, white and middle class.  
Even among black activists who were committed to increasing equality and 
access within the city’s hospitals, the priority of this development seemed to ensure equal 
access to the jobs it would create for black middle-class residents rather than creating 
better health care access for poor black residents. The Detroit Urban League, the local 
chapter of the national nonprofit organization that advocated against racial segregation on 
behalf of black Americans, was the leading activist organization at the center of the DMC 
development. Advocating for nearly a decade, the Detroit Urban League was successful 
in delaying the construction of the DMC until the city agreed to stop its segregationist 
policies and discriminatory hiring practices for nurses, physicians, and other hospital 
staff. While this organization campaigned for an equitable medical center for both 
patients and professionals, this group was most dedicated to advocating on behalf of 
black workers. It is important to recognize that the Detroit Urban League, a group of 
mostly educated and middle-class black activists were advocating for other black 
residents to have access to the middle class through the same paths through which they 
had achieved this status.  
Historian Touré F. Reed has traced the intellectual history of the National Urban 
League as a college-educated erudite group that applied its leaders’ liberal sociology 
training.36 He writes about how this group emphasized data gathering and surveys to 
develop their advocacy. This evidence-based format, argued Reed, did not address the 
structural violence nor discrimination black residents faced in the cities where active 
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local chapters of the Urban League worked because of their focus on the “reorganization” 
of black working-class life to one that assimilated into white middle-class life.37 The 
solutions of the Urban League, argues Reed, victim-blamed black residents implicitly. Its 
leadership sought to convince white professionals that there were “good blacks,” which 
only highlighted class differences between black residents.38 Other historians, like Kevin 
K. Gaines, have argued that racial uplift ideology—essentially, that the upward mobility 
and social progress of black Americans would result in the elimination of racism—
actually contributed to negative stereotypes of black Americans by emphasizing class 
differences, and was therefore ineffective against fighting racism.39 This was the case in 
Detroit where the advocacy of the Detroit Urban League ignored the most vulnerable 
among Detroit’s residents, namely, the increasing population of indigent patients. This 
development created more housing and job insecurity for those residing in the area that 
would become the DMC development. While the Detroit Urban League did express 
concern over the displacement and failure to plan for rehoming residents, their ultimate 
concern and greatest advocacy was toward the opportunities for jobs and training at the 
new DMC. 
Understanding the genesis of the DMC demonstrates that direct advocacy to 
protect civil rights and end racial discrimination was necessary, even in diverse northern 
cities. But it also demonstrates the way that even those speaking on behalf of 
marginalized peoples had within their own population their own hierarchies and ignored 
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constituencies. Both city planners and the Detroit Urban League used rhetoric about 
patients and care to debate the importance of the DMC, but the actions from 
representatives of both groups indicate that concerns about employment were valued 
more than improving health in this community.  
 
The Origins of the Detroit Medical Center Plan 
The four voluntary hospitals at the center of the DMC development—Harper, 
Hutzel,40 Children’s, and Grace—all had histories in the city dating back to the 
nineteenth century. Harper University Hospital, the oldest of these four, began in 1863 as 
a hospital for Civil War soldiers. It had since become a hospital affiliated with the local 
nursing school, Wayne State University College of Nursing.41 Hutzel Hospital was 
established next in 1868 to serve the city’s women, but this hospital began serving men as 
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Figure 1: The original locations of the 
four hospitals that would become the 
DMC on a map of modern-day Detroit. 
The area shown on this map is 
approximately two square miles. 
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well in 1929, followed by Children’s in 1886, and Grace in 1888.42 These hospitals were 
all developed in close geographical proximity to each other, and through the rest of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, saw a dense residential area develop around 
them.43 These hospitals were all formed by charitable, Christian organizations that prided 
themselves on caring for all regardless of their ability to pay; perhaps this is why these 
hospitals soon became among the busiest in the state.44 In 1955, one-twentieth of all 
hospital patients in Michigan received care from one of these four institutions.45  
While these hospitals were well utilized, they were not financially well-off. By 
the mid-1950s, fewer patients were able to pay for their care.46 Hospital administrators 
blamed this on the changing neighborhoods surrounding their buildings; the densely 
populated neighborhood was home to a large population of Detroit’s black working class. 
Not only did this mean that those who came to these hospitals from the surrounding 
catchment area were poorer, but that those from outside of the city no longer wanted to 
attend these hospitals in “blighted” and unsafe areas.47 The area of the greatest 
concentrated poverty in the state of Michigan was located in the neighborhood directly 
surrounding these four hospitals.48 And for those who traveled through this neighborhood 
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to visit these hospitals, either for their care or for work, this poverty signaled increased 
crime—or at least the perception of it. In the early 1950s, nurses and other women who 
staffed the hospital reported that they were afraid to walk through the parking lots before 
and after their shifts.49 Hospital administrators believed that the only way to save their 
hospitals was to drastically change their surroundings. 
 There had been a dearth of federal funding to support urban renewal for nearly 
two decades by the mid-1950s, and so cities like Detroit were ready to enact plans that 
had long existed—like the DMC—by the 1950s. The administrators of these four 
voluntary hospitals had developed the idea for a new medical center in as early as 1936, 
but a lack of secure funding meant this project was delayed until the availability of urban 
renewal funds. This plan, eventually presented to Detroit City Council in 1956 when 
health infrastructure and urban renewal funds became available, included the 
modernization of Harper, Grace, Children’s, and Hutzel, as well as the widening of city 
streets and green spaces surrounding the development.50 The DMC plan also included 
nearby residential housing units for the physicians who would seek employment at the 
new DMC.51 
City planners decided that a medical center in the core of the city would help to 
address the loss of jobs in the manufacturing industry. These federal funds allowed 
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Detroit officials to move forward on plans for a new, integrated hospital campus that 
would expand the physical space of the hospitals into the surrounding neighborhood. 
 
Changing Federal Policies 
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act, more commonly referred to as Hill-
Burton, was introduced by Congress in 1946 in response to the American Hospital 
Association finding that many rural areas in the United States lacked basic services at 
hospitals—or hospitals at all.52 This federal legislation was the first in nearly two decades 
aimed at directly improving the health infrastructure of the United States.53  
Although not official until a 1964 amendment, Hill-Burton funds began going to 
urban hospitals after its 1954 funding expansion, and it was common by the late 1950s 
such support went toward urban hospital construction.54 Between 1946 and 1964, over 
two billion dollars were allocated throughout the United States, Guam, Puerto Rico, and 
the Virgin Islands for the construction and redevelopment of general hospitals, mental 
hospitals, tuberculosis hospitals, public health centers, nursing homes, diagnostic and 
treatment centers, rehabilitation centers, and projects aimed at improving hospital 
services.55 Although it is difficult to find statistics demonstrating the exact ratio between 
urban and rural Hill-Burton construction, the focus of construction was different in each 
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locale; in rural areas, building deficiencies were in ”service departments” like pharmacies 
and laboratories, and the urban deficiencies were related to nonconformities in fire and 
safety codes.56 
The Hill-Burton legislation coincided with other urban renewal policies that were 
directed at improving urban infrastructure. This provided the landscape for the Michigan 
State Legislature and Detroit City Council to pass laws making the construction of the 
DMC a bit easier. The Federal Housing Act of 1949 was the beginning of federal 
legislation that provided financing for slum clearance and reconstruction, usually 
resulting in the development of public housing units.57 While its authors planned for this 
legislation to prioritize residential construction, these projects only accounted for about 
half of the cleared sites and  the rest of the construction happened at public facilities 
including hospitals and schools.58 The residential buildings that were razed were not 
replaced.59 By 1959, the Housing Act was amended to increase grant authorization for 
nonresidential development by ten percent, signaling a shift in the intentional focus of 
urban renewal. Policymakers’ intent was to make sure that there were colleges, hospitals, 
and businesses in a city center to support the concentrated populations, as well.60   
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Perhaps emboldened by these federal policies and the promise of funding for 
development in the state’s larger cities, the Michigan State Legislature passed a law in 
1949 in which “any city or incorporated village, having a population over 500,000” 
would be required to “establish a medical center commission and prescribe its duties, to 
acquire and dispose of real property in the medical center district, to prescribe the 
methods of finance and exercise of these powers, and to declare the effect of this act.”61 
The City of Detroit responded to this state legislation, and passed its own ordinance in 
1950 to create a Medical Center Commission to “encourage the centralization of a 
number of institutions, governmental, and non-governmental, into a Medical Center 
District.”62 While noteworthy as the first official organization to work toward the 
development of the eventual DMC, their progress was stagnant until the development of 
the Medical Center Committee five years later. 
 
The Medical Center Committee 
 In 1955, at the discretion of City Council and Mayor Albert Cobo, the director 
and two trustees from each of the four hospitals of the proposed medical center, and the 
Dean of the School of Medicine at nearby Wayne State University formed The Detroit 
Medical Center Committee [DMCC]. The DMCC took five years to organize itself while 
city officials worked to secure likely funding for this project.63 This body articulated the 
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purpose the medical center development, stating that they were determined to create a 
“great medical center” that would utilize the already-existing hospitals as a “core” to 
develop additional institutions for medical care and teaching.64  
The Detroit Medical Center plan was part of a “comprehensive plan for making 
Detroit a better place to live” and its planners worked to make sure that “every detail of 
[the] physical plan [was] evaluated on the basis of its contribution to human dignity and 
to the welfare of all” Detroit residents.65 Building an “integrated medical center” like that 
at Columbia, which shared responsibilities and services across institutions and was 
anchored by a medical school, would, the DMCC and city planners hoped, create a 
“specific and much more important…active relationship” between the hospitals within 
the medical center.66  
The DMCC believed that a redesign of these four hospitals with a formal 
relationship with Wayne State University would help to make up for the shortage of 
physicians within city limits. Physicians were already opting to have their offices outside 
of the city of Detroit as early as the 1950s, and this development would help transform 
the medical school into a “well-established and well-rounded postgraduate67 program” 
able to build new programs with hospitals that offered specialty care services.68 DMC 
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planners’ medical center models, Johns Hopkins and Columbia, both had formal 
affiliations with hospitals that offered specialty care services, and these institutions saw 
their national profile grow as these affiliations resulted in breakthrough in biomedical 
research.69 DMC planners hoped for the same. Additionally, the committee believed that 
having a program offering many options for clinical training would mean that medical 
interns and residents would stay and build their practice within the city of Detroit. 
Planners thought that the positive educational experience that these students would 
receive from Wayne State University School of Medicine at the new medical center 
development would instill loyalty, resulting in greater retention. Planners believed that 
this would be especially true with a planned move of the Medical School to the physical 
campus of the DMC, since this proximity would help to breed familiarity with the area.70 
A crucial part of the DMC plan was attracting and retaining gifted young 
physicians who would join the DMC permanently after their medical residency. Wayne 
State University School of Medicine provided the perfect affiliation. Moreover, the 
relationship was mutually beneficial; as of 1956, Wayne State only had an affiliation with 
the city’s municipal hospital, Detroit Receiving, and that only allowed for training its 
undergraduate population.71 A formal affiliation between Wayne State University School 
of Medicine and the four hospitals of the proposed DMC—Harper, Grace, Hutzel, and 
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Children’s—would serve as the “clinical base” the future of medical advanced education 
at Wayne State University.72 
 Once the plan began to take shape, the Detroit Medical Center Citizen’s 
Committee involved Gerald Crane, an architect and Detroit city planner, who performed 
a feasibility study to determine if the land surrounding the four medical center hospitals 
could be cleared.73 This was an essential part of the plan. It was the opinion of the Detroit 
City Plan Commission, the city government board tasked with approving and overseeing 
new development in the city, and other city officials that rehabilitating the area 
surrounding the hospitals was the greatest necessity of this development because it was 
                                                            
72 Detroit Medical Center Citizens’ Committee, “The Detroit Medical Center,” 1958. 
73 Crane and Gorwic Associates, Inc, “Detroit Medical Center Progress Report,” 1966. 
Figure 2: Aerial photograph showing density of land before the Detroit Medical Center development. In 
Mozena, “The Detroit Medical Center,” p. 23.  
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identified as blighted.74   
While the DMCC was the central organizing body, the Master Plan for the Detroit 
Medical Center was a “cooperative effort” between public and private groups including 
the Detroit City Plan Commission, and citizens’ groups and private consultant agencies 
like Crane and Gorwic.75 The City Plan Commission slated nearly eight thousand acres of 
“contiguous land” for redevelopment as part of this Master Plan.76 On these eight 
thousand acres surrounding the four community hospitals, the Master Plan also 
recommended the incorporation of residential services, including housing for nearly 
thirty-six hundred employees.77 This housing would be for “comfortable income 
groups,”—or those with a professional, white-collar income. In addition, they planned for 
schools, shopping centers, parks, and parking areas near the medical center 
redevelopment to service a quite different population from the one being displaced, 
which was primarily black working-class families.78  
 
The Detroit Medical Center Plan 
The chair of the Detroit City Plan Commission, Ray Eppert, presented the Detroit 
Medical Center Plan to Detroit City Council on May 23, 1956. The plan included four 
major redevelopment phases. The first called for the smaller residential blocks in the 
neighborhood surrounding the hospital to be paved into larger “superblocks” to curb 
                                                            
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Detroit Medical Center Citizens’ Committee, “The Detroit Medical Center,” 1958. 
77 Detroit Medical Center Citizens’ Committee, “A Proposal for a Detroit Medical Center,” May 23, 1956. 
75, Temporary Committee Hospital/Medical Services, 1951-1960. Detroit Urban League Collection, Bentley Library. 
78 Ibid. 
 36 
 
traffic and present more space for better utilization of land. The second phase of the plan 
called for complete separation of vehicular and pedestrian traffic, installing sidewalks, 
while also beginning work on hospital redevelopment and expansion. The third phase 
included a reorganization of the street system, including refiguring one-way streets, to 
“facilitate efficient movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic.”79 The third phase was 
the slated phase for construction on Wayne State University School of Medicine. The 
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final, and most vague phase of the project—perhaps to allow for unanticipated changes 
and additions—sought to “provide maximum freedom for the utilization and expansion of 
existing institutions.”80 Planners established that the boundaries of the proposed project 
were Woodward Avenue on the west, Hastings on the East, Mack Avenue on the South, 
and Warren to St. Antoine and Ferry to the north (see Figure 2 above).81  
The plan submitted in 1956 noted that this area of land played a “dual and 
contradictory role in the matter of [Detroit’s] health,” since the four proposed medical 
center hospitals—Children’s, Harper, Grace, and Hutzel—were sites where good medical 
care was offered, but were “hemmed in by the worst slums in Detroit.”82 This is the only 
place in the initial medical center plan that alludes to the physical health of the 
surrounding community residents or the capacity of these hospitals to provide better 
health services if their buildings were rehabilitated.  
This plan stated that the main objective for DMC development was to “try to get 
the neighborhood redeveloped in the shortest possible time,” noting that capitalizing on 
the already-existing resources in the area, like Wayne State University School of 
Medicine, would be the quickest, most efficient way to remove the “blight.”83 But the 
plan also noted a second goal: to create an “integrated medical center” to “realize the full 
potential of the excellent resources for health care and medical education that are 
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currently in existence.”84 From its inception, this plan was about urban revitalization and 
job creation rather than a health-centered project. 
The Chairman of the DMC Citizen’s Committee noted that the resources available 
at Wayne State would be wasted if the city did not prioritize this institution and allow it 
to flourish, noting: 
“The Wayne State University College of Medicine is one of the finest in the 
country…We have a cyclical pattern to consider. Education and training, 
clinical practice, education, training, over and over again. This cyclical 
process of education, training, clinical practice, as it also involves research 
and experimentation, is most productive when we have an integrated 
relationship between a medical school and teaching hospitals to carry it on. 
This is what we have in mind when we speak of developing an integrated 
medical center.”85 
 
Wayne State University School of Medicine, arguably, was always the central focus of 
this development. The hospitals of the proposed DMC served primarily as the extended 
training facilities of this school and its capacity to train future health workers.  
Because of the focus on Wayne State and the training these hospitals would 
provide, planners viewed these sites as places of eventual employment rather than sites of 
improved health care delivery for the surrounding neighborhood. Planners believed that 
modernized physical structures and a transformed surrounding community would result 
in not only greater interest in health workers coming to learn and work at the DMC but 
their staying throughout their careers. Planners noted that currently, “desirable categories 
of employees” move away or reject employment offers “because of the slums which 
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surround [these hospitals].”86 It is important to note that planners did not speak of 
desirable individual employees rejecting these offers, only “desirable categories” of 
employees. While not explicitly stated in these planning documents, we should recognize 
this language as a racial dog-whistle, with planners growing increasingly fearful that 
white physicians would no longer want to work in poor, black communities.87  
To clear out further “slums” in the area and ensure the neighborhood’s total 
transformation, the plan also included single family homes and apartments for up to 
3,600 future “employees of the four hospitals and their families.”88 Ultimately, the 
planners emphasized the necessity of this development, arguing that “adequate medical 
teaching, research, and practice is vital to the economic health of our community,” 
although there was little concern for how this development would also help (or hurt) the 
physical health of the residents living in the surrounding community.89 The planners’ 
belief that “slum” clearance would improve the economic health of the community and 
city at large was not supported by any statistics or economic information.90 
The City Council unanimously approved this plan. Planners hoped it would 
“provide a unique clustering of medical and related facilities [that could only] be brought 
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to fruition because of a fortunate set of circumstances and conditions,” according to  
Harry J. Durbin, Director and Secretary of the Detroit Housing Commission.91 
“Foremost…[is] the availability of federal funds through passage of urban renewal 
legislation [like the FHA], and the passage of state enabling laws [such as the state 
legislation in 1949 supporting medical centers], and the enlightened attitude of a local 
administration—the members of which are eager to serve our citizens.”92 
 
Wayne State University School of Medicine at the Detroit Medical Center 
Perhaps the most central institution in the proposed medical center plan was 
Wayne State University School of Medicine. Without it, the crux of the economic 
motivation for this plan—the training of future physicians—ceased to exist. Wayne State 
University is in the heart of Detroit and has long placed medical education at the center of 
its mission. In 1868, Civil War veterans founded the Detroit Medical College—the 
antecedent of what would become Wayne University in 1933.93 In 1956, this institution 
evolved to Wayne State University through a charter passed by the Michigan legislature, 
calling for a university to be in the “industrial area of southeastern Michigan.”94  
Phase I of the DMC Master Plan reserved twenty acres for the relocation of 
Wayne State University School of Medicine to the medical center campus. The relocation 
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would increase the size of the campus in anticipation of increased enrollment: from 
twenty thousand in 1956 to forty thousand in 1975 at the entire university, and nearly 
four hundred medical students for this new development to become the largest single-
campus medical school in the nation, through the use of urban renewal and Hill-Burton 
funding.95  
In a letter expressing his support, Dean of the College of Medicine, Gordon H. 
Scott wrote to supplement the 1956 plan:  
“In the past two years, we have made every effort to aid in the formulation 
of these plans and to help in their activation. It is our deep concern that these 
hospitals not only continue their high standards, but that they expand their 
efforts in new directions so that, with the cooperation of the College of 
Medicine, their facilities may become the proving ground for even finer 
teaching, research, and service.”96  
 
It is significant that like the planners, Dean Scott was most concerned about further 
developing this site for medical training as a vehicle for biomedical jobs, not necessarily 
for better patient access. 
President of the University, Clarence B. Hilberry, understood the reciprocity of 
this arrangement, and saw the implications for the future of both the university and the 
city. He noted that the value of a world class medical center offering top rate medical 
education in the city of Detroit would bring taxpayers “millions of dollars.”97 That said, 
Wayne State thought that no such agreement for teaching and residency could be made 
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without “many changes” in both the “physical plants and in the area surrounding them,” 
including new teaching auditoriums and laboratories in these hospitals, and removing the 
“blight surrounding the hospitals.”98 “Until these changes are made,” President Hilberry 
wrote, “the community as a whole is prevented from realizing the most efficient use of its 
available medical teaching personnel and of its outstanding clinical facilities.”99 
Throughout these discussions, city planners and officials were most interested in 
the development of the DMC because of its potential to create future jobs for white-
collar, educated workers in Detroit through its partnership with Wayne State School of 
Medicine. Improved health care delivery would be a welcome byproduct, but was never 
an explicit aim, or one that planners and officials seemed enthusiastic about addressing. 
To achieve their goals of the DMC development, the city planned on razing densely 
populated black neighborhoods displacing many black residents and black businesses, 
much to the dismay of activist groups. 
The DMC development was part of a larger urban renewal strategy in the city of 
Detroit called “The Detroit Plan,” which joined the three largest projects in the city—the 
Gratiot Area Redevelopment Project, the development of the Brewster and Douglass 
housing projects, and the DMC development—and all resulted in the destruction of the 
most solidly black neighborhoods in the city of Detroit.100 Urban renewal previous to the 
Detroit Plan, like the construction of highways through other Detroit neighborhoods that 
were mostly populated with black residents, like Black Bottom and Paradise Valley, 
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displaced black residents without assistance when they had difficulty finding new 
housing due to redlining and other legal acts of housing segregation.101 These events also 
contributed to the increasing density of housing in poor areas of the city. Mayor Albert 
Cobo, a staunch supporter of the urban renewal projects in the city called this residential 
displacement an “inconvenience” that was simply “the price of progress,” even when 
these residents were only given thirty days’ notice to vacate.102 As more black residents 
moved into public housing, which was built using urban renewal funds, as a result of 
displacement from other urban renewal projects, activists started stating that “slum 
removal equals Negro removal.”103 When the DMC development plan began to gain 
traction, activists representing Detroit’s black community realized they needed to 
mobilize to create more equitable development. 
 
Involvement of the Detroit Urban League 
The neighborhoods that Detroit planners identified as “blighted” were inhabited 
by black Detroiters, meaning that the results of this development would 
disproportionately affect Detroit’s black communities. The Detroit Urban League, a black 
activist organization that worked to provide residents with equal opportunities at 
economic prosperity, noted that the changing demographics were obvious to those living 
in the city, writing that: 
“Oakland and Macomb Counties have more than doubled their increase in 
white population since 1950. Conversely, marked gains in Negro population 
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increases, appear to be occurring most strikingly in Detroit proper. This 
seems to reflect the general opinion that Detroit City is increasingly 
becoming more heavily populated with Negro people and the surrounding 
communities are becoming more thickly populated with white persons.”104  
 
The Detroit Urban League was interested in improving the lives of black residents who 
were affected by these demographic changes, including mobilizing around unequal 
employment opportunities as job competition increased through these demographic 
changes.105 The Detroit Urban League viewed equal access to employment as the most 
effective way to improve the economic standing of black residents. To act on its mission, 
the Detroit Urban League closely monitored urban renewal developments that displaced 
black businesses, including the DMC development. 
 
Detroit’s Blight  
 The language of “blight” became a self-fulfilling prophesy. Housing 
discrimination in Detroit in the 1930s and 1940s forced Detroit’s black residents—
already relegated to the city’s lowest paying, most insecure jobs—to live in the city’s 
oldest housing stock, which needed constant repairs and maintenance for standard 
livability. Already paying a greater percentage of their income for housing than their 
white counterparts, banks would not loan black residents the funds for home 
improvement to improve these properties.106 Thus, the already-deteriorating housing in 
these neighborhoods continued to decline, with some of these properties eventually 
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becoming condemned, resulting in greater “blight.” As these neighborhoods declined, the 
inaction of homeowners to improve their properties contributed to continued housing 
discrimination, providing evidence for white homeowners that black residents were 
irresponsible, and the continued deterioration of black neighborhoods demonstrated to 
banks that these neighborhoods were a credit risk.107 The continued disinvestment in the 
neighborhoods that were most densely populated with black residents caused the “blight” 
that urban renewal in the 1950s, like the DMC development, sought to correct. 
The Detroit Urban League noted that initial plan presented to City Council in the 
Spring of 1956 lacked any sort of clear detail, including a work plan, time frame, or plan 
for financing.108 This concerned the Urban League since previous urban renewal projects 
had not clearly communicated to residents about the timeline of their displacement, and 
this organization feared the lack of details in the early stages of planning would result in 
more short-notice removals of black residents.109 The only certainty this development 
plan offered, seemingly, was an assurance that the city would raze black 
neighborhoods.110 The Detroit Urban League petitioned the city requesting to learn if 
displaced groups would be allowed to return post-construction, but also began to raise 
questions about the particular meaning of this development for the very community it 
sought to displace. The Detroit Urban League also became interested in learning more 
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about how this plan would improve opportunities for black residents. Noting that 
“inasmuch as the acquisition of land will be based on the theory that the development of 
the project is ‘in the interest of the public welfare,’” the organization sought to 
understand how the development would have on the “presently racially restricted policies 
and services of the hospitals in the area.”111 
 
Legal Discrimination112 
A major factor that resulted in the declining support of Detroit’s black community 
for the DMC development was the known segregation that occurred at the four hospitals 
of the future medical center. Alleged discrimination in training facilities pointed out the 
lack of residency opportunities and restrictions on the number of internships available to 
black physicians. While there appear to be no metrics as of the mid-1950s about the racial 
demographics of residencies and internships, the Detroit Urban League had begun 
collecting anecdotes from trainees who had been denied opportunities at hospitals outside 
of the black hospital system in Detroit.113 This was the same for restrictions on the 
number of the staff privileges of black physicians and the denial of employment 
opportunities of qualified black workers to fill the many and varied positions found in 
general hospitals.114 By the administrators of the larger, more mainstream hospitals 
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excluding black trainees and employees, instead relegating them to continue their work at 
Detroit’s large system of “black hospitals,”115 hospital leaders contributed to not only a 
segregated, two-tiered system of health care, but also a segregated, two-tiered system of 
health care employment. These hospitals had fewer resources, and therefore offered 
lower salaries for their employees.116  
Despite the plethora of anecdotal evidence, the only claim of discrimination the 
Detroit Urban League could substantiate with corresponding data was that these four 
voluntary hospitals that would become the DMC had an absence of black members on 
administrative committees.117 The lack of black representation on these decision-making 
boards continued a culture of segregation at these hospitals because neither employment 
nor care of black residents was a priority. 
This was a particularly egregious offense, as Hill-Burton legislation had been 
intended to improve conditions in segregated hospitals. As condition of receiving these 
funds, hospitals needed to provide equal treatment to their patients, even if wards 
remained separate. The non-discrimination clauses of Hill Burton included prohibiting 
patient admissions to “that portion of the facility for which federal funds were sought,” 
and no patient could “be denied a service essential to his medical care.”118 But this clause 
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still allowed for active discrimination in areas of the hospital not receiving Hill-Burton 
funding. Urban hospitals mostly received funds for repairs and additions, meaning entire 
wards could exist without the receipt of any federal funding, still allowing segregation.119 
While it appeared that the intent to minimize discrimination was built into the legislation, 
historians have identified that “separate but equal,” which was still enshrined in Hill-
Burton until 1963, was a way to perpetuate legal discrimination at hospitals through the 
allowance of continued segregation.120 Historian Beatrix Hoffman has demonstrated that 
the allowance of “separate but equal” institutions actually contributed to expanded 
segregation in the American South.121 So long as there were alternative care facilities for 
black patients within the “territorial area” of the Hill-Burton applicant, there was no need 
to provide integrated health care, thus providing the federal sanctioning of Jim Crow.122 
This legislation also allowed the discrimination in hiring at these hospitals under the 
same principles of its enshrinement of Jim Crow health care for patients, stating 
“professionally qualified persons could be denied staff privileges on account of race, 
creed, or color.”123  
Discrimination at Hill-Burton hospitals was deemed unacceptable with the Fourth 
Circuit ruling in Simkins v. Cone (1953).124 In this case, black health care professionals 
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and providers faced alleged discrimination at hospitals in Greensboro, North Carolina.125 
The black plaintiffs had asked the Court recognize and enforce the following acts as 
unconstitutional under the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: 1) to 
order that hospitals cease denying black physicians staff facilities based on race, 2) to 
restrain hospitals from denying and “abridging” admission of patients based on race, 3) to 
stop hospitals from denying patients get treated by their home physicians and dentists 
based on race, and 4) to end the “separate but equal” provision of the Hill-Burton Act.126 
The Fourth Circuit Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and, when the Supreme Court of 
the United States refused to hear the case, this ruling was upheld.127 This resulted in The 
Surgeon General publishing a new regulation in the Hill-Burton legislation in 1964, 
stating:  
“Before a construction application is recommended by a State agency for 
approval, the State agency shall obtain assurance from the applicant that all 
portions and services of the entire facility for the construction of which, or 
in connection with which, aid under the discrimination on account of race, 
creed, or color; and that no professionally qualified person will be 
discriminated against on account of race, creed, or color with respect to the 
privilege of professional practice in the facility.”128 
 
This regulation meant that no additional “separate but equal” projects could be approved 
after March 1964, and projects that had been previously approved as such and were in 
progress needed to remedy to become nondiscriminatory institutions.129 This ruling was 
supported through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which made discrimination 
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on the basis of race illegal for any program that received federal assistance.130 Medicare 
mandated compliance with this title after its implementation in July 1965.131 
Desegregation would happen across the country either voluntarily by the hospital, 
through state ordinance, court action, subsequent approval of applications of Hill-Burton, 
or through the application of Medicare reimbursements.132  
 
Detroit Urban League Activism 
While federal policies would help to make discrimination at hospitals receiving 
federal money illegal in 1964, when the DMC plan was put forth in 1956, the Detroit 
Urban League realized the only way to stop discrimination at these hospitals was to take 
matters into their own hands. Members of the black community had long complained of 
discrimination at these hospitals when they sought to receive treatment.133 In addition, 
members of the Detroit Urban League criticized the hospitals of the proposed DMC for 
using discriminatory hiring practices—a crucial criticism due to both the development’s 
focus on employment opportunities and the mission of equal opportunity of the Urban 
League itself.134 
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The Detroit Urban League operated under the auspices of The National Urban 
League. Regarding health care and black Americans, the National Urban League 
designated four action areas: 1) the elimination of racial segregation and discrimination, 
2) the development of citizen leadership for the health field, 3) a solid demonstration in 
maternal and child health services, and 4) health career recruitment and training.135 
Additionally, the National Urban League believed that it was its own responsibility to 
find  “strong, well-informed leadership within the Negro community” to develop.136 At 
the local level, they believed that good leadership could enforce national priorities by 
helping to: 
“…mobilize the community and professional teamwork required; first, to 
rectify smoldering civil rights injustices in medical institutions and health 
agencies; second, to assure the best utilization of available manpower and 
facilities; and third, to plan comprehensive high-quality health services for 
all people regardless of color or income.”137  
 
And so, taking the lead from their national chapter, local leaders in the Detroit 
Urban League first organized to provide comment to Detroit’s City Council about how 
they feared many of the aspects of the proposed DMC plan would negatively impact the 
lives of black Detroiters, including relocation of housing, the reinforcement of the dual-
system of care in the city due to the continued segregation of care, and the lack of 
employment opportunities for black Detroit residents.  
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The Detroit Urban League agreed with the ultimate goals of the development; 
however, they wanted to ensure that black Detroiters could also share in the positive 
gains brought by a new medical center. In a report that the Urban League presented to 
Detroit City Council in 1956, they wrote:  
“In view of the expanded medical and hospital service that this Proposal 
would offer the residents of the city, in view of the potential expansion in 
medical and nursing training opportunities that may develop and in view of 
the communal benefits that may derive from the eradication of some slum 
conditions and the attending deteriorating factors which contribute to 
neighborhood decay, the Urban League herewith affirms its endorsement of 
these socially desirable goals inherent in the proposed medical plan. The 
creation of a medical oasis in a health deteriorating neighborhood, 
characterized by conditions that create and ever-increasing demand for 
more and better health facilities, would be an accomplishment for our city 
in which the League would like to share.”138   
 
The Detroit Urban League noted that they would support any work that could help 
alleviate the social plight of Detroit’s black residents, including better access to health 
care. They again echoed the National Urban League in this sentiment, stating that: 
“no community or region has a working plan that assures the best use of 
what is available. Such a plan would identify and fill gaps, eliminate 
duplication, promote excellence of performance, and make it possible for 
each individual to have a personal doctor and a comprehensive range of 
health services. These services should have continuity, emphasize 
preventative and prompt care, be family centered, and respect the dignity of 
the individual as much as the science underlying modern medicine.”139 
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While the Detroit Urban League was clear that they supported this development in 
theory, they expressed concerns in three main areas: segregation of health care services at 
the hospitals of the DMC, a lack of a democratic relocation process for the displaced 
families during the DMC’s construction, and discriminatory hiring practices at the 
hospitals of the DMC for Detroit’s black residents. 
Initially, it was an exciting prospect for the Detroit Urban League that this 
development could contribute to the improved health status of the residents they 
represented. In Detroit in 1950, black residents died five years earlier on average than 
their white counterparts.140 The Detroit Urban League suggested that hospital 
discrimination was a contributing factor to this, citing an adherence to racialized intake 
quotas, segregation of patients in their ward and room assignments, and denial of black 
patients at obstetrical wards forcing laboring mothers to deliver in the emergency room at 
the city’s municipal hospital, Detroit Receiving.141 The Detroit Urban League petitioned 
City Council in hopes of getting their elected officials to understand the serious problems 
that this segregation did to the health status of black residents. Detroit Urban League 
leaders also hoped that their testimonial would encourage City Council to realize the 
importance of ending this segregation now that this project was receiving federal dollars, 
stating: “tax dollars bear no racial identification.”142 The Detroit Urban League leaders 
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continued, arguing that they “fail[ed] to comprehend any reasonable grounds for limiting, 
by race, the services which they have created. To impose such limitations might 
precipitate grave legal, as well as moral, implications.”143 
In addition to discrimination that black Detroiters experienced at the four 
hospitals of the DMC when they sought health care services, the Detroit Urban League 
challenged City Council to realize the difficulty that would be experienced by the twelve-
thousand families that this construction would displace.144 This development required 
that surrounding commercial buildings were razed, also, meaning that two-hundred 
black-owned businesses would be displaced without any financial support from the 
city.145 Knowing the outcome of previous urban renewal projects, the Detroit Urban 
League noted to City Council that there would not be enough public housing to 
accommodate all those displaced by this construction, and the planned replacement 
residential housing “suggest[ed] preferential controls favoring white professionals, and 
economic restrictions designed to exclude Negro families from residing in this area.”146 
The Detroit Urban League also noted the lack of medical residencies, restrictions 
on internships, restrictions on staff appointments, the lack of black nursing supervisors, 
and the lack of black individuals in leadership or administrative positions at the four 
hospitals of the DMC as evidence of the exclusionary efforts of black Detroiters to share 
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in the economic potential of this development.147 The Detroit Urban League believed that 
the needs of Detroit’s black community, like equal access to the jobs new developments 
offered, would be exacerbated by its construction—not helped. Ultimately, the Detroit 
Urban League could not support what they called a “Pyrrhic victory gained at the expense 
of family disorganization and human deprivation.”148 However, the Detroit Urban League 
did state that if their concerns were assuaged by the hospitals of the proposed DMC 
ending discriminatory practices in hiring and treatment and ensured democratic relocation 
for the area’s black residents and businesses.149 
While the Detroit Urban League was initially dedicated to addressing their 
concerns over the lack of equal health provision and housing displacement as a result of 
the medical center development, their focus would shift primarily to the training and 
employment opportunities afforded at the institutions of this development. This may be 
both due to the centrality of equal employment opportunity to the Urban League’s core 
mission, and potentially because this seemed to be the focus of the city’s 
acknowledgement of the Detroit Urban League’s grievances. While the explicit 
motivations for this change no longer exist in the archives, the actions of the Detroit 
Urban League through the early 1960s demonstrate that their focus was to work toward 
equality in training and employment at the DMC; in that process, they no longer 
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emphasized displaced black residents and health service accessibility for indigent 
patients. 
 
Employment Discrimination Studies 
In May 1956, Detroit City Council approved the DMC plan. After this approval, 
the Detroit Urban League continued to testify before and appeal to Detroit City Council 
to create a more equitable development before planners began construction. But 
ultimately, planners were more concerned with moving forward to secure this project’s 
funding rather than ensure its equitable opportunities. By 1957, the city had secured 
enough funding from federal urban renewal policies and Hill-Burton to move forward 
with the project. City planners, however, had made no progress on addressing the issues 
raised by the Detroit Urban League only a year before.  
Later in 1957, representatives from the Detroit Urban League appeared before 
City Council to again deliver the message that they could never support a plan for this 
sort of development at segregated hospitals, and to remind City Council that soliciting 
public funds should mean greater responsibility to provide equal treatment at these 
hospitals.150 When it appeared to Detroit Urban League leaders that City Council would 
again be unable to provide the outcomes they desired, they turned to the tactics of the 
National Urban League. 
The National Urban League saw the role for its local chapters as groups that 
would “gather evidence of continued discriminatory practices as an aid to Federal 
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enforcement activities.”151 Thus, leaders of the Detroit Urban League understood that 
data gathering would be the most helpful way to support the National Urban League’s 
mission to improve the economic security and job prospects of black residents. As a 
potential solution to the concerns that the Detroit Urban League expressed about the 
DMC development, the Medical-Hospital Committee of the Detroit Urban League 
submitted a program to its Board of Directors, suggesting that they form a committee to 
host a conference with community leaders and conduct a study on opportunities for black 
medical professionals at the DMC hospitals.152  
This study committee, with members of the Detroit Urban League’s Medical-
Hospital Committee and led by Dr. Thomas Batchelor—the first black physician 
employed at Detroit’s municipal hospital (or any hospital in the city that was not a 
traditionally segregated hospital)—would submit a survey to all of the hospitals of the 
proposed DMC and ask its administrators about their hiring practices and opportunities 
for black professionals like physicians, nurses, and medical technicians.153 This study 
committee would then report regularly back to the Detroit Urban League’s Executive 
Board who would then, in theory, make further evaluations and provide any necessary 
guidance to City Council for ending discrimination in the DMC hospitals. The Detroit 
Urban League also simultaneously planned how to enforce the recommendations to City 
Council that would come from the study findings. While planning the study, they also 
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met with the Michigan Hospital Services—the precursor to Blue Cross—to encourage 
representatives to not reimburse services at hospitals that discriminated against patients 
or black physicians; the payors were not responsive to this request.154 This response was 
in line with the attitude of other private health insurers at the time, whose welfare 
capitalist policies, in the end, still prioritized capitalism.155 
Perhaps understanding the seriousness with which the Detroit Urban League 
petitioned City Council, the city of Detroit began to organize its own study related to the 
employment opportunities for and current status of black workers in the four hospitals of 
the DMC. Leading this charge was the city’s newly formed Hospital and Medical Study 
Committee, an organization of hospital representatives organized by the Medical Center 
Citizens’ Committee and the Commission on Community Relations. The Hospital and 
Medical Study Committee was the precursor to the city body tasked with overseeing 
equal opportunity for city employees. This Advisory Committee entered a joint statement 
to City Council on March 27, 1957, which stated that their general purpose was:  
“to advise and assist the Commission on Community Relations on the 
elimination of racial factors and discriminatory practices in medical, 
college-nursing, and hospital nursing school training; in nursing and 
medical staff appointments, and in-patient admission and bed assignments 
in Detroit area schools and hospitals as reviewed by the Hospital and 
Medical Study Committee.”156 
 
Despite being the likely source of motivation for this survey, the Detroit Urban League 
was not tapped for guidance after their initial opposition to the DMC plan. 
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The Committee on Community Relations began the study of area hospitals in 
1958.157 For reasons that are unclear—perhaps because this body did not contain a 
statistical expert or because it was hastily assembled—this study did not contain 
quantitative data. It relied on the perspectives of the hospital directors and trustees, who 
produced information that downplayed the accusations of discrimination. In fact, the only 
data in this study was interviews with the members of the Board of Directors and 
Hospital Trustees at each of the four proposed medical center hospitals.158 Hospital 
representatives submitted their own data to this committee—usually a letter from its 
president or lead administrator summarizing the environment of the hospital. If study 
personnel determined that a “discriminatory policy or practice” existed in “any phase of a 
hospital’s operation,” the committee sought out members of that particular hospital to 
“clarify the problem with the Board of Trustees and seek those actions that would, in fact, 
demonstrate compliance.”159 Additionally, relying only senior members of the hospitals 
themselves to report on the status of discrimination at their institutions when they were 
reinforcing discriminatory practices—perhaps sometimes unknowingly—all but ensured 
an ineffective basis to address fundamental problems. 
The hospital administrators all reported how these hospitals did not practice 
discrimination in hiring and promotion. Many of their statements included statements we 
now recognize as problematic, like: “I’m not prejudiced. Some of my best friends are 
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Negro physicians.”160 Representatives from the Detroit Urban League were present at the 
City Council meeting where the Committee on Community Relations revealed their 
findings, where they heard what they believed were inaccurate overestimations at best of 
the number of black physicians and nurses at the four hospitals.161 But there is no 
evidence that city study representatives interviewed these black health professionals for 
their own perspectives. Leaders from the proposed DMC hospitals reported that they had 
“at least one or two” physicians and believed this to be “enough” since “the intern 
matching system assure[d] equal opportunity for all applicants.”162 Hospital 
representatives in their study materials stated that the low number of black physicians 
was indicative of lower desire for these positions and not because of any systemic 
discrimination.163 This was consistent with arguments put forth at the time justifying 
discrimination on the lack of willingness or interest on the part of black folks; those in 
power saw no barriers or fault with their own actions, and the lack of non-white 
representation was blamed on a lack of interest or incompetence. Therefore, City Council 
determined the claims of Detroit’s black community and various committees put forth by 
The Urban League were unfounded.164  
Perhaps in a peace offering to appease the Detroit Urban League and stop their 
petitions, the four hospitals of the Detroit Medical Center signed non-discrimination 
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agreements in January 1960, but the Detroit Urban League alleged that this 
discrimination continued because these policies were not enforced.165 
 
Continued Discrimination 
As discussed earlier, ending discrimination against black hospital employees was 
a priority of the National Urban League, since their mission was to improve economic 
prosperity for black individuals nationwide. Black activists in this group were hopeful 
that the growing Civil Rights Movement in the early 1960s would make their attempts at 
more inclusive health care and medical training more effective. Simultaneously, the 
Detroit Urban League continued to work for the city’s changing attitudes about this 
development so that a more inclusive medical center would appear. The National Urban 
League, and as a result its local chapters, saw their role in working for equal rights not as 
disrupters or enforcers, but instead to “alert the administrators of the existing inequities 
and their resultant community unrest” in hopes that this work would “initiate orderly, 
democratic changes.”166 Other activist groups were more militant, but the National Urban 
League was a more middle-class organization that saw its greatest chance for success 
through the court system and with direct government advocacy. 
Dissatisfied with the study results that came from the 1958 city-sponsored survey 
and seeing that the non-discrimination agreements at the hospitals of the proposed DMC 
were not resulting in any meaningful change, the Detroit Urban League again sought to 
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begin its own survey later that year. Led now by its Community Services Department167 
and run by volunteers who did not charge for their work, the Detroit Urban League 
surveyed Detroit’s eleven largest voluntary hospitals in Metro Detroit, including the four 
hospitals of the proposed DMC. More hospitals than just these four were surveyed to 
investigate if this was a city-wide problem and to provide a benchmark.168  
Lead researcher Dr. Thomas Batchelor—now the head of the Detroit Urban 
League’s Medical-Hospital Study Committee—ran this study from April through 
December of 1962. The Detroit Urban League’s study asked hospital administrators, 
physicians, and nurses about the discrimination at their own hospitals, but rather than 
request a letter from study participants about their perception of their hospital’s 
discrimination, Dr. Batchelor prepared a standard survey and asked hospital 
administrators to address these questions in person.169  
Batchelor was also adamant that this study should secure quantitative data in 
order to measure the degree of discrimination. In 1962, the black population of Detroit 
had grown to twenty-nine percent, but the Detroit Urban League alleged that this this was 
not nearly the percentage of the city’s black physicians, nurses, or other support staff at 
these hospitals, which they believed should be representative of the population of the 
city.170 By quantifying the number of black workers at each hospital, the Detroit Urban 
League hoped their data would provide a better illustration of the level of discrimination 
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at Detroit hospitals. The Urban League also hoped for conversation with the hospital 
administrators after the survey, since “through the exchange of ideas” they could 
“accelerate positive action.”171 
The results of this survey showed that not only were there few opportunities for 
black employees at these hospitals, but those that found jobs lacked support services or 
the necessary advanced training that would help them succeed.172 The survey found that 
there were only minor changes made at the DMC hospitals from 1948 through 1962, 
leaving the Detroit Urban League still dissatisfied with the current employment 
structure.173 The Detroit Urban League also warned that unless “hospital administrators 
decide to initiate abatement of inequities, people outside the hospitals…will actively and 
emotionally seek such changes”—a statement that is cryptic in hindsight because of the 
violence that happened in Detroit during July 1967.174  
The degree of discrimination varied between each hospital for each position. For 
example, Children’s Hospital had two-hundred-seventy staff physicians, none of whom 
were black. But nearly eight percent of its medical residents identified as black—by far 
the highest of these four medical center hospitals.175 On the other hand, Harper was the 
hospital that was the most integrated for registered nurses—21.5 percent of their one-
hundred-fifty-two registered nurses identified as black, and the most beds—26.5 
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percent—designated beds for black patients.176 Additionally, the head dietician at Harper 
Hospital was black.177 The Detroit Urban League admitted this was impressive progress, 
considering that until about 1957, there was an “unwritten policy” that “Negroes would 
not be admitted to the different schools” for nursing and residency at Harper.178 
 However, the Detroit Urban League recognized that there were opportunities for 
improvement at these hospitals. The Detroit Urban League made nine recommendations 
from this study upon its completion in 1962 that they shared with Detroit City Council to 
inform the medical center development. These recommendations included: 
1. Place qualified black applicants on the boards of directors at the four 
medical center hospitals. Certainly, qualified applicants can be found 
from a city of 500,000 black residents that currently was home to only 
180 black physicians. 
2. Patient admissions should be made solely on need, not color of patient. 
3. Qualified black physicians should be given internships and residencies 
whenever possible. 
4. Black physicians should be given full staff and surgical privileges. 
5. Promotions should be granted based on ability and not color. 
6. Every hospital facility should be integrated, including beds in all 
wards. 
7. These study findings should be made available to the public through 
the Detroit Commission on Community Relations Advisory 
Committee. 
8. Black physicians should be able to utilize community resources. 
9. With the initial groundwork being completed, the individual hospitals 
needed to continue to take regular surveys to keep track of their 
nondiscrimination policies.179 
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While there are recommendations regarding segregation against patients, most of these 
recommendations are on the employment, admission, and promotion of black residents 
rather than on patient access. 
After the survey and these recommendations were released to the four DMC 
hospitals, Hutzel Hospital—one of the worst offenders of discriminatory practices 
according to the Detroit Urban League’s data—wrote to “correct” the findings. While the 
survey showed that there were no internships available for black physicians from 1957 to 
1962, Hutzel Hospital Administrator Catherine M. Maloy wrote to say that during that 
time, they did train one black doctor, Solomon Payne, as an intern during the 1959-1960 
academic year, noting that this was “enough.”180 In the margins of the study data, a 
researcher wrote that Maloy did not disclose the intern in earlier conversations, and that 
she had been “quite reluctant to give information to staff.”181 
In the Detroit Urban League’s study, not a single hospital administrator admitted 
to discrimination based on race.182 Regarding patient segregation, one hospital 
administrator suggested that patients are placed in racially similar wards because 
“happiness was essential to their recovery,” and being placed with others who identified 
as their own race would result in this happiness.183 Perhaps one of the most egregious 
examples of racial discrimination in the hiring process was Grace Hospital refusing to fill 
a residency vacancy despite the application of two qualified black physicians.184  
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After the Detroit Urban League submitted the study to the City Council, black 
individuals—both patients and hospital employees—reported to the Detroit Urban 
League that there was further discrimination at hospitals around the city that this study 
did not capture, including an adherence to a quota system in intake, segregation of 
patients in ward and room assignments, fixed maximum of private or semi-private rooms 
for black patients, limitations in facilities for obstetrical care and treatment for black 
patients, restrictions on use of facilities for special surgeries and therapies—like iron 
lung, physical therapy, oxygen, etc.—and restricted board membership.185 There was also 
reported alleged discrimination in training facilities that confirmed the Detroit Urban 
League’s data, like a lack of medical residency opportunities, restrictions on the number 
of internships available to black physicians, and restrictions on the number of the staff 
privileges, absence of black members on administrative committees, and denial of 
employment opportunities of qualified black applicants to fill the many and varied 
positions found in general hospitals.186 The Detroit Urban League did not officially 
validate these through an additional formal survey. 
 City Council was sent the results of this study, but no one from the Detroit Urban 
League ever got on the agenda to publicly present the data to the Council.187 Instead, City 
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Council continued to work specifically with city-sponsored study data through 
communication with hospital administrators and trustees.188 
 
The City’s Response 
The Community Coordinating Council of Metropolitan Detroit was a commission 
started in 1957 to address race relations in Detroit. It was headed by a white Episcopal 
Reverend, Richard S. M. Emrich who hoped that “Detroit may become the first major 
city in the nation to fully reflect nondiscrimination in the health, hospital, and medical 
services available to all its citizens.”189 The Community Coordinating Council of 
Metropolitan Detroit drafted an Ordinance on Hospital Discrimination that was 
eventually signed in 1963 by the Detroit City Council.190 Responding to continued 
pressure from the Detroit Urban League, the city recognized this ordinance in August 
1963, which read that: 
“No hospital, nor any person acting as super or manager, or who is 
otherwise in charge or control of such hospital, nor any person connected 
with or rendering service in any hospital in any capacity whatsoever, nor 
any agent or employee thereof shall deny to any person admission for care 
or treatment, equality of care of treatment in a hospital, or the use of any of 
the hospital facilities and services relating to care or treatment of such 
person, including placement in hospital rooms, on account of race, color, 
creed, nation of origin or ancestry, provided that a member of the medical 
staff of said hospital or an authorized physician designated to act for him 
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may examine such person and determine the need of such person for 
medical care or treatment.”191 
 
This ordinance was very responsive to discrimination of patients, but not to the 
discrimination that most bothered the Urban League—discrimination against black 
workers looking for employment opportunities at the four hospitals of the Detroit 
Medical Center, the ultimate concern for the Detroit Urban League. As construction 
continued, the Detroit Urban League continued to work for equal employment 
opportunities for Detroit residents at the four hospitals of the DMC. 
   
Conclusion 
 
 In the same year of the Detroit Urban League’s study in 1962, Detroit elected a 
new mayor—Jerome P. Cavanagh. The case of the DMC provides a lens for the way that 
black residents interacted with city government when they were upset over the lack of 
equal opportunities in employment and health care in the late 1950s and 1960s. Cavanagh 
capitalized on this, running against incumbent mayor Louis Mirani in 1961, and won an 
upset mayoral election by criticizing the way that the city government treated its growing 
black population.192 For a while, at least, Cavanagh kept his campaign promises to 
prioritize Detroit’s black communities. 
One of the biggest issues facing the city was the DMC development. Cavanagh 
familiarized himself with the controversy surrounding this development and appeared to 
side with the Detroit Urban League. Stating that a medical center could only exist if it 
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was “free of the blight and cancer of discrimination against persons because of his or her 
race, religion, or national origin,”193 the city partnered with the Urban League in late 
1963 to create a new acceptance system for medical residencies, ensuring that an 
applicant would not be excluded based simply on his or her race.194 This partnership did 
not, however, include a provision to ensure that the August 1963 ordinance that promised 
non-discrimination extended to hospital patients.195 
Detroit has a long history with labor—most visibly associated with the auto 
industry, of course. But some may find it difficult to find a city more closely associated 
with work than Detroit. Perhaps this is why once the auto industry began declining 
shortly after such an intense period of prosperity, planners looked toward alternative 
sources for a new industry that could power the city. Working with the resources already 
in place—four hospitals that provided much of the state its medical care and a growing 
medical school—city planners in the 1950s and 1960s believed that a new medical center 
could provide Detroit these opportunities for work and employment that had long brought 
people to this city. This focus on employment by the initial planners, as well as the focus 
on equal employment opportunity on behalf of its national organization, explains why the 
Detroit Urban League focused most of its advocacy on the employment capabilities of 
this institution rather than its health provision. 
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Within the context of the mid-twentieth century, this makes perfect sense. Several 
other Rust Belt cities—including Cleveland and Pittsburgh—were able to use federal 
urban renewal funding to transform their local economies into medical destinations.196 
And for the Detroit Urban League, the importance of regular employment paired with the 
cultural and social benefits afforded by white-collar work and educational opportunities 
cannot be understated. 
However, historians must closely examine the origins of these developments—
both the initial plans and the response from the activist communities most affected by the 
projects—to investigate the full implications of urban renewal. In the case of the DMC 
development, the focus on employment rather than health provision reveals the role that 
planners felt urban hospitals played during the period of urban renewal in manufacturing 
cities. Additionally, it demonstrates that even activists who represented black residents 
were willing to compromise for their vision of a future city that left behind indigent 
patients.  
The outcomes of this development and its focus on employment meant that black 
indigent patients continued to be excluded from the care offered at the DMC. This 
resulted in greater struggles and more work for Detroit’s municipal hospital, Detroit 
Receiving. The next chapter explores how a continued focus on the DMC resulted in 
further separation from Detroit Receiving because of the negative connotations 
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surrounding the patients that hospital treated, and its incongruity with the Detroit 
planners’ vision for the new DMC.
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Chapter 2 
“You Cannot Wish Away a Patient Population”: The Detroit Medical Center’s 
Contributions to the Continued Struggles of Detroit Receiving Hospital 
 
While public funds were directed toward the construction of the new Detroit 
Medical Center [DMC], the city of Detroit long had a public hospital facility: Detroit 
Receiving Hospital. Historians have shown that urban public hospitals were the de facto 
site of all medical care for the poor, non-white, and indigent, resulting in the issues 
typical at this sort of institution: overcrowding, noncompliance with safety regulations, 
and a stigma against this site as a hospital only for poor patients.197 These same problems 
plagued Detroit Receiving. For this hospital, these challenges grew in tandem with 
enthusiasm for the DMC; the city saw the new medical center as the future of the city’s 
health care, and officials began to wonder if maintaining Detroit Receiving was even 
worth the trouble. This was reflected in the failure of planners to give serious 
consideration to integrating Detroit Receiving with the hospitals of the medical center; 
the city and county provided inadequate funding to this hospital to address its 
accreditation violations, and they were also unable to understand the seriousness of the 
immediate needs of patients who utilized this hospital. This failure—either through their 
inability or unwillingness—of the city of Detroit and Wayne County to sufficiently 
operate Detroit Receiving Hospital contributed to perpetual strife at this hospital. 
Compounded with the growing population of poor, indigent residents in Detroit who 
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relied on Detroit Receiving, this hospital became a burden that cost the city greatly. 
These issues were only exacerbated by the development of the DMC. 
Housing has long been the lens by which historians explore the impact of the 
urban renewal policies of the mid-twentieth century. Many historians have noted that the 
federal policies of the mid-twentieth century resulted in continued racial segregation that 
the nation is trying still to recover from today. Most often, these conversations center 
housing policy as the primary driver of this continued segregation.198 This makes sense: 
housing is a base need, and is therefore primary for wealth creation, job security, and 
familial relations. Housing restrictions through financial policies like mortgage refusals 
and local redlining only served to reinforce the federal housing policies that cleared the 
“slums,” disproportionately affecting neighborhoods with black residents.199 But as 
discussed in the first chapter, federal urban renewal policies resulted in the expansion and 
development of institutions like hospitals and universities in the city center. While 
historians have examined the housing crisis that resulted from federal urban renewal 
policies, particularly as a result of razing and displacing communities to make space for 
these urban institutions, this only examines half of the story. Urban renewal policies also 
resulted in the development of commercial buildings and institutions, which also 
contributed to the displacement of communities. 
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Two of these institutions that came from urban renewal, hospitals and 
universities, require a closer analysis. By analyzing the impact of provisions within urban 
renewal policies to support their construction and expansion, historians can ask important 
questions about the public benefit these institutions are intended to provide to their 
communities. Because of their role as service providers, most hospitals have been 
exempted from paying taxes to their local and federal municipalities since the early 
twentieth century. Policy makers argued that these institutions served their community 
through their services and thus did not need to support the community through property 
taxes.200 In the case of the DMC and many other institutions built with urban renewal 
funds across the country, the provision of public funds increases the obligation of public 
institutions to meet community needs.  
This chapter argues that the excitement around the promise of the new DMC 
supported by urban renewal funding further contributed to the economic decline of the 
city. This is because the continued focus on a new DMC created false expectations and 
resulted in city officials continually ignoring the needs of Detroit Receiving Hospital and 
its patients. The city’s continued emphasis on the DMC and its neglect of an already-
existing municipal hospital meant that its role in the lives of Detroit’s neediest 
populations was ignored. This cost the city greatly. Understanding the struggles of 
Detroit Receiving in the 1950s and 1960s serves as an allegory for the troubles of the 
city. Ultimately, the story of the decline of Detroit Receiving demonstrates a lack of 
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understanding on the part of city government of how their city and its residents were 
changing in the mid-twentieth century. Even as the indigent population continued to grow 
in the city and the specific requirements of this patient population expanded, city and 
county officials continued to ignore these needs in favor of boosting the DMC 
development in hopes of courting private patients. Vulnerable populations need adequate 
provision of health services to thrive, and the absence of this provision further stressed 
existing municipal services.  
In making these arguments, this chapter contributes to the historiography of urban 
renewal policies and their effects on vulnerable populations, including poor black 
patients. Historical analysis that centers hospitals like the ones of the proposed DMC and 
the city’s municipal hospital, Detroit Receiving, during the period of urban renewal 
highlights how these policies contributed to racially segregated and discriminatory cities. 
This happened not only through the well-documented housing crises throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, but also through the continued discrimination at the 
hospitals of the DMC and the further strain on Detroit Receiving because of the 
environment these policies created. In addition, due to increasing economic discrepancies 
between races related to the job discrimination at these hospitals, explored in the first 
chapter, the policies aimed at improving the city made no improvement in the health 
status of the residents most in need of medical services. 
 
Detroit Receiving Hospital 
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 From its founding in 1915, the center of Detroit’s medical services has been 
Detroit Receiving Hospital. Located on St. Antoine Street near the growing, bustling 
downtown neighborhood,201 this city-owned hospital complemented the voluntary 
hospitals in the city by promising to provide care regardless of a patient’s ability to pay 
for their services. After the hospital’s transfer to the city’s health department in 1949, 
Detroit Receiving also served as the central primary care center for the city.202 Detroit 
Receiving was one of the busiest—and costliest—urban hospitals in the nation.203 Still 
today, half of all of Michigan’s emergency physicians are trained at this hospital.204 
By 1950, Detroit Receiving Hospital was the largest operation of the Detroit 
Board of Health, operating at a loss of nearly two million dollars a year throughout the 
1950s.205 This hospital saw 24,000 admissions, 200,000 outpatient visits, and 
approximately 200,000 ER visits in 1961.206  Ninety-five per cent of these patients were 
black, and only thirty-six percent of these patients carried private insurance—explaining 
the financial loss. The hospital was so overcrowded that, on average, 9,000 patients were 
turned away or transferred to other hospitals annually due to lack of space.207 Primarily a 
hospital that saw patients for acute concerns, its promise to provide care to all those who 
sought it became an increasingly more difficult one on which to deliver during the 1960s. 
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 In 1962, the operating cost of Detroit Receiving was approximately ten million 
dollars, and the city was able to recuperate only about six million.208  City taxes provided 
1.9 million dollars of this hospital’s funding, and Wayne County designated four million 
dollars annually to Detroit Receiving in exchange for taking all of the county’s indigent 
patients. This made the hospital not only Detroit’s municipal hospital, but also the 
county’s, doing little to minimize its overcrowding problems.209  Detroit Receiving’s 
leaders assumed in its budget that patient fees would make up the remaining four million 
dollars in operating costs, although that consistently fell short; the majority of Detroit 
Receiving’s patients could not pay.210 The problems at this hospital were cyclical; 
increasing unemployment and poverty meant fewer privately insured and more indigent 
patients, and with fewer public funds to pay for these patients, the hospital sank further 
into debt.211 The growing challenges at Detroit Receiving were due, in no small part, to 
the changing demographics of the city and its residents’ increasing poverty. 
 
The Changing Landscape of Detroit 
The demographic changes in Detroit during the period immediately following 
World War II are well known.212 But lesser studied are the declining health statuses of the 
Detroit residents that remained living in the city. Jobs in Detroit, especially during the 
period of highest population before World War II, were largely manufacturing with 
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strong union bases that included access to health insurance as part of the employees’ 
wages.213 Immediately after the war, Detroit’s manufacturing jobs moved out to the 
suburbs—as did many of their workers, leaving behind large numbers of unemployed 
workers without access to health insurance. In 1954, inner city Detroit—the 
neighborhood of the eventual DMC—had an infant mortality rate of 33.9 per one 
thousand births. 214 By this point, the neighborhood was solidly black. Residents in this 
area experienced death rates from pneumonia and influenza of 37.5 per one thousand 
persons, and a tuberculosis death rate of 27.9 per one thousand persons.215  
While inner-city black residents were getting sicker, the gap between the health 
status of these residents and their white counterparts was increasing. In the northwest 
corner of the city where many middle-class white Detroiters resided, the infant mortality 
rate was 16.6 per one thousand, while deaths from pneumonia and influenza occurred at a 
rate of 6.0 per one thousand. In this area, there were no deaths from tuberculosis.216   
These trends in health disparities worsened throughout the 1960s. In 1962, inner-
city Detroit saw a rise in infant mortality to 43.5 per one thousand individuals. The death 
rate from pneumonia and influenza increased to 72.1 per one thousand individuals, 
though there was a slight decrease in tuberculosis deaths to 24.6 per one thousand 
cases.217  In the northwest corner, there were only ten infant deaths for every one 
thousand babies born. The death rate from pneumonia and flu of was 15.4 per one 
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thousand individuals, and the death rate of tuberculosis was 5.4 per one thousand 
cases.218   
The inner city was unhealthy. People were dying from diseases for which there 
were effective therapies provided the patient could see a physician early enough, such as 
antibiotics in the case of pneumonia and tuberculosis. In Detroit’s inner city, barriers 
prevented poor Detroiters from accessing primary care, with deadly consequences. These 
barriers to access included a lack of insurance as unemployment continued to rise, and 
the move of physicians to private offices outside of inner-city Detroit—inaccessible to 
many Detroiters without reliable transportation.219 
Between 1942-1962, the number of patients who came to Detroit Receiving had 
increased 150 percent, although the proportion of private paying patients were steadily 
decreasing.220 The unemployment rate, gradually increasing in the United States since 
World War II, resulted in increasing numbers of the medically indigent. In strong union 
cities like Detroit, insurance was typically linked to employment so as workers lost their 
jobs, they also lost their health insurance.221  
 
The Medically Indigent and the Reliance on Detroit Receiving 
As access to physicians grew more difficult, the emergency room at Detroit 
Receiving was becoming the source of primary care for many Detroiters. In September 
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1964, the emergency room at Receiving saw 2,351 patients. The medical staff reported 
that only 751, or one-third of these were actual medical emergencies.222 The situation at 
Detroit Receiving, and in the inner city more generally, was in part due to a shortage of 
primary and preventative healthcare services at other locations in the inner city. Medical 
students were increasingly choosing their medical residencies and careers in procedure-
heavy specialties like cardiology, oncology, and radiology because there were greater 
opportunities for reimbursement than in family and internal medicine.223 Primary care 
provides the stopgap for patients, making emergency care only necessary for actual 
emergencies, but it is only truly accessible with adequate health insurance—and 
difficulties in understanding public insurance and differing reimbursement levels mean 
that it is often only privately insured patients who utilize primary care.224 Physicians 
understood this, too, and placed their offices in places where they had a greater patient 
census and a higher number of insured patients, often far out of the inner city.225 The lack 
of public transportation for residents between the city and its surrounding suburbs made it 
nearly impossible for indigent patients to reach these offices, even if these physicians 
would accept patients without insurance in the first place.226 By the 1960s, only one out 
of every twelve thousand residents of inner city Detroit had access to a physician for their 
primary care needs.227 Emphasizing the class and racial dimensions of healthcare access, 
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by comparison, Oakland County, the mostly white, middle and upper-class community 
immediately north of Detroit’s Wayne County, had one primary care physician for every 
three hundred people.228  
Sociologist Michael Harrington has stated that these indigent patients in the early 
1960s—some forty or fifty million in the United States—were “socially invisible” to the 
rest of America.229 This “invisibility” meant that institutions like Detroit Receiving and 
other public hospitals across the nation became more important for the poor as a source 
for medical care. Public hospitals across the country provided care for the poorer and 
often uninsured folks in society, with higher concentrations of black and other non-white 
patients.230 Voluntary hospitals, which were also not-for-profit (like the four hospitals of 
the proposed medical center), still saw many white patients who carried private 
insurance.231 This, conflated with the migration of physicians to the suburbs left the 
hospital emergency room as the “primary source of care” for many who lived in cities 
across the United States.232 Between 1954 and 1964, emergency room visits increased by 
175 percent nationwide.233 With these departments already stretched thin, this dramatic 
increase resulted in a drop in the quality of care offered, and unhappy and overworked 
physicians.234 
 City officials in Detroit seemed to realize that there were these differences in 
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healthcare access for people depending on their income level, if not their race. Mayor 
Cavanagh commented that there was a clear linkage between a person’s health and their 
income level, calling poverty “one of the most serious deterrents to the improvement 
community health in Detroit.”235 He reiterated that his administration was dedicated to 
“the elimination of poverty from our midst,” and that the “Department of Health has a 
vital role to play in this total effort.”236 As the largest operation of the Department of 
Health, Detroit Receiving was crucial in this fight. 
 
Growing Challenges at Detroit Receiving 
Despite the decrease in population for Detroit itself, the patient census and intake 
numbers at Detroit Receiving continued to grow. On its busiest days in the early 1960s, 
Detroit Receiving could see one thousand outpatient visits with an additional six-
hundred-and-fifty emergency department patients.237  
One of the biggest struggles the staff at Detroit Receiving faced was the electrical 
load the hospital’s high patient amount had with its subpar infrastructure. It was not 
uncommon for tasks like surgery to be interrupted by power outages at the hospital, 
especially in the early 1960s.238 It was also not unusual for what had become typical 
hospital tools, like x-ray machines and other diagnostic tools, to be unusable because of 
the inability of the electrical load to support such machines. This resulted in large 
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backups and bottlenecks. In a complaint to Mayor Cavanagh about the conditions at 
Receiving, Health Commissioner Charles P. Anderson wrote: 
“When demands are the greatest, all appearance of order is lost. The halls 
are so crowded that it becomes a major problem to get from one portion of 
the outpatient division to another. There isn’t space to wait at the 
registration desk, and it is almost impossible to pass the elevator area. 
Similar crowding occurs on the first, second, and third floors of the 
hospital.”239  
 
In 1961, almost ten thousand patients were turned away because the hospital was too 
crowded.240 It was clear that for Detroit Receiving to survive, the physical space would 
need to be expanded to accommodate this growing population. 
 
 
Detroit Receiving and the Detroit Medical Center 
 While Detroit Receiving’s problems became worse in the 1960s, DMC planners 
had known about the strain at the city’s municipal hospital at the development’s 
inception. In 1960, external marketing consultants had suggested to the Medical Center 
Development Committee that Detroit Receiving be absorbed into the new medical center. 
This implied that these external consultants understood not only the importance of Detroit 
Receiving, but also the need of this hospital to operate in an adequate space. The 
consultants suggested that the DMC would be more successful with an integrated Detroit 
Receiving Hospital to serve as the emergency care and trauma care hospital in the new 
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medical campus.241 Despite this, throughout the 1960s officials refused to develop plans 
to incorporate Detroit Receiving into the new medical center.  
The DMC plan in 1956 which used urban renewal funds to rehabilitate the land 
around four centrally located voluntary hospitals—Grace, Harper, Hutzel, and 
Children’s—excluded plans for incorporation of the city’s municipal hospital, despite the 
continued declining state of this hospital. Planners stated that this was due, explicitly, to a 
lack of space in the development.242 The DMC plans had already zoned all land 
surrounding the four hospitals for housing for the medical staff they hoped would live 
near these hospitals.243 But implicitly, critics like boosters from the Detroit Health 
Department believed that it was because of the difference in clientele, and therefore 
perceived reputation, of Detroit Receiving and the future DMC hospitals.244 Success of 
the new DMC was dependent on attracting private paying patients to this campus; the 
Medical Center Development Committee feared that association with Detroit Receiving 
would make this less likely to happen. 
 Detroit Health Commissioner Anderson saw any medical center development that 
did not prioritize Detroit Receiving Hospital as a mistake.245 However, realizing the 
limitations of his solo advocacy, Anderson was hopeful that the new DMC, built about 
two miles north of Detroit Receiving with talk of a potential wing of four-hundred beds 
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built for “charity” patients, would help to lessen the burden at Detroit Receiving. 
Undoubtedly he hoped, this would provide more space for patients who frequented 
Detroit Receiving to gain access to the new DMC.246 Anderson understood the changing 
demographics of the city of Detroit, and saw the growing poverty issues in the city of 
Detroit as being a signifier to more people needing care at places like Receiving, stating:  
“It is my personal believe that if this population change continues at the 
same rate, by the time the new medical center is completed there will be a 
need for it and old Receiving with the same present level of service being 
offered at both places.”247 
 
It was the understanding of Commissioner Anderson and the rest of the Detroit Board of 
Health—and also the community it served—that the public funds from urban renewal that 
were being spent on the development of the DMC would mean that public patients would 
be welcomed at this hospital.248 This eased some anxiety, as Anderson understood that 
both the DMC and Receiving would have to work in tandem to meet the needs of this 
population of patients. In practice, however, DMC planners continued to prioritize 
economic imperatives over community health needs by limiting the number of indigent 
patients the DMC would accept. The result was increased pressure and patient load on 
Detroit Receiving. One case that demonstrates this is the discussion of the formal 
removal of psychiatric patients at Detroit Receiving Hospital. 
 
Psychiatric Patients at Detroit Receiving 
                                                            
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid. 
248 For more information on this fight, see the first chapter of this dissertation. 
 86 
 
One in ten patients at Detroit Receiving were hospitalized for mental health 
services—a three percent increase from 1960-1963.249 Black patients were diagnosed 
with serious mental illnesses like schizophrenia at higher rates during the post-war period 
because of the correlation of this disease with markers of stereotypical blackness, like 
aggression and impulse control, as historian Jonathan Metzl has shown.250 Because 
Detroit Receiving’s patients were predominantly black, increasing diagnoses of mental 
health in this population could explain the increasing incidence at Detroit Receiving. 
Additionally, hospitals in Wayne County were expanding the reimbursement criteria for 
mental health diagnoses. At hospitals in Wayne County, the county health department 
had categorized any hospitalization from violence, substance abuse, or some accidents as 
a mental health issue.251 Both of these factors contributed to the increase in mental health 
hospitalization in Detroit in the early 1960s. 
More than seven thousand psychiatric patients were admitted to Detroit Receiving 
annually in the early 1960s. As James Graves, the Director of Psychiatry at Detroit 
Receiving Hospital, admitted, the “psychiatric needs of the community are growing and 
are likely to do so for many years to come.”252 This hypothesis was informed in no small 
part by the change in city population and economic status that he had observed. The area 
surrounding Detroit Receiving Hospital was the most “blighted” in the city, and crimes 
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like drugs and sex work—now categorized by Wayne County as forms of mental 
illness—were visible throughout the city.253 
Dr. Graves was particularly concerned about the greater burden of psychiatric 
care, because the psychiatric ward at Detroit Receiving had not been updated since 1927 
despite the growing needs of this population.254 This resulted in a shortage of beds for 
these patients, and an increasingly taxed staff resulting in lower quality care. There were 
also no current plans to invest in the hospital’s psychiatric services; finances were tight, 
and the amount of money this facility was getting from Hill-Burton funds were already 
slated for other projects, including expansions at all four hospitals of the proposed 
DMC.255 For Graves, the increasing psychiatric needs of the community would tax 
Detroit Receiving’s already over-burdened psych services. 
Psychiatric patients had long been ignored in the provision of care in Detroit. 
While the city and county policies favoring private patients implied that patients in 
poverty were less important generally, psychiatric patients carried an additional level of 
stigma. Dr. Graves noted this, and advocated for improved psychiatric hospitals stating: 
“A vital choice must be made now that will affect the development of 
psychiatric services in Detroit or the rest of the 20th Century. It would be 
tragic if this increasingly important public service were once more, as it has 
been for so many decades, neglected and exposed to callous indifference by 
those municipal officials responsible for the quantity and quality of mental 
health services in Detroit.”256 
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The choice Dr. Graves was referring to was how to afford to pay for psychiatric patients. 
It was becoming untenable to meet their needs at the increasingly decrepit Detroit 
Receiving. Ultimately, the care of psychiatric patients at Detroit Receiving cost the city 
one and half million dollars a year; the city was able to collect about half of that back 
from other government agencies, insurance companies, and private pay, resulting in an 
annual deficit of about seven-hundred fifty thousand dollars a year—the greatest of all 
services provided in the city.257  
Mayor Cavanagh, City Council, and representatives from the Board of Health 
believed that reducing the number of patients receiving psychiatric care at Detroit 
Receiving was the best way to control its costs. To do this, city officials believed that 
moving psychiatric services from Detroit Receiving would be the best option—a move 
that would save the city money and free up space at Detroit Receiving for other services. 
One potential solution was to close the tuberculosis wing at the nearest county hospital, 
Herman Kiefer, as tuberculosis beds became less needed into the 1960s due to the 
availability of antibiotics to treat this disease.258 Mental health, in contrast to tuberculosis, 
was becoming an “increasing public health problem.”259  
In addition to the extra space this would afford the city at Detroit Receiving, the 
move to Herman Kiefer, a Wayne County hospital, would mean that the county would 
assume responsibility for these patients—not the city.260  But first, rehabilitation of the 
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space at Kiefer would have to adequately support and house these patients, or else the 
problems of Receiving would simply replicate at this new hospital. City Council in 
collaboration with county officials developed a plan was to use Hill-Burton funds for a 
pediatric psychiatric wing that would provide both service, and run a fund-raising drive 
from local nonprofits.261 To complete the fifth floor where these psychiatric services 
would be housed at Herman Kiefer, the city still needed $250,000. The plan’s authors 
gave no indication of how they would pay for the rehabilitation of the sixth floor where 
the adult psychiatric services would be offered.262  
Mayor Cavanagh did not support this plan, however. For Cavanagh, the costs to 
renovate Kiefer would create even greater deficits to the city’s finances. Instead, the 
mayor’s office developed an alternative plan to move psychiatric emergency patients to 
Wayne County General Hospital, where the rest of Wayne County’s psychiatric patients 
were treated. This hospital was in Inkster, about a thirty-minute drive from Detroit 
Receiving.263 This plan was only supported by the mayor and his immediate staff; it did 
not have the support of City Council or Wayne County officials.264  
These opponents believed that this move would not adequately address the 
underlying problem of overcrowding, since those in the surrounding community 
experiencing psychiatric crises would still come to Detroit Receiving first, if nothing else, 
out of habit.265 Additionally, there was concern that this would diminish the level of care 
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provided to already-needy patients by discouraging care—there was no public 
transportation from the center city to Wayne County General Hospital, and if a person 
was experiencing a psychiatric emergency, even if they owned a car, it would be unsafe 
for that patient to drive. Because of this, critics saw this as a plan intended to remove 
undesirable patients from Detroit altogether. Dr. J. Gottlieb, President of the Michigan 
Neurology and Psychiatry Society and director of Psychiatric Emergencies at Detroit 
Receiving, wrote to Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh regarding this plan, stating:  
“the innumerable problems will be well beyond the savings in costs, which 
is evidentially the motivation for this consolidation. Many patients we see 
are homicidal or suicidal. These patients would still find their way to the 
hospital, even if on other services and require at least a consultation 
service.”266  
 
He added, identifying what he believed to be the main motivation for such a move, “It is 
impossible to wish away a patient population.”267 Still, Mayor Cavanagh’s office 
believed that this would be the solution that would best address the needs of city residents 
because it would make the least impact on the city’s and county’s finances.268 
Moving psychiatric patients to Wayne County General Hospital was not a popular 
choice among city residents either, with residents in the surrounding neighborhood 
calling “shipping them off…outdated.”269 Community members cited the size of the city 
of Detroit—at this point well over 1.5 million residents—and the growing problem of 
drug addiction as reasons why Detroit needed to prioritize psychiatric emergency services 
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within the City of Detroit.270 The Detroit Medical Society, a group of black physicians 
intensely opposed to the move, criticized Cavanaugh’s policy as a racist and classist 
move to displace the neediest patients seen at Detroit Receiving.271 
Opponents also invoked the surrounding community’s safety as a reason to 
continue care at Detroit Receiving. Police cars drove patients in psychiatric emergencies 
to this hospital to “protect them and the public,” and this service would not be able to 
continue if the patients were moved to Wayne County General Hospital.272 Residents 
were also concerned that this move to save money was shortsighted, and would result in 
greater burden on other areas, like the Detroit Police Department. If a patient could not 
get a ride out to Wayne County General Hospital, the Detroit Police Department, 
according to the Travelers Aid Society of Detroit, would: 
“be placed in the position of having to provide shelter for emergency psych 
patients, since police stations and the jail would necessarily be the resource 
for dangerously mentally ill people. This would not only be a return to the 
practice of a century ago…but would add a great burden to an already 
understaffed and overworked police department.”273 
 
City officials all agreed that Detroit Receiving was not able to accommodate 
psychiatric patients in its current state, but there was still contention about where these 
patients should be moved. John Graves, a professor at Wayne State University School of 
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Medicine and physician at Detroit Receiving Hospital, suggested that “no enlightened 
medical educator can long remain ignorant of the fact that a psychiatric unit is most 
essential for general hospital unity and is not well considered to be detachable,” arguing 
that there could be no movement of these patients because psychiatric care was so 
essential to providing any sort of general care for residents.274 Other critics warned that 
this move would be no way to establish Detroit as a leading city in any way, calling it 
“medieval, going back to the Dark Ages,” since no other major city in the United States 
did not have an emergency psych unit.275 Administrators tried to appeal to officials’ 
humanity, likening emergency psychiatric care to getting into a car accident, emphasizing 
that anyone could find themselves needing psychiatric care, regardless of class, 
educational status, or race.276 
Mental health advocates and physicians at Detroit Receiving argued that patients 
should not be moved to Wayne County General Hospital over thirty miles away from 
Detroit Receiving because it “would cut the ties between patients and relatives, between 
the staff and the Wayne State University School of Medicine, and discourage community 
social agencies from work they now perform.”277 For them, the move to Herman Kiefer 
was preferable.278 But the discussions at the internal committee meetings discussing these 
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moves was tumultuous; at the “height of the fight,” the Detroit News reported that the 
entire staff at Detroit Receiving planned to resign.279 Many in the city government, 
including Anderson himself, preferred the move to Wayne County General Hospital 
because it would cost the city “virtually nothing.”280 On the other hand, remodeling a 
wing to make it work for psychiatric patients at Herman Kiefer would cost upwards of an 
estimated three-hundred fifty thousand dollars, the source of these funds was uncertain.281 
 While even Anderson admitted that staying at Receiving was untenable because 
of inadequate space, Mayor Cavanagh told constituents that “much more [was] at stake 
than the saving of money…[he was] much more interested in helping human beings who 
need help than in attempts to cut costs,” a position that leadership at Detroit Receiving 
like Dr. Gottlieb found less than convincing.282  
There is no explicit evidence in the sources to indicate why Cavanagh was so 
opposed to a move to Herman Kiefer instead pushing for the move of psychiatric patients 
to Wayne County’s hospital. However, we must view his motivations in the context of his 
desire to be on the national public stage, which required support from the wealthier 
suburbs and outstate.  
 Jerome Cavanagh was elected in 1961 in no small part due to the overwhelming 
support of Detroit’s black community. Cavanagh told this constituency that he recognized 
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the changing demographics of the city and would be a mayor that worked to center the 
black community in his decisions about the future of this city. This resonated with 
Detroit’s black voters, especially after the Cobo and Miriani Administrations. Mayor 
Cobo razed black neighborhoods in the name of progress, and black Detroiters believed 
that Mayor Miriani condoned police brutality. By 1960, about thirty percent of Detroit’s 
population by 1960 was made from black residents.283 Once entering the mayoral office, 
due in no small part to Detroit’s black voters, it became clear that Cavanagh had higher 
political aspirations. Quickly befriending President Kennedy, and then later Johnson, 
Cavanagh was often on the short list for political appointments for both men, and had 
ambitions of achieving a Governorship or serving as one of Michigan’s Senators.284 
When Cavanagh was encouraged by President Johnson to run for Senate in 1966, he lost 
handily and did not even carry Detroit.285 Perhaps Mayor Cavanagh, in order to achieve 
his political ambitions, realized that he needed to politic outside of the city and sought to 
garner goodwill outstate and throughout greater Wayne County. Moving these psychiatric 
patients away from the city center—which city officials saw as a destination for 
suburbanites and white, college-educated families for both living and tourism—would 
perhaps “clean up” one of the city center’s biggest problems and result in a more 
welcoming environment for those Cavanagh hoped to court. Perhaps he was, as Graves 
had suggested, “wishing away” this population.  
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At no point during this contentious discussion did anyone from the city 
government, Wayne State University, or activist groups suggest moving the growing 
number of the city’s psychiatric patients to the DMC. This seems like a blind spot—the 
patients at Detroit Receiving that were of concern to this group were public patients, and 
the hospitals of the DMC were receiving a significant amount of public funds for 
expansion to serve the city. Additionally, administrators at Wayne State School of 
Medicine were actively seeking to establish a deeper relationship between the university 
and these hospitals; providing a solution for the city on where to care for their psychiatric 
patients seems an obvious solution. However, the stigma of this population—not only as 
a group of indigent patients but also dangerous, violent, and deeply misunderstood—did 
not fit the vision of who should utilize the DMC for their care. It seems intentional that 
this development was never considered for the care of these patients, despite the hope 
that the hospitals of the DMC would share some of the burden of Detroit Receiving’s 
service to its surrounding community. 
The concern over what to do with psychiatric patients at Detroit Receiving is 
illustrative of how the focus on the development of the DMC continued to create a dual 
system of care despite medical center boosters claiming that this construction would work 
to remedy health problems in Detroit. Patient dumping was proof that the DMC 
construction did not resolve this issue, especially for vulnerable patient populations like 
Detroit Receiving’s psychiatric patients. While the four hospitals of the DMC very near 
Detroit Receiving were getting a large influx of public funds to remodel and expand their 
buildings, there was never a realistic chance that psychiatric patients could be cared for at 
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these hospitals. It was likely never considered because of the tacit understanding that 
while the new DMC was to be a hospital campus that treated all, it was not intended for 
indigent, needy patients, especially those in psychiatric distress. This tension between 
rhetoric and practice is made evident by the frequent dumping practices at the hospitals of 
the DMC. 
Dumping, still a concern in many major American cities today, occurs when a 
hospital transfers an indigent patient to a city’s public hospital or another medical center 
of “last resort.” This way, the private hospital does not have to absorb the costs of a 
patient who is unable to pay. Throughout the 1960s, Detroit Receiving staff would 
frequently find an abandoned patient, often in a hospital gown or with minimal clothing, 
on the curb outside of their hospital’s Emergency Department. Detroit Receiving staff 
conducted investigations to find that these patients most often came from the hospitals of 
the DMC. Dumping was a way for the DMC hospitals to avoid lower levels of 
reimbursement from “unattractive” patients without obviously breaking the law.286  
Perhaps because dumping was already such a concern for Detroit Receiving, 
activists had correctly identified that in a psychiatric emergency, patients would still 
come to this hospital regardless. Because of this, the city ultimately decided to keep 
psychiatric patients at Detroit Receiving. In April of 1963, Mayor Cavanagh approved a 
1.2-million-dollar expenditure to update and expand the psychiatric ward to keep these 
patients at Detroit Receiving. This solution came with the caveat that if their stay 
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extended five days, they would be transferred to Wayne County General Hospital.287 City 
officials knew that this was a short-term fix for a growing problem, however, and so they 
continued to look for ways to lessen the financial and physical strain on Detroit 
Receiving to keep this hospital open for as long as it possibly could. One way to do so 
was formalizing the long-standing relationship between Detroit Receiving and the 
growing Wayne State University School of Medicine. 
 
University City 
In the early 1960s, as plans to develop the DMC were underway, the city started a 
second federally funded urban renewal plan. Located close to the site of the DMC, 
University City was a project to expand and redevelop the campus of Wayne State 
University. By 1961, the city had secured over eighty million dollars in federal urban 
renewal funds for this project that would further develop the campus around Wayne State 
University.288 Wayne State had only become a university recently under a 1958 Federal 
Act which provided more public funds for increased scientific research and an increase in 
the student body.289 Already at this time, the health services programs were among the 
strongest at this institution, and the city and state wanted to capitalize on this.  
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 The University City development would secure twenty acres within the DMC for 
the larger and relocated medical school and a new, four million dollar medical research 
building.290 While this was the first stage of development, the final project would total 
over three hundred acres with planned completion by 1975; this additional land would be 
used for full university expansion, residences, and commercial development. This 
expansion was part of a plan for an increased enrollment at Wayne State from twenty-
thousand in the 1960s—a mid-sized university—to over forty-thousand by 1975, making 
it one of the largest universities by enrollment in the country.291 DMC planners were 
involved from the beginning of the University City project, hoping that the medical 
school expansion that was central to this plan would facilitated a closer partnership for 
graduate medical education.292 Wayne State University already had an existing 
relationship with Detroit Receiving, but the increase in enrollment at the medical school 
would necessitate additional training sites. However, the continued stigma of Detroit 
Receiving and its patient population made DMC officials leery of an official partnership. 
 
Wayne State at Detroit Receiving 
 While an informal relationship had existed between Wayne State and Detroit 
Receiving for years, allowing medical students to receive hands-on clinical training, in 
1962, the School of Medicine recognized that the “increasing responsibilities and 
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complexities of patient care and the continued growth of the College of Medicine” 
required formal affiliation.293 The school’s leaders stated that that the “chief purpose of 
such an agreement [was] to ensure that the patients in Receiving Hospital receive the 
highest standard of medical care” and that “medical students, interns, and residents 
receive the best teaching and training.”294 The agreement, which was finalized in 1962, 
made “all members of the [Detroit Receiving] professional staff” faculty at Wayne State 
University—a typical facet of such agreements.295 Wayne State paid these employees’ 
salaries, saving Receiving several hundred thousand dollars annually. Administrators at 
Detroit Receiving were hopeful that this would relieve the hospital’s current financial 
woes.296 There seemed to be few downsides to such an agreement. But already by 1962, 
the formal affiliation was threatened by accreditation concerns that came with the 
decrepit state of this hospital. This of course was detrimental to the continued educational 
opportunities available at Detroit Receiving.297 In particular, Detroit Receiving was in 
risk of losing its accreditation to space and building safety concerns.298 The only way to 
address these issues was to prioritize building rehabilitation and expansion. 
Leadership at Detroit Receiving had begun advocating and planning for an 
expansion to provide education at the hospital since before the start on the University 
City project had officially begun. In 1951, when the Department of Health took over 
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Receiving Hospital from the Welfare Department, the city set aside 7.7 million dollars for 
expansion, capital improvements, and equipment at the hospital.299 The Board of Health 
had planned to expand the Emergency Department in 1951 into a teaching auditorium, 
which had provided extra space only for lectures since it was “practically unknown for 
large teaching hospital[s] affiliated directly with a medical school to operate without such 
accommodations.”300 As proposed in 1951, the auditorium was estimated to cost five 
thousand dollars, but the construction never happened, presumably because the funds 
were never actually secured.301 
 After the formal agreement was reached between Detroit Receiving and Wayne 
State in 1962, city officials knew that they needed to deliver on the plans for expansion to 
provide a teaching space for the students that the University City development would 
bring in. While the building improvements were needed at Detroit Receiving regardless 
of its affiliation with Wayne State and the University City project, this provided the 
impetus for city planners to prioritize this construction.  
In a report to City Council in 1964—two years after the formal agreement 
between Detroit Receiving and Wayne State began—Commissioner Anderson noted that 
the conditions had “reached the point of such terrific overcrowding, which was a definite 
threat to the health and safety of patients in these areas.”302 When city planners developed 
their plan for Detroit Receiving expansion in January 1964, the costs for this construction 
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had increased greatly since 1951; the City Engineer estimated the cost at twenty-five 
thousand dollars with air conditioning, or fifteen thousand dollars without.303 The Board 
of Health, responsible for this construction, had secured some of this funding: five 
thousand dollars from the Receiving Hospital Research Corps, seven thousand dollars 
from the School of Medicine, five hundred dollars collected from private donations from 
residents themselves, and thirty-five hundred dollars in additional individual 
contributions.304 Anderson approached Common Council to pay for the remaining six 
thousand dollars under the justification that the Board of Health already had approved a 
five thousand dollar expenditure in 1951, and they had never received those funds.305 The 
city had already promised to provide the labor for the construction of the auditorium.306 
No additional funds or support were given by the city for this proposal; Mayor Cavanagh 
noted that he did not believe that this expansion was a good use of the limited funds of 
the Detroit Board of Health.307 This lack of prioritization of the standards of an adequate 
teaching hospital put the accreditation of Detroit Receiving continually at risk. 
During the early 1960s, the physical integrity of Detroit Receiving Hospital 
continued to get worse. In early 1963, the building had developed a slant, which on 
higher levels caused chairs and pens to roll on the ground. Workers joked that the 
hospital would “probably slide into a sewer within two years.”308 
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Accreditation Crises 
 At the time of the next inspection in early 1964, Detroit Receiving received a 
probationary status from the Joint Commission on Accreditation because the 
overcrowding issues and lack of building updates from the 1962 probationary 
accreditation had not been addressed.309 This meant that patients were being treated for 
emergencies, delivering babies, and (if they were one of the patients from the local 
prisons that used Detroit Receiving for care) restrained to radiators and pipes in hallways 
and waiting rooms.310  
The Detroit Receiving staff were devastated by the probationary status. It was not 
the first time that their accreditation had been called into question, but this time the 
consequences were higher; losing accreditation meant that the hospital would lose its 
entire medical staff through an elimination of its partnership with Wayne State School of 
Medicine residency program, and no longer be able to operate at all. At this point, it 
became critical for city officials to address these struggles; the expansion of the medical 
school depended on Detroit Receiving’s ability to provide training opportunities. If 
Detroit Receiving lost its accreditation and closed, it would put the expansion of the 
medical school at risk and threatened the very viability of the University City 
development. 
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 Realizing the seriousness of this, Mayor Cavanagh and City Council approved 
funds for a renovated entryway and façade to Detroit Receiving—another short-term fix 
to a long-term problem. These two things were not identified as issues in the 1962 nor 
1964 accreditation.311 However, city officials’ prioritization of this improvement seemed 
to highlight that their concerns with Detroit Receiving were only cosmetic. Detroit Health 
Commissioner James E. Franzen, who had replaced Charles Anderson when he left for a 
job in New York, was critical of the city’s prioritization of the entryway and façade rather 
than expansions that would truly improve the outcomes for patients at Receiving, stating 
that for the City of Detroit: 
“It is far more important to care for the physical condition of the indigent 
than it is to have a pretty façade on a building. Receiving Hospital, which 
offers such good medical care, is always the first to get public criticism and 
the last to get financial help.”312  
 
Others, like the head city planner Francis P. Bennett, said that attention to the entryway 
was necessary because the entrance to Detroit Receiving was a “disgrace,” and that the 
new addition would stop the “gathering of people on the steps of the present entrance, the 
litter that collects in two courtyards away and the danger of undesirable persons lurking 
after dark in the entranceway.”313 As a peace offering, Mayor Cavanagh in December 
1964 set aside fifteen thousand dollars for a study for hospital construction at Detroit 
                                                            
311 Memo from Booz, Allen & Hamilton Management Consultants to John Hanlon, December 15, 1965. 269, 
7, Cavanagh Collection, Reuther Library, Detroit. 
312 JoAnn Hardee, “OK Plans for Addition to Receiving Hospital,” Detroit News, February 6, 1964. Box 198, 
Folder 198-2 Board of Health. Jerome P. Cavanagh Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, 
Detroit, Michigan. 
313 Ibid. 
 104 
 
Receiving in addition for the funds for an entryway addition.314 Seeing no way out of the 
hospital’s continuing problems, Mayor Cavanagh began to seriously push for a new 
Detroit Receiving Hospital in late 1964, when he asked Clyde Palmer, the City Engineer, 
to meet with Detroit Receiving Superintendent, Dr. Hanlon, to prepare a “comprehensive 
report on costs and other factors relative to the construction of a new Receiving Hospital 
in the Medical Center.”315 
In April 1965, Superintendent of Detroit Receiving Dr. Hanlon reported to the 
Joint Commission on Accreditation, asking that the one-year probationary period be lifted 
for a full three-year accreditation at Detroit Receiving. The fifteen thousand dollar needs 
assessment study that came as a compromise to the entryway and façade fiasco had 
proven to the city that much more funding needed to go to the hospital to resolve this 
crisis; Hanlon cited eight million dollars that the city had approved for the expansion of 
the hospital to go toward an auditorium and other teaching spaces, conversations about 
moving patients to alternative hospitals, and a higher salary offered to nurses to help 
eliminate the nursing shortage.316 Hanlon emphasized that without accreditation, Detroit 
Receiving would cease to exist; Wayne State provided all staffing, and if this hospital 
folded, the hospitals of DMC would be unable to facilitate all the care necessary.317 
The relationship with Wayne State and the subsequent actions by both the city 
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and Detroit Receiving staff demonstrate again how urban renewal funds drove decisions 
in the city at this time, including decisions about indigent patients’ care. Because 
University City was another project in the urban renewal pipeline, the future of Detroit 
Receiving became important for city officials—but only important enough to satisfy the 
conditions that the hospital remain open to serve as a training facility for Wayne State’s 
School of Medicine, not to provide proper and adequate health care for those patients 
who relied on this hospital. This trend continued throughout the 1960s, as the city’s focus 
remained on the hospitals of the DMC and not Detroit Receiving—the city seemed 
incapable of supporting both. 
By 1965, things had gotten so dire at Detroit Receiving that hospital staff 
remained continually fearful of losing their accreditation due to the overcrowding that the 
1964 front entryway expansion had not addressed. The hospital began checking to make 
sure that the patients that came to the emergency room were private patients. If an 
investigation from Detroit Receiving’s billing department revealed that these patients 
were not private, and that there was an “inability of the patient to assume his fiscal 
responsibility,” the staff at Receiving began taking advantage of a state law that placed 
the responsibility for indigent emergency hospitalization under the Wayne County Social 
Welfare Department at Wayne County General Hospital, and would transfer these 
patients to this hospital.318 Even Detroit Receiving had begun dumping patients. This was 
because the hospital, and therefore the city, incurred “several millions of dollars…for 
patients who legally might be considered the responsibility of other governmental 
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jurisdictions.”319 This was the first time in the hospital’s history where its actions were 
directly, and systematically, against its mission to provide care for all those in need 
regardless of their ability to pay.  
 
A New Detroit Receiving Hospital 
Mayor Cavanagh’s decision to push for a new Detroit Receiving Hospital 
beginning in 1964 was a purely economic decision due to the hospital’s necessity to 
retain accreditation to support Wayne State University School of Medicine. But as 
Detroit Receiving continued to decline through the mid-1960s, even young people who 
did not directly live in the area surrounding Detroit Receiving or the DMC were speaking 
out on behalf of those who depended on Detroit Receiving Hospital for their care. In 
1964, high school students from suburban Detroit toured Detroit Receiving after their 
schools contacted the hospital to arrange a tour for students interested in the health 
professions.320 Finding themselves “appalled at the conditions under which the staff must 
work,” these students formed the Students for Practical Action through Community 
Effort activism group, or SPACE, believing “if we can afford to put a man in space, we 
can afford space for a man.”321 Recognizing the discrepancy between the physicality of 
Detroit Receiving and the investment in the DMC, these students advocated for a better 
use of the land around the medical center development, and suggested that the city could 
find space for a new municipal hospital on this campus. These students believed that 
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adequate health services were “vital to the community and to the growth of this dynamic 
city,” but understanding the role that economic capacity building played in the new 
medical center development, they asked: “How much of this [revenue] ought to be spent 
on meeting some of the health problems of the people who were displaced by these urban 
renewal projects?”322 They cited the city’s willingness to spend twenty-five million 
dollars on a new stadium for the bid for the 1968 Olympic Games, and indicated that 
parts of the DMC development like wider streets and parking lots were “taking the place 
of lives” around Detroit Receiving rather than using that space for the hospital’s 
expansion.323 Noting the level of decline, student leader Patricia Mason stated that she 
would “rather stay at our new, modern jail than Receiving.”324 
SPACE submitted a proposal to Mayor Cavanagh suggesting that the city make, 
what they thought would be, better use of the space surrounding the DMC—a new 
municipal hospital. They believed that a newer, larger building serving the Receiving’s 
patients would solve the old hospital’s most pressing issues like wait times and poor 
conditions. Mayor Cavanagh did not agree with these students, nor did he take their 
proposal seriously, stating: 
“This is not a decision to be lightly made and I am sure you will understand 
my reservation in not wholeheartedly embracing this proposal…I think it is 
important for young people to be aware of community problems and try to 
inform themselves as you have. May I suggest you consider as an action 
project participation in summer tutoring for inner-city youngsters who have 
academic deficiencies as a means of helping the students in Detroit Public 
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Schools.”325 
 
Perhaps deterred by Mayor Cavanagh’s lukewarm reception to their activism, SPACE 
was not active past the summer of 1964. But in that same summer, Cavanagh reiterated 
his supported the development of a new Receiving, stating that: 
“Without modernization, hospitals cannot render good modern medicine 
unless these buildings and equipment are brought up to date by substantial 
alternations and installation of the most modern equipment made available 
by today’s medical science.”326  
 
However, the mayor’s verbal support was just that; there were still no formal plans to 
develop a new Receiving Hospital. 
 As of December 1964, the Detroit News and other media outlets were still unclear 
if there had been a new Detroit Receiving Hospital approved by the city, but “the need 
and inevitability [was] obvious.”327 They cited the continued threats of losing 
accreditation as a reason for the inevitability.328 The Detroit Free Press struggled to 
identify where the funding would come for this new hospital, since city and county 
sources were “tied up with thorny problems of county indebtedness to the city, possible 
county home rule and the possible union of the city and county health department.”329 
Once the mayor began to publicly advocate for the construction of a new hospital, rumors 
began to circulate in these newspapers about the incorporation of a new Detroit 
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Receiving Hospital into the DMC.330 In response to these rumors, the staff and students at 
Wayne State School of Medicine submitted a resolution to Mayor Cavanagh to guarantee 
that they were involved in the entirety of planning of the new Detroit Receiving Hospital 
since they would be “responsible for patient care, education, and research.”331  
The Greater Detroit Area Hospital Council, a group of executives and 
administrators from the hospitals of the DMC and Detroit Receiving Hospital that city 
officials consulted about local hospital development, had received a federal research 
grant to study the needs for modernization, renovation, replacement, relocation, 
expansion, and conservation of hospitals in Detroit.332 This group did not advocate for the 
development of new structures, necessarily, but understood that this might be necessary 
to achieve Mayor Cavanagh’s vision.  
In 1964, the Greater Detroit Area Hospital Council approved six projects. Only 
one of these were at the DMC: the modernization of the Hancock Building of Hutzel 
Hospital, which included an upgrade to patients’ rooms, a surgical suite, and service 
departments.333 Despite the mayor’s public advocacy, this council did not include a new 
Detroit Receiving Hospital within the confines of the DMC.334 The plans for a new  
Detroit Receiving Hospital, then, did not move forward, despite its accreditation 
struggles, further signifying the lack importance this hospital held for the city. 
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Conclusion 
 Even as Detroit Receiving struggled, the DMC development, which was the 
largest project using urban renewal funds in the nation, and University City, garnered 
national attention. From the New York Times in 1964: 
“Detroit will contain a project of national prominence in its 236-acre 
Medical Center. It is being expanded from a core of four existing major 
hospitals. Ground has been broken for the first phase, a Professional Plaza, 
15 acres of medical office buildings and related facilities costing $25 
million. The new Wayne State University College of Medicine campus will 
rise in the center. A related multi-million-dollar research facility will take 
occupants early this year. An $8 million Children’s Hospital will rise 
nearby.”335 
 
The national news media depicted the DMC and University City projects as giving the 
city “national prominence” and credited them with Detroit’s “renaissance.” In an article 
that appeared in Business Week  in 1963—much earlier than most think Detroit needed a 
“renaissance”—the publication reported that “Detroit has always been an unlikely spot 
for renaissance” due to its identification as a “dull industrial city whose people have 
rarely been interested in anything else but how well automobiles are selling.”336 
However, the increase in automation, dropping car sales, and the “auto industry 
diversifying geographically away from the city” which resulted in unemployment of 
fifteen percent by 1961, a “cultural movement” became necessary to revitalize the 
economic environment in the city.337 By 1963, unemployment had fallen to three-and-a-
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half percent, credited largely to the projects of urban renewal undertaken by the city, 
including the DMC project which transformed two thousand acres of land.338  
From a national perspective, the DMC development was driving the success of a 
city in decline. But a closer, more local examination reveals a different story. While 
unemployment had dropped, Detroit continued to show signs of economic deterioration. 
In 1958, the city had a deficit of eight-hundred thousand dollars; by 1962, after the bulk 
of urban renewal projects had taken off, the deficit had grown to thirty-four million 
dollars.339 And despite the new employment opportunities in science and medicine that 
these projects offered, about sixty percent of Detroit’s 3.8 million workers’ jobs were still 
tied to the auto industry.340 The jobs offered by the DMC development, as covered in the 
first chapter, were developed largely for white Detroiters and suburban residents. Even 
national media acknowledged this deficit, noting that the Detroit “renaissance” would 
perhaps stimulate the tourist business “which offers jobs for the unskilled…The Negro 
community has been less helped than others by the city’s diversification because man 
Negroes lack the needed skills and education.”341 
The unequal benefits of urban renewal in Detroit meant that those most in need 
continued to struggle while city services focused less on this group. No case demonstrates 
this this more clearly than an examination of the attitudes of city planners and officials 
toward both Detroit Receiving and the DMC during this time. Throughout the 1960s, 
construction at the DMC continued—all the existing hospitals were connected by tunnels, 
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streets were being widened, and land was being cleared around the complex to create a 
fully connected campus.342 All the while the city’s investment in Detroit Receiving 
declined. Emphasizing both the isolated nature of this development and its role in 
bringing a new industry to the city, local media had begun speaking about the DMC as a 
city within a city, referring to it as the Medical City.343 This new moniker for the DMC 
also applied to the rest of the city as a replacement for the Motor City, identified most 
notably by Mayor Cavanagh at a groundbreaking ceremony for Professional Plaza at the 
DMC in 1965, where he stated that while Detroit had been known as the “Motor City,” 
the DMC ushered in new opportunities.344 
The influx of federal urban renewal and hospital infrastructure funding in the 
1950s and 1960s created an environment in cities across the country where grand 
schemes for redevelopment could be realized. In Detroit, no development was as large or 
exciting as the DMC. This project transformed “slums” into world-class hospitals and 
housing for the professionals who would flock to Detroit to work at there. As Detroit 
continued to decline, city officials and planners became more dedicated and confident in 
this development’s ability to bring the change they desired in their city. 
But this excitement and investment came at the expense of already-existing city 
infrastructure, like its municipal hospital. Even with federal funding, the city’s resources 
were limited, and the focus on the DMC meant that the challenges Detroit Receiving 
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faced were never properly tended to. Additionally, the patient population at Receiving, 
while growing throughout the 1960s due to the city’s continued demographic changes 
and economic decline, never seemed to be able to find a home at the hospitals of the 
DMC, despite this development’s reliance on federal funds for its very existence. 
The negative effects of federal urban renewal programs on cities’ black 
communities has been thoroughly studied, especially regarding the housing and job crises 
created by these programs. But the specific role that public benefit institutions like 
hospitals and universities played is less well-known. By not centering these institutions in 
our narratives of urban renewal, historians have ignored a crucial component in this 
period in American history. Doing so helps us better understand the plight, and 
grievances, of black urban communities. A further study of these grievances related to 
Detroit Receiving and the DMC is developed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The Language of the Unheard: Detroit Receiving Hospital and the Violence of July 
1967 
 
The first and second chapters of this dissertation examined the role of the DMC as 
a symbol of urban development through the promise of industrial transformation and 
white-collar employment rather than a provider of health to vulnerable residents of 
Detroit’s core. The actions of its planners and other city officials resulted in a two-tiered, 
segregated, and discriminatory health care system that resulted in poorer health outcomes 
for Detroit’s growing black community. This coincided with the growing platform of 
national black rights organizations to incorporate health inequalities into their 
advocacy.345 In Detroit, this echoed the initial advocacy championed by the Detroit Urban 
League that sought to encourage the Detroit City Council to build a more inclusive DMC 
to serve as the main center of health care for all residents of the city of Detroit. After the 
introduction of the Medical Center Development Plan to City Council in 1956, the 
Detroit Urban League increased its pressure on the city. This advocacy came after they 
learned how much public funding would go toward the construction of this center and 
that this development would displace thousands of black individuals and black-owned 
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businesses— “slum clearance” that all but ensured that the remaining neighborhood was 
a “slum.”  
Advocating for better health care access had always been central to the groups 
who fought for civil rights for black Americans. In the early twentieth century, activists 
like Booker T. Washington advocated for improved access to health care because they 
believed that this was a safer form of activism rather than overt and explicit activism for 
equal rights among the races.346 And while civil rights leaders could differ in their 
philosophies, the most prominent leaders, including W.E.B. Dubois, understood the 
centrality of health to social and economic justice.347 It is no surprise, then, that the 
continued poor health of Detroit’s black residents throughout the early stages of the 
construction of the DMC, with an ever-increasing gap between black and white residents, 
was of primary concern for some of the city’s most prominent black activist groups.  
In 1942, the World Health Organization identified the “social roots of health,” 
indicating that poor living conditions were directly responsible for health outcomes.348 
The National Urban League promoted these ideas about social determinants of health 
throughout the 1960s, including blaming shorter lifespans, higher infant mortality, and 
increased amounts of disease and disability on low incomes, inadequate education, and 
poor living conditions across the United States, especially in proportion to white 
counterparts, stating:  
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“The poor health of the Negroes retards education, lowers earning power, 
and prevents them from realizing their potential for full and worthwhile 
lives. It is our view, therefore, that specific steps to promote the health of 
the Negro population should be taken along with efforts to improve jobs, 
education and housing.”349 
 
This statement from the National Urban League emphasized the position that black 
activists had taken before them: better health, while important to advocate for on its own, 
was about much more. Poor health was just another—and perhaps the most pressing—
symptom of poverty, but it was intrinsically linked to other conditions of poverty, like 
housing and jobs. The National Urban League went a step further to name the 
relationship as cyclical: lower economic conditions led to poor health, but that poor 
health continued to keep poor, black residents in lower economic conditions.  
While local black activists had been engaged and active throughout the 
construction of the DMC, the 1950s saw a groundswell of national black activism that 
placed health care needs of black people at its core, and this activism led to federal 
legislation that attempted to force integration. On December 18, 1952, the President’s 
Commission on the Needs of the Nation unanimously recommended in its “Building 
America’s Health” report that “segregation in the use of hospitals be eliminated since it 
detracts from the efficiency and quality of care.”350 And as a final message from the 
federal level, the Supreme Court ruled in May 1954 that separate health facilities were 
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inherently unequal.351 The first health system to act on this was the federally run 
Veteran’s Affairs hospital system, which despite being integrated during even the Civil 
War, began segregating care after the Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) decision in the late 
nineteenth century.352 
The National Urban League chalked up any meaningful integration in all parts of 
the United States, “even in the Deep South,”  to actions taken by the Veterans 
Administration, which practiced equal health provision even in places like “Birmingham, 
Jackson, and New Orleans.”353 The comparison was intentional—northern cities like 
Detroit had the potential for greater segregation than did cities in the South.354 The 
National Urban League was disappointed, then, that other federal funding programs, like 
Hill-Burton, did not provide the same assurance for integration.355 But the environment 
created by federal regulations seemed favorable for the elimination of segregation when, 
in 1956, the Detroit Urban League began its fight for the full integration of the DMC. 
However, as described in chapter one, the city was still reluctant to tackle the allegations 
of discrimination head on.  
Emboldened by these legislations, Detroit activists rallied for better access and 
improved health care at Detroit Receiving and the DMC for indigent patients. The DMC 
development displaced thousands of black residents and forced many into public housing; 
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this construction did not contribute to the overall improved health status of the city. 
Throughout the 1960s, the health of black Detroit residents declined while the health of 
white Detroit residents and those in the suburbs continued to improve. In the context of 
the “social health” understood by activist groups, the poor health of Detroit’s black 
residents was caused by the poor housing and economic situation created by the 
construction of the DMC, while their poor health reinforced their poor economic 
circumstances. 
This chapter argues that the city officials’ decision to prioritize construction at the 
DMC while at the same time failing to address the declining status of Detroit Receiving 
contributed to the conditions that ultimately led to the Detroit Riots.356 In particular, the 
focus on the DMC reflected city leaders’ preference for its white middle- and upper-class 
residents at the expense of the city’s black residents. City officials continually delayed 
improvements at Detroit Receiving, arguing that it was not a good use of funds for the 
city, while continuing to build and expand the DMC and University City, which did not 
provide services that directly benefitted Detroit’s most vulnerable populations. The 
continued avoidance of Detroit’s indigent population—comprised of mostly black folks 
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due in part to the disproportional way that urban renewal policies negatively affected this 
population—meant that many of Detroit’s black communities were relegated to a life of 
poverty and all the ills that came with it. Those who participated in the violent protests 
during July 1967 cited unequal treatment in housing and employment opportunities, and 
other events that doomed them to a life of poverty. Thus, the effects of the DMC 
development and its role in the decay of Detroit Receiving Hospital must be considered 
in an historical analysis of this event. 
This chapter also attempts to parse out the difficult and complicated role that the 
DMC and Detroit Receiving played in the violence that occurred July 23-28, 1967 in 
Detroit. At once, these hospitals symbolized both the new Detroit and the one the city 
was choosing to leave behind, but this violence made city officials realize the necessity of 
an institution like Detroit Receiving. The aftermath of this event led to a newfound 
excitement from city officials like Mayor Cavanagh for Detroit Receiving to serve as a 
new trauma hospital within the confines of the DMC—whose previous political actions 
suggested a lack of support for such an institution. While city officials had spent the 
previous decade boosting the DMC Development, often to the detriment of Detroit 
Receiving, the violence in July was understood as a message—at least initially—about 
who actually lived in the city and utilized its resources. While the DMC was a symbol for 
city officials of what Detroit could be, Detroit Receiving was a symbol of what Detroit 
was at that moment. The central need of adequate trauma care during this event 
demonstrated that the offerings of Detroit Receiving were necessary not only for the 
indigent black patient community who frequented this hospital, but also for the success of 
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the whole city. While perhaps employing imperfect methods to do so, both city officials 
and black residents hoped the new trauma hospital would bring benefits to the health of 
the black community. These groups hoped that this hospital, Detroit Receiving, which 
had such meaning for black residents would be prioritized, updated, and have a physical 
presence finally reflective of its almost spiritual importance among this community. 
The effects of the violence during the summer of 1967 were long lasting for the 
city but also within the DMC. The DMC development was the largest urban renewal 
project in the nation but is notably absent from the historiography of the Detroit Riots. 
This is despite historians noting that some of the effects of urban renewal, like housing 
displacement and subsequent economic disparities, were motivators for this event. This 
chapter seeks to correct that by acknowledging the role that Detroit Receiving played in 
the lives of Detroit’s black communities. This chapter also recognizes the centrality of 
health activism among the city’s black communities.  Black activists often advocated for 
improvements in health provision concurrently to calls for improved economic conditions 
like housing and job opportunities. Many activists saw health advocacy as an entryway to 
further discussions of economic advocacy. In doing so, black activists highlighted the 
relationship between medical care, housing, jobs, and other markers of the lack of 
economic opportunity. 
This chapter begins by exploring early black health activism, demonstrating that 
black activists often centered health in their activism as a means of advocating for overall 
improved living conditions. In Detroit, this activism continued throughout the twentieth 
century, carried out by groups already discussed in the first chapter, like the Detroit 
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Urban League, but also labor unions and the NAACP. In the case of the DMC, urban 
renewal development was at the intersection of health, housing, and jobs. Activism 
around this construction led to continued frustration with the city government and was a 
contributing factor to the conditions leading up to the incident in July 1967. The chapter 
will then explore the event that became known as the Detroit Riots, and chronicle both 
the national and local response that sought to address why this happened and determine 
how to never have an event like this again. Part of this response was the recognition of 
the importance of Detroit Receiving, which provided emergency and trauma care to black 
participants and city official’s eventual decision to integrate Detroit Receiving into the 
DMC campus after decades of delay. This chapter will conclude by demonstrating that 
any understanding by city officials of the needs of Detroit’s black community was 
fleeting.  One of the more lasting effects of the inability of Detroit to confront its racial 
divisions was the failure of the city to deliver on its promise of a new Detroit Receiving 
Hospital.  
 
Foundations of Black Health Activism 
 One of the earliest instances of formalized black health activism was Negro 
Health Week in the early twentieth century, largely motivated by the work of Booker T. 
Washington. Initially promoted and sponsored by the National Negro Business League, 
the impetus for the creation of Negro Health Week was twofold: to improve the overall 
health conditions of black Americans, and to increase the number of black Americans 
represented in the health care professions. Segregated medical education and training 
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resulted in drastic discrepancies in the number of trained black physicians in the United 
States.357 In 1924, throughout the United States when segregation was not only common 
but often the law, there was only one black physician for every three thousand black 
patients, while there was one white physician for every white patient.358 Negro Health 
Week focused on hygiene, with public health nurses and social workers providing 
education to black women about how to keep their home sanitary, and promoting the 
necessity of personal responsibility in advocating for individuals’ improved health 
statuses for all members of black families.359 Health demonstrations were a large part of 
the strategy of many public health workers during the Progressive Era, but these 
demonstrations were different in that they were developed for, and by, black 
populations.360 
 National Negro Health Week led to the establishment of the Office of Negro 
Health Work within the United States Public Health Service in 1932 as part of the New 
Deal.361 Activists saw the establishment of this office as a victory, and, as a result, by the 
mid-twentieth century had begun taking a step back and broadening their definitions of 
“Negro health” improvement. In doing so, activists began taking what we today identify 
as a population health approach: working to improve job outlooks and providing 
education to black communities about how to navigate their local ordinances to demand 
                                                            
357 This is covered more in depth in Chapter 1, but you can also see Gamble, Making a Place for Themselves 
and Darlene Clark Hine, Black Women in White: Racial Conflict and Cooperation in the Nursing Profession, 1890-
1950 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). 
358 Sandra Crouse Quinn and Stephen B. Thomas, “The National Negro Health Week, 1915-1951: A 
Descriptive Account.” Minority Health Today, 2:3 (March/April 2001): 45-51. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Angela Castellanos, “Federal Government and African-American Communities Identifying and Defining 
African-American Health Disparities Through Intervention: The National Negro Health Week Movement and the 
Office of Negro Health Work from 1915-1951.” PhD Dissertation, Harvard Medical School, 2015. 
 123 
 
better living conditions, in addition to still providing check-ups and vaccinations for 
communicable diseases.362 In this way, black activists saw the clear, and unbreakable 
linkages between health and an improved standard of living for the broader black 
community. 
 In Detroit, this work on the national scale provided the background for groups like 
the Detroit Urban League to flourish. As we saw in the first chapter of this dissertation, 
the Detroit Urban League, an organization of middle-class black residents representing 
Detroit’s black community by working for equal economic opportunities, worked toward 
a more inclusive medical center that would provide well-paying professional jobs to 
black Detroit residents. Even this activism demonstrates that medical center development 
was about so much more than just health—the urban revitalization plans included 
housing, transportation, employment, and changes to public safety in one of Detroit’s 
neighborhood that had experienced historical disinvestment. 
 
Black Health Activism in Detroit  
 By the 1950s, activism groups like the Detroit Urban League had made city 
officials and planners aware of the dual-system of care and opportunities for employment 
between black and white Detroiters. For example, activists organized studies, 
demonstrations, and testified before groups like City Council and the Detroit City Plan 
Commission presenting evidence of these disparities. In as early as 1948, the Admissions 
and Allocations Committee of the Greater Detroit Hospital Fund—a state-appointed and 
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sponsored group of mostly white business men and philanthropists that provided 
advisement on how to prioritize hospital development in the Detroit area—noted that: 
“The problem of providing adequate hospital facilities for Negroes is more 
than a problem of construction of physical facilities. It is a problem of social 
policy. Negro citizens in Metropolitan Detroit need more adequate facilities 
because of a general long-standing community policy of segregating the 
sick Negro from our voluntary hospitals, he has been compelled to utilize 
inferior commercial hospitals. If he was fortunate enough to be admitted to 
one of our voluntary hospitals, he had to leave his Negro physician at the 
door of the hospital. Aside from a limited few, Negro physicians are not 
granted staff membership in our voluntary hospitals. Aside from an 
exceedingly limited number of isolated exceptions, young Negro physicians 
are not accepted as residents and interns in our voluntary hospitals. 
Advanced medical training and specialization is virtually impossible for the 
Negro physician in the Detroit area as long as he is unable to obtain staff 
privileges in high grade hospitals…The other half of the medical team, the 
trained nurse, has likewise not been given full opportunity to share the rich 
training experience our Detroit hospitals could offer…Negro women are 
generally unable to gain admittance to schools of nursing in the Detroit 
area…It is clear from the evidence that reasonably good hospitalization for 
Negroes and opportunities for training Negro physicians and nurses are 
exceedingly limited at the best and are largely non-existent in the Detroit 
area.”363 
 
As noted by this state board, the path for training black medical professionals was 
separated from “mainstream” white and publicly sponsored hospitals and training 
programs, even in northern cities like Detroit. This did not mean that there was a lack of 
interest or skill among black communities—quite the opposite. Historian Vanessa 
Northington Gamble has written that beginning in the late nineteenth century, black 
leaders began “making a place for themselves” by developing a black-controlled hospital 
systems in cities across the country, not only to ensure adequate treatment of black 
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patients, but also to provide training opportunities for black physicians and other medical 
professionals.364 Detroit had one of the highest number of black hospitals in the country, 
and most of these hospitals were owned and operated completely by black residents.365 
However, due to the financial and other capacity limitations of the black hospital system 
in Detroit, groups like the Detroit Urban League continued to work for integration of 
medical education and employment at the city’s white voluntary hospitals. 
Also, in 1948, operating under the assumption that this group would be 
sympathetic to the health needs of black Detroiters, a group of citizens supported by the 
Detroit Urban League submitted a proposal to the Greater Detroit Hospital Fund for the 
development of a new interracial hospital. Although this was a philanthropic group, the 
Greater Detroit Hospital Fund wielded great political power in the city due to its role as 
an advisor to the mayor and other city officials on the prioritization of hospital 
construction, and thus was able to work in tandem with City Council. The organization 
decided not to recommend the inclusion of this project.366 The Admissions Committee of 
the Greater Detroit Hospital Fund stated on November 26, 1948 that: 
“Thoughtful observers believe the inevitable trend of a so-called interracial 
hospital will be toward a segregated institution and low health standards; it 
permits the community to congratulate itself upon having solved a difficult 
social issue without in truth having made a basic attack upon the 
problem…Such a separate institution might well retard social progress 
toward the decent and democratic goal of integration. The issue before the 
Detroit community is clear. We can nurse our prejudices at a cost of an 
initial $4,000,000 initial investment, or we can work honestly toward 
integration of Negro personnel in our voluntary hospital system.”367 
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For the Greater Detroit Hospital Fund, then, it made more sense to work on integrating 
the hospitals that already existed rather than build a brand new one with the explicitly 
stated goal of integration. Black Detroiters were skeptical that this would work, perhaps 
doubting the belief of the inevitability of integration that the Greater Detroit Hospital 
Fund seemed to purport since there were no other attempts to actively integrate, so they 
turned to their greatest source of political power: the unions.  
Any political power that black Detroiters held in the 1950s was largely credited to 
their large numbers in the United Auto Workers [UAW] or Congress of Industrial 
Organizations [CIO] Unions. The CIO had been leading the fight for integration in labor 
settings—including hospitals that offered many service-level jobs for black employees. 
The CIO was involved because they had “always supported medical and hospital 
programs designed to bring professional training to all doctors, nurses, and medical 
technicians regardless of race, creed, or color.”368 The CIO made it known that while they 
believed the Greater Detroit Hospital Fund,  saying that their statement was “abundantly 
clear” and would “inevitably result in a program of complete integration of all 
community hospitals at every level,” they would also hold this group accountable to its 
promise to push for integration.369  
The CIO issued a statement on hospital segregation and discrimination, stating 
that they had “repeatedly…sought to alert the American public, the United States 
Congress, and the organizations of professional people who have primary responsibilities 
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in the fields of health care to the scandalous failure to meet the needs of our nation’s 
families.”370 The Wayne County CIO Council Delegates then, representing three-hundred 
thousand workers in Metro Detroit, urged the Metropolitan Detroit Building Fund to “use 
their good offices and work for an accelerated program designed to assist the citizens of 
Detroit in achieving the goals of complete integration in all of the hospital services in the 
community in a non-discriminatory and non-segregated basis.”371 Moreover, the CIO said 
none of their unionized workers would work to build or work in hospitals that were 
segregated.372 
The Greater Detroit Hospital Fund determined that Parkside Hospital, the first and 
largest black hospital in the city, was the ideal hospital at which to work toward 
integration in the early 1950s. Black activists working for health integration in Detroit 
opposed the plan to integrate Parkside Hospital, however, believing that this would only 
result in continued “Jim-crow style hospitals.” Instead, black activists argued that 
successful integration must happen from black patients being allowed in white 
hospitals—institutions that often had more capacity and funding—rather than expecting 
white patients to come to underfinanced and overburdened black hospitals.373 These 
activists were disheartened at this half-hearted integration strategy at Parkland that they 
believed only paid lip service to equal opportunity. 
In a joint address to make this frustration clear, the CIO and NAACP noted on 
November 16, 1953 that they “[were] against segregation in any form—whether in 
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hospitals, in schools, public transportation, public accommodations, or churches,” making 
it clear that these activists were opposed to any expansion of a segregated hospital, and 
would instead continue to fight for integration throughout the city.374 The CIO was no 
longer in support of the Greater Detroit Hospital Fund’s plans for the future, and realized 
more grassroots activism would be necessary to create the changes in the city this union 
sought. 
The activism from groups like the CIO, the NAACP, and the Detroit Urban 
League in the early 1950s to remove openly discriminatory policies at white-only 
hospitals did little to improve access at first, because there was no real way to police 
these policies. This was in line with other cities across the country, too. De facto 
segregation existed in nearly every city in the United States but was more prominently 
felt in places like Detroit where the black population was so prominent and 
concentrated.375  
 
Beyond Access 
 Detroit’s black activists knew, however, that the difficulties that black residents 
had in securing adequate medical care was more complicated than a lack of access. 
Harlan Randolph, an organizer with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
[SNCC], was among the civil rights activists in the early 1960s who suggested that a lack 
of access was only one barrier of many that prevented black Americans from receiving 
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medical care. The bigger issue was that American medicine was a discriminatory system 
that prevented black patients from seeking health care and created issues preventing 
proper care utilization. He remarked: 
“Look at systems for the delivery of services in terms of the impact of 
different providers on different socio-economic groups. For example, in the 
treatment of venereal disease, the middle-class patient is treated by a private 
physician and no public record exists of this. The lower-class patient, in 
contrast, goes to a public clinic, where he is questioned extensively, and a 
public record is made. This kind of contact results in a negative 
psychological attitude toward receiving medical care.”376 
 
For Randolph, it was not enough to simply offer health care for all people regardless of 
their racial backgrounds or ability to pay; the care had to be of equal level and 
practitioners—and the systems in which they operated—needed to prioritize all patients’ 
humanity and dignity regardless of racial background or ability to pay. 
While of the things that DMC planners believed contributed to poor health for the 
bulk of the city’s population—like a lack of physicians in the city’s center and 
dilapidated buildings—certainly contributed to the poor health of Detroit’s black 
residents, the real cause was hard-baked into the system itself. The explicit segregation—
like excluding patients from white wards, denying black physicians admission privileges, 
and relegating black nurses to LPNs rather than achieving RN status—did result in a two-
tiered system of health care in the city, and an inability of black city residents to find 
upwardly mobile employment within this growing industry. But the widespread, systemic 
segregation caused by more hidden transcripts, like denying patients based on their public 
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insurance status or the way they received their injury, were more difficult to parse out. As 
Randolph noted, the perfectly legal, and unintentional segregation resulting from a black 
patient with a sexually transmitted infection going to a public clinic and therefore 
carrying a public record, were not factors taken into consideration by the DMC planners. 
 
Social Determinants of Health in Detroit 
 As previously discussed in chapters one and two, Detroit had begun losing 
population shortly after World War II, seeing a proliferation of white suburbs and a core 
of mostly black urban residents. In Detroit, this resulted in a shrinking tax base, and a 
lower standard of living for the city’s residents compared to their suburban counterparts. 
Detroiters, especially those living in the “inner city,” experienced higher rates of 
unemployment, more difficulty finding safe and affordable housing, and other symptoms 
of increased poverty.  
 This was felt, perhaps more egregiously, because of the role that the medical 
center development played in increasing racial discrepancies in Detroit and making the 
social determinants of health even more severe. While a more thorough discussion is in 
earlier chapters, it is important to reiterate the housing crisis that this development helped 
to create.  
 The housing around the DMC required a “comfortable income.” The Detroit 
Urban League pointed out this economic test excluded the black folks who had formerly 
lived in the neighborhood and instead privileged white-collar professionals.377 The 
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Detroit Housing Commission made their intention evident when they wrote that “the 
[ideal] Medical Center household is small, above average income, in a white-collar 
occupation, earning above average income.” Again, the emphasis was on bringing people 
back to the city. From the same report:  
“The downtown image is in need of promotion to make it widely acceptable 
as a place to live. Only half of the people interested in downtown have ever 
seen any of the new housing built there. Concentrated efforts are therefore 
needed to reach and sell them…It is important to note that it is white-collar 
employment which holds the greatest promise for future economic growth 
in the Detroit area. The future of Detroit depends on utilizing this trend. 
Large shortages of residence for white-collar employees around the City’s 
major white-collar employment centers could seriously impair future job 
expansion in the city.”378  
 
 One-bedroom housing in this area before DMC Development cost an average of 
thirty dollars per month. After construction, planners estimated that similarly sized 
apartments would go as high as ninety-six dollars per month.379 For context, the national 
average monthly rental in 1960 for a one-bedroom apartment was sixty-nine dollars.380 
The displacement that resulted from similar developments resulted in the growth of 
public housing—a project of urban renewal itself. While public housing was a solution 
for the lack of affordable housing, they quickly became centers of highly concentrated 
poverty, crime, and health troubles.381 All the while, black Detroiters remained excluded 
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from both the care provided at the hospitals of the DMC and also the economic 
opportunities it afforded white residents.382 
In Detroit, the mobilization around the problems of the DMC development and 
the neglect of Detroit Receiving fell primarily with the Detroit Urban League and the 
NAACP. Alondra Nelson has written how the Black Panther Party mobilized around 
these social determinants of health in other places around the nation, realizing that 
physical ailments and economic and social realities were inseparable among black 
residents. The Panthers offered free clinics with culturally competent care to 
impoverished black communities and ran campaigns to raise awareness about problems 
facing black communities like sickle cell anemia. At the same time, the Panthers 
demanded from white medical establishments and policymakers a greater understanding 
of biomedical issues facing black Americans and, in general, more equitable medical 
care.383 In Detroit, however, while there was an active Black Panther Party, it focused 
primarily on self-defense against the police.384 Its leaders focused on other forms of 
activism. Perhaps that is why the event in July 1967 was so violent and intense in this 
city. 
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The Detroit Riots 
 In the early morning of July 23, 1967, Detroit police officers raided an unlicensed, 
after-hours bar that was housed in the headquarters of a black civil rights group. The club 
was particularly busy that night, hosting parties for servicemen returning from Vietnam, 
and providing an air-conditioned respite from the thick humidity and oppressive heat 
outside. As police arrested the eighty-five black men inside the club, a group gathered on 
the street to observe. After about an hour, when the last person was arrested and taken 
away, hundreds of people had flooded the street, and the group that had gathered outside 
began throwing glass bottles. The police initially ignored this, but when a bottle crashed 
through a window of a police car, chaos erupted. The subsequent, three-day long violence 
would come to be known as The Detroit Riots, one of the deadliest and largest urban 
events during a decade that saw similar events around the nation. Fires had broken out by 
sunrise, and only hours later, every Detroit firefighter and policeman had been called into 
work, and violence continued to overwhelm the city. 
 Mayor Cavanagh requested that Governor George Romney send in State 
Troopers, and Governor Romney sent in the National Guard shortly thereafter. When the 
violence continued to grow, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent in two thousand Army 
paratroopers to patrol the streets in armored tanks. Over those three days, seven thousand 
people were arrested, forty-three people were killed, fourteen hundred buildings were 
burned resulting in nearly fifty million dollars in property damage, and five thousand 
people lost their homes.385 
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 When the fires were put out and the damage was assessed, the questions that 
people across America could not stop asking were: “What happened? Why did it happen? 
What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?”386 This event, 
happening nearly in tandem with the less deadly incident in Newark, was directly 
responsible for President Johnson appointing an eleven-member National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders only hours after the end of the violence in Detroit on July 
28, 1967.387 The Kerner Report, as it became more commonly known, stated that 
America was facing a “system of apartheid,” and that the country was “moving toward 
two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”388 The Kerner Commission 
acknowledged the way that racist and discriminatory policies kept black Americans “in 
the streets of the ghetto,” and that this was the primary reason for these acts of violence 
by black communities across the nation. The report stated:  
“What white Americans have never fully understood—but what the Negro 
can never forget—is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. 
White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society 
condones it.”389 
 
The eleven-person commission was a bi-partisan contingent of state and federal 
elected officials, business representatives, and the Police Chief of Atlanta, Georgia and 
the president of the NAACP. The commission suggested practical solutions including 
raising taxes to fund better inner city job opportunities, open housing opportunities in the 
suburbs, and create what housing advocates today called “scattered site housing,” where 
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affordable housing is spread throughout an area rather than concentrated in high rises in 
the projects or in slums.390 The findings of this commission were largely ignored; shortly 
after the publication of these findings, the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. was the 
catalyst for similar violent events across one-hundred American cities—the aftermath of 
which occupied the president’s time.391 
 In Detroit, locals tried to assess on their own how their city could erupt with such 
violence, seemingly–at least according to journalists and those in white society—out of 
nowhere. About a month after the incident in late July, the Detroit Free Press ran a 
survey of four-hundred-thirty-seven black people involved in the event. Out of the 
twenty-three possible choices for the main cause of the event provided by the newspaper, 
police brutality, overcrowded living conditions, and poor housing were found to be the 
leading causes. Well over half of respondents identified these as having “a great deal” to 
do with the violence; frustrations around health and/or medical services were not options 
given by this newspaper.392 Additionally, black participants noted that they felt treated 
unfairly by grocery stores, loan offices, real estate agents, banks, furniture stores, 
insurance brokers, automobile repair shops, and car dealers.393  
 These reasons for this violence were like the reasons that had motivated black 
activists decades earlier to work to improve health equity for black Americans. But 
instead of the more traditional routes of non-violent protest like public health 
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demonstration projects, lobbying elected officials, and enacting research studies those 
involved in the event in July 1967 employed violent protest. In this way, this incident was 
the result of a population whose needs had been largely ignored—despite decades of non-
violent protest—by their city’s government. As Martin Luther King said, “A riot is the 
language of the unheard,” and black Detroiters demanded to be heard.394  
 
Speramus Meliora; Resurget Cineribus395 
 The violence in Detroit during late July 1967 has been well covered by historians, 
and anecdotes from that summer remain important for nearly all Detroiters today. But 
something that has received less attention is the peculiar place that the DMC and Detroit 
Receiving play in this narrative, and how city residents and officials placed newfound 
importance on the future of these institutions because of this event. The stories of many 
participants have largely been lost to history. However, the stories of the men and women 
who worked at the hospital that saw the bulk of the victims, Detroit Receiving, help to 
illustrate the important place that this hospital held was during the events in July. 
Throughout the days of violence, the hospitals of the DMC and Detroit Receiving 
were heavily protected by Detroit Police, the National Guard, and active service troops 
sent in by President Johnson. Those injured in the event needed somewhere to go, and for 
that reason, these areas were given priority protection. However, the care received, even 
though the city had allegedly stopped segregating care in 1965, was segregated. Injured 
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black Detroiters were sent to Detroit Receiving, and white folks with private insurance 
were sent to the hospitals of the DMC and other private hospitals in the city, like Henry 
Ford Hospital.396 
 Already taxed and stressed out, this event required Detroit Receiving hospital 
staff to see even more trauma cases, testing the limits of both the physical structure and 
its personnel. Trauma surgeon John Crissman, who had just begun work at Detroit 
Receiving on July 1, 1967, remembers the “eerie calm” of the hospital during the event, 
especially in juxtaposition to the war happening outside its walls. Dr. Crissman said of 
the event that: “There was a paradox because the emergency room basically closed down, 
because there wasn’t any of the routine, ambulatory emergency room patients coming 
in…The only things we saw were major trauma.”397 In addition to hallways flooded with 
patients and the “eerie” white noise of forty black patients on stomach pumping machines 
to heal from abdominal surgery to treat their stab and gunshot wounds, Crissman noted 
that he felt scared. He was worried that the animosity black participants showed in the 
streets toward white folks and white businesses would carry over to these patients in the 
hospital. But he reported he was surprised to find all his patients peaceful and “very 
grateful that someone was taking care of them.”398 While danger and destruction erupted 
outside of the walls of Detroit Receiving, the hospital was a haven of sorts where the 
racially charged violence stopped.   
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One medical resident, Dr. Carl Lauter, recounts the surprise he felt when he was 
called into the hospital. He was off, and was asked to come in, but not to drive because it 
might not be safe. He was further instructed that the bus would be even worse. His 
supervisor, Dr. Richard Bing, suggested that he call a “black cab” company to get to 
work. Dr. Lauter says of this transport: 
“I didn’t know there was such a thing as a white cab company and a black 
cab company…apparently there were two black-owned cab companies in 
the city at the time and the police gave me their numbers, they know who 
they were.”399  
 
Tall, fair, and blond, Dr. Lauter was asked by his black cab driver to “scrunch 
down” in the back seat so to not draw attention to the cab and potentially welcome 
snipers’ bullets.400 Lauter didn’t need to worry about his female nurse colleagues arriving 
safely to the hospital; in a gendered (and perhaps racially charged since many 
participating in the event were black men) practice to ensure the their safety, nurses were 
driven to the hospital via ambulance. This was possible since, despite the ever-growing 
violence creating a likely need for ambulances, they were not venturing out to find 
patients—patients came to the hospital mostly by police car.401  
 Lauter was at Detroit Receiving for seven days straight, and despite leaving his 
medical residency soon after to serve as a doctor in the military, he “never saw anything 
in the Air Force two years like [he] saw in that one week at Receiving Hospital as far as 
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those type of injuries.”402 Because of the danger that came from getting to and from the 
hospital, most employees stayed there for the whole week, and from their sleeping room 
on the eighth floor, could see flames in all directions.403  
The paranoia outside also brought in accident victims not injured in the violence 
per se; in fact, Detroit Receiving saw more accidental injuries during the riots than during 
a normal week. According to nurse Cheryl Pierce-Reidy, several people were actually 
“shooting themselves in the foot” because they were buying and working with firearms 
when they were not used to them.404  
But just because the violence on the street was erupting, it did not mean that other 
medical issues and emergencies were not coming into the hospital. By the “third or fourth 
day” according to Dr. Lauter, he saw mostly “people like diabetics, who would run out of 
insulin and they couldn’t get to the drugstore because everything was closed.”405 
The overflow of Medicaid and public patients made reimbursement more difficult 
than normal for the billing staff. Ultimately, the hospital was reimbursed at-cost for 
diagnosis and treatment of treating trauma injuries like gunshot and stab wounds, but 
many physician services were simply absorbed without reimbursement for the time of the 
hospital staff who treated and cared for all who arrived.406   
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 Despite the peculiarities of working during this event, the physicians at Receiving 
were “mostly upbeat.”407 The hospital was protected with soldiers and military 
accompanying physicians on their medical rounds, and they were so busy they were 
largely unaware of the extent of what was happening on the outside of their so-called 
fortress.408 Adding to the confusion was that virtually everyone who was coming into 
Receiving for trauma treatment was under arrest or a prisoner. As Dr. Lauter explained, 
“There were many, many, hundreds, maybe thousands of prisoners…[it was too 
confusing] so most were just released [after receiving care].”409 In the accounts of the 
white medical staff about their time serving black Detroiters during this event, there was 
seemingly no concern over the continued policing of black bodies by locking these 
prisoners to their beds and pipes or fortifying the hospital despite it being an otherwise 
neutral zone.  
 After the flames subsided and the troops left the city, a fractured Detroit began to 
assess the damage. What was clear to all—residents, onlookers, and the city government 
itself—was the competency of staff at Detroit Receiving throughout the event. Praising 
the staff, representatives from Mayor Cavanagh’s office wrote: 
“There is no question in my mind that had it not been for your most efficient 
handling of the many questions and requests that arose from the start of 
things, things would not have gone as smoothly as they did. I consider the 
City of Detroit exceedingly fortunate to have [a staff] of your dedication 
and ability serving its interests.”410  
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 The Assistant Dean Walt of Wayne State University Medical School, who 
oversaw the workers at Detroit Receiving Hospital, received applause from Cavanagh’s 
office for the way they worked during the “civil unrest.”411 Cavanagh’s office wrote:  
“The manner in which you not only mobilized the professional staff, but 
perhaps more importantly, inspired them unquestionably played a major 
role in the amazingly effective manner in which the many problems were 
handled.”412 
 
More praise went to the administrator of Detroit Receiving Hospital, E.P. Henry. In 
speaking about the incident, Cavanagh stated:  
“I have bragged to so many people by now about the superb administration 
and activities of the Detroit [Receiving] Hospital during the course of that 
unfortunate week that I fear I overdo it. There is no question in my mind 
that the hospital would never have been able to perform in such an 
outstanding manner despite its excellent professional staff if you had not 
personally and consistently been at the helm from the very start to see that 
everything went properly.”413 
 
It was clear that despite the tragedy and uncertainty that befell the city during that 
event in July, city officials understood the central role that Detroit Receiving 
played in the continued operations of a functioning Detroit. 
 
 
A New Receiving 
 
 As city leaders tried to make sense of why the events in July escalated so 
drastically, they sought to remedy ill will among the city’s black communities and the 
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increasing feelings of separation of the remaining white population within the city.414 
One direct action was the development of the New Detroit Committee, founded in 1968 
by Henry Ford II, J.L. Hudson, and Max Fisher—the three most prominent 
philanthropists in Detroit—to assist with Detroit’s “rebuilding.”415 This ushered in a new 
era of even greater reliance on private funding for development in Detroit. 
 Federal funds for urban renewal had largely run out in Detroit by 1967, but by 
July 1968, the city unanimously endorsed the development of a new Detroit Receiving 
Hospital within the confines of the DMC.416 This was due, largely, to the summer’s 
previous violence giving the city the “proof” it needed to begin the reignited push for a 
new Detroit Receiving.417  Mainstream organizations in Detroit, including New Detroit, 
partnered with “radical” black organizations in the first several months after the incident, 
working to include black voices in the future planning of the city.418 The motivations of 
city officials and boosters to partner with black organizations are unclear. Perhaps they 
understood the need for inclusion from the findings from the Kerner Commission or 
perhaps they simply understood that the city’s majority was changing and were 
concerned about the growing political power of the city’s black residents. Regardless of 
their complex motivations, there were genuine attempts by city officials and boosters to 
prioritize the needs of this community in the aftermath of the summer of 1967. However, 
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like Mayor Cavanagh’s initial courting of black Detroiters during his upset mayoral 
victory in 1961, these promises were short-lived. 
 
The Medical Center Moves Forward 
As the city announced its plans for a new Detroit Receiving within the DMC, the 
medical center development continued to flourish. In March 1967, the city broke ground 
on the first new hospital of the DMC: Children’s Hospital. This month saw also the 
development of the Medical Court Apartments, a new apartment complex designed by 
the Detroit City Plan Commission for the largely white professionals who would work at 
the new Medical Center, as well as the establishment of the Coronary Center at Harper 
Hospital, which DMC developers hoped would become the “best in the nation.”419 These 
projects continued through summer 1968 when the city tried to finalize its plans for a 
new Receiving. 
From the perspective of city planners and officials, the development of the DMC 
was working. From the start of the project in 1956 through December 1969, crime was 
reduced ninety percent, providing proof of a community transformed in the ways that 
would bring renewal to the city.420 That said, the city’s Thirteenth Precinct, which was 
the neighborhood immediately south of the newly developed DMC, still had the highest 
crime rate in the city.421 The rest of the city was excluded from the progress made at this 
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development—even the area directly neighboring the DMC. It was becoming 
increasingly clear that this development was isolated from the rest of the city; DMC 
officials did not see themselves as responsible for improving conditions outside of its 
own boundary walls.  
This isolation from its surrounding community was not unique to DMC; there are 
many stories of academic health centers in urban centers struggling to reconcile their own 
economic progress with its economically depressed surrounding neighborhoods during 
the mid-twentieth century. One such incidence was the development of the Cleveland 
Clinic and its role in that city’s violence in the summer of 1966. Like the DMC, the 
Cleveland Clinic developed in an impoverished part of the city. This institution did not 
include members of the surrounding neighborhoods in plans for its development and did 
not prioritize poor residents in its plans for care. Its leaders were caught by surprise when 
its surrounding neighborhood erupted in violence in the summer of 1966. But unlike in 
Detroit, Cleveland officials noted the disconnect between the Clinic’s development and 
the state of its surrounding residents, noting that the renewal had “not paid off” for the 
most vulnerable of Cleveland’s communities.422 While similarly confused and scared like 
Detroit officials, Cleveland’s city and county officials were able to implement 
meaningful change into future Cleveland Clinic development to work toward city-wide 
renewal through the development of satellite clinics serving indigent populations. While 
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it is fair question if these were tokenism it is important to note that the Cleveland Clinic 
enjoys the national reputation that the DMC hoped for during its planning throughout the 
mid-twentieth century.423 
In Detroit, the DMC remained insular, and the involvement that city officials and 
powerful philanthropy groups like New Detroit initially sought from black residents was 
short-lived. This may be because this partnership between future planning in Detroit and 
vocal black activists was not politically advantageous in the suburbs during the aftermath 
of the violence in July 1967. Also short-lived was the commitment to rebuild a new 
Detroit Receiving within the confines of the DMC. While never outright denying this 
development, its commencement was indefinitely delayed without any progress until the 
mid-1970s due to a perpetual lack of funding. 
 
Declining Health in Detroit 
 While people had begun leaving Detroit long before July 1967, the violent event 
that summer was enough to solidify Detroit’s reputation as an unsafe and unwelcoming 
place for white folks. Homeownership rates declined, as did the city’s tax base, and jobs 
became scarcer throughout the 1970s as manufacturing jobs moved south and overseas.424 
The economic realities of life in Detroit meant that residents were more in need 
than ever of public services, but the city was not financially able to provide these. 
Because of declining city finances, Detroit ended its visiting nursing program, and queues 
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increased dramatically at public health clinics throughout the city.425 In early 1974, a 
parent could schedule a pediatric appointment for her child at any of Detroit’s clinics 
within about a week; by 1975, the wait time had increased to nearly three months.426 
Even though Detroit had a drug problem that had reached epidemic levels, the city-
sponsored methadone clinic and drug abuse program were ended in 1975 due to a lack of 
funding.427   
 This strain on the city’s health services was felt especially in the health status of 
Detroit’s poor, black community. As in the previous decade, this decrease in health status 
was juxtaposed with continually improving health statistics in the outer city and the 
suburbs. Health disparities were so great in this area, in fact, that the Detroit Health 
Department branded the inner city as the “City Within the City.”428 By 1975, the “City 
Within” was home to half of all city residents.429 The majority of these residents were 
black, and forty percent lived in substandard housing.430 The “City Within” had higher 
rates of morbidity—twice the rates of pneumonia, cirrhosis, and infant mortality as 
compared to Detroit’s suburbs, or even the “outer” city.431   
The healthcare system that existed in the “City Within” was, according to a 
Detroit Receiving physician, “insufficient, discriminatory, fragmented, and burdened by 
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red tape.”432 With few other choices, inner city residents continued to turn in droves to 
the emergency room at Detroit Receiving.433 By this point in 1975, the hospital was 
losing nearly sixty thousand dollars a day, just shy of twenty-two million dollars annually 
due to the increasing visits from indigent patients.434  
 As the black population returned to being ignored by city government, their 
political power grew as the city demographics further shifted to a city that was 
increasingly black—forty-eight percent by 1970.435 This led to the election of the city’s 
first black mayor in 1972. 
 
The Coleman Young Era 
 A suspected Communist who represented Detroit in the Michigan Senate, 
Coleman A. Young was elected on his platform of ending police brutality and promoting 
racial equity with over fifty-nine percent of the vote, indicative of the changing electorate 
within city limits.436 Mayor Young immediately began working on his campaign 
promises but he also immediately became a controversial figure and an easy scapegoat 
for an increasingly tenuous relationship between the city and the suburbs. In his inaugural 
address, Young stated: 
“We can no longer afford the luxury of hatred and racial division. What is 
good for the black people of this city is good for the white people of this 
city. What is good for the rich people in this city is good for the poor 
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people in this city. What is good for those who live in the suburbs is good 
for those of us who live in the central city.” 
 
And then, previewing his ad lib styling that would become a hallmark of his tenure, 
Young closed with a warning: 
“I issue open warnings now to all dope pushers, to all rip-off artists, to all 
muggers: It’s time to leave Detroit. Hit Eight Mile Road!437 And I don’t 
give a damn if they’re black or white, if they wear Superfly suits or blue 
uniforms with silver badges. Hit the road!”438 
 
This began the mythos of Mayor Young as an executive who not only wanted white 
people to leave the city but encouraged the migration of “problem” residents to the 
suburbs. Both perceived suggestions made for a difficult relationship between city 
leadership and its surrounding suburbs in the years during the Young administration. In 
fact, city development plans became even more difficult as groups like the Greater 
Detroit Hospital Fund shifted focus from the city to the suburbs.439 But Mayor Young 
believed that a new era of revitalization in the city center would bring about Detroit’s 
renaissance. To that end, Mayor Young and his staff began developing a plan for their 
vision of Detroit and hoped to find funding through appeals directly to the President of 
the United States. 
By Mayor Young’s inauguration, the city faced a thirty-five million dollar budget 
deficit.440 Mayor Young tried to remedy this by raising taxes on the remaining property 
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owners in the city, but this did little to help—many of these tax bills went unpaid.441 
Knowing municipal funding would be necessary for any sort of renaissance or continued 
development in the city—which was still rehabilitating from the violence of July, 1967—
Mayor Young reached out to the philanthropists of New Detroit (which had changed their 
name to Detroit Renaissance) and Governor William Milliken to develop a plan to 
approach the president directly.442 It was the hope of this coalition that President Ford 
would be sympathetic to this cause as a Michigan native himself—and the chair of the 
Kerner Commission—and could thus sway Congress to approve special funding for the 
city.443 Additionally, Mayor Young believed that the city was “owed” for damages from 
the federal government for what he called “Hurricane HUD”—a housing crisis caused by 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD]’s mismanagement of 
foreclosures in Detroit—in the same way that the federal government would help a city 
rebuild after an actual hurricane.444 
After the July 1967 event, HUD “guidelines were purposely relaxed” to help 
rehome those who had lost theirs in both the event and subsequent economic decline, but 
“hindsight indicates the Department should not have been insuring” mortgages for some 
of these properties.445 In addition to essentially providing subprime mortgages for Detroit 
residents and falsely inflating property values, opportunistic contractors “took advantage 
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of the pressures and volume and were successful in ‘ripping off’ both HUD and 
unsophisticated buyers.”446 This left “drug dens and useless wreckage” in the city across 
its twelve thousand vacant homes.447 By the mid-1970s, a third of all repossessions in the 
nation existed in Detroit due to the HUD crisis.448 By 1974, HUD owned over sixteen 
thousand single-family homes in Detroit—twenty-one percent of the department’s 
national inventory.449 This catastrophe, created by the federal government and a key 
cause of the severity of Detroit’s struggles, was another motivator for Mayor Young 
pleading to the president directly for funding for his jobs plan for the city. 
The mayor realized that his city had become “the international symbol of the 
problems of big cities with its rates urban crime and unemployment,” but he knew that it 
was “not ready to accept an epitaph.”450 Young saw in this crisis an opportunity, and in 
turn, this had implications for the city’s health care institutions.  
 
The Detroit Plan 
In April 1975, Mayor Young presented “Moving Detroit Forward: A Plan for 
Economic Revitalization,” to President Ford in April 1975. The Detroit Plan was an 
employment program for revitalization that emphasized immediate public service jobs to 
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restore activity within the city.451 Central to the Detroit Plan were jobs in the medical 
industry. With a fifteen-million-dollar infusion from the federal government for this 
specific purpose, planners believed that they could add fifteen thousand jobs just in this 
industry. The Detroit Plan placed the DMC at its center. It conceded that development of 
a place like the DMC was “not traditionally seen as an industrial undertaking,” but its 
importance in this venue could not be underestimated—by 1975, the DMC employed 
ninety-five hundred people and had an annual budget of one-hundred-eighty million 
dollars.452 
To complete the DMC, Mayor Young and Detroit Renaissance petitioned the 
federal government for funding for a new Detroit Receiving Hospital at the center of the 
DMC. The Detroit Plan stated that this hospital’s “rapid completion…[was] an integral 
part of the expansion of new industries in Detroit.”453 The city acknowledged that Detroit 
Receiving was “no longer economically efficient.”454 The construction of a new trauma 
hospital, however, in the DMC would mean that this hospital could be the flagship of one 
of the largest medical centers in the United States. Receiving would be “physically 
centered so patients could get specialized care from the most comprehensive array of 
services available anywhere.”455 In order to make this a reality, the city was asking for an 
interest-free federal loan. Eighty million dollars were needed for the construction of the 
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new Detroit Receiving, which would result in one thousand short-term labor positions 
and fifteen hundred new permanent jobs.456 
 This plan also made suggestions for new federal legislation that would ease the 
troubles of Detroit and other cities like it, including tax credits and automatic funding for 
emergency feeding programs for cities with unemployment greater than nine percent, 
mass transit funding, and specialized housing funding for cities deemed “economically 
depressed.”457 
 Before meeting with Mayor Young and Detroit Renaissance, the president and his 
staff knew they would not be approving this plan, and schemed how to “not raise false 
expectations.”458 The president’s advisers stated that this proposal “ignored” several 
avenues for funding that Detroit was not currently pursuing, including the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, the Work Incentive Program, the 
Economic Development Administration, the General Revenue Sharing fund, and its 
eligibility to receive about thirty-four million dollars from HUD as part of their Block 
Grant Program.459 While acknowledging that Detroit’s problems were “more severe than 
most cities,” President Ford and his advisers understood that Detroit’s difficulties 
reflected those experienced across other American cities at this time.460 
 Mayor Young felt optimistic after his meeting with the president, despite learning 
that it would be impossible for the federal government to provide the nearly 2.4 billion 
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dollars in funding required for what Mayor Young called a “Marshall Plan for urban 
depression.”461 President Ford told Mayor Young that he would prioritize Detroit on 
existing appropriations for mass transit and housing, and that the city should begin 
moving forward with some of the proposal “based on the assumption that the tax [credits 
discussed in the plan would] be approved.”462  
 
Receiving Hospital Within the DMC 
 Although the Detroit Plan did not receive the 2.4 billion dollars for which it 
asked, the federal government did give the city its eighty million dollar loan for a new 
Detroit Receiving Hospital.463 The city was confident in its ability to turn around its 
unemployment in a short time and repay this loan using tax dollars from Mayor Young’s 
increasing tax rates for city residents.464 
The hospital construction itself cost only eighty million dollars, but another forty-
five million was spent on its “cutting edge” concourse, award-winning architecture, and 
unique specialty care equipment.465 This additional amount was not covered by their loan 
from the federal government, but the city believed it would make up this deficit through 
the economic transformation brought to this area.466 “Rising like a beautiful phoenix from 
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the ashes of its predecessors,” it was hoped that this new structure would become the 
epitome of modern hospital architecture while simultaneously serving as a symbol of 
Detroit’s renewal and the provider of health care to Detroit’s neediest population.467 
Completed in late 1979, it won several national architecture awards.468  
This excitement, however, was short-lived. After its completion, Mayor Young 
announced that the new, one-hundred-twenty-five million dollar structure would not open 
because the city could no longer finance its operations and debt service.469 Adding to this 
crisis, the city could no longer support the old, outdated Receiving Hospital and so it too 
would be closed.470   
News coverage of the planned closure made clear that the hospital’s importance 
extended beyond the medical care it provided. An emergency room nurse was quoted in a 
newspaper article saying: “Here’s a social problem: What do we do with the street people 
who live under Detroit Receiving’s warm air vents when they turn the heat off?”471  
While city officials assured Detroiters that they would be able to receive care at the 
hospitals of the DMC, black residents maintained that Detroit Receiving was the only 
hospital that truly cared about the poor of Detroit—whether it was truly medical care they 
needed, or just basic human assistance.  
Mayor Young and City Council felt like they were out of options; if the city was 
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to have a Detroit Receiving Hospital, it could no longer belong to the city.472 They began 
discussing selling the hospital to the Detroit Medical Center Corporation [DMCCo]—the 
nonprofit body that oversaw operations at the DMC.  
One of the proposed solutions for Detroit Receiving’s woes was floated in 1976 
when Mayor Young and Governor William Milliken appointed a task force to discuss a 
potential state takeover of Detroit Receiving rather than place it into the DMC.473 Mayor 
Young was never in favor of this, despite strong support from the DMCCo, business 
consultants, and DMC hospital trustees stating that the hospital must be “run by the city, 
for the people of the city.”474 The continued city ownership, however, made it difficult to 
run Detroit Receiving efficiently; its continued existence meant that the hospital had 
many masters within the city, including the health department, the mayor’s office, city 
council, and voters, and this bureaucracy and lack of centralization and efficiency led to 
“chronic problems.”475 
Concerned Citizens for Detroit Receiving Hospital, a vocal community 
organization, rallied to prevent the sale.476 They argued that turning Detroit Receiving 
Hospital into a “public benefit corporation” would make care more difficult to access for 
the medically indigent population in Detroit.477  They argued that people who lacked 
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insurance would be refused care at this new hospital, citing instances of difficulty in 
accessing care at Harper, Children’s, or Hutzel, noting that  if you had “no money or 
insurance (and sometimes even with Medicare and Medicaid) you could be turned 
away.478   
Hospital employees also protested the sale, realizing that they would lose their 
status as city employees and therefore their union benefits with the sale to a public 
benefit corporation.479  They argued that this sale would cut city jobs with no guarantee 
that current employees would be hired at the DMC. If they did find jobs at the new 
center, their new status as private employees would mean a pay cut and a drastic cut in 
fringe benefits.480 
 In the end, Mayor Young believed a private Detroit Receiving was better than 
none at all. The city sold the never used, one-hundred-twenty-five-million-dollar 
structure for twenty million dollars to the DMCCo in 1980, and the city was still 
responsible for the full repayment of the eighty million dollar loan from the federal 
government.481 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Viewing the event commonly known as the Detroit Riots through the lens of 
Detroit Receiving Hospital reveals both the reasons leading to unrest within Detroit’s 
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black communities and the low-level of meaningful commitment that the city had to 
addressing the needs of these communities in the future. Even the election of Detroit’s 
first black mayor could not fully address these seemingly intractable issues in housing, 
job opportunities, and health. Mayor Young and his predecessors understood that health 
care could be a new industry for the city and emphasized the development of the DMC, 
often at the neglect of Detroit Receiving. Historians miss a crucial part of this event if we 
do not seek to understand how the failure of the city to provide adequate health care 
services contributed to this violence. It is even more important to do so since the nature 
of the incident itself had revealed the need for competent trauma care and facilities with 
enough capacity to treat the influx of patients injured in any emergency during this event.  
 The violence that erupted in the city in July 1967 did not come from nowhere. It 
was a confluence of years of unheard activism from groups like the NAACP and the 
Detroit Urban League about the lack of employment, unsafe housing, and police brutality 
in the city of Detroit. This event led to long term effects in the city of Detroit that 
ultimately affected the DMC in both positive and negative ways. While this event has 
entered the mythos of the city as the initial point of Detroit’s decline, historians like 
Thomas Sugrue have demonstrated that Detroit began losing economic power and 
population decades before.482 Even contemporaneously, news media knew this was not 
true; in October 1961, Time Magazine ran a story titled “Decline in Detroit.” This article 
noted that the wartime prosperity of the 1940s ended almost immediately, creating a 
recession in 1958 and resulting in a marked population loss. The article did speak, 
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however, of the hopefulness of urban renewal projects like University City, and the 
eventual election of Jerome Cavanagh.483 But that hopefulness and benefits of renewal 
were not shared with Detroit’s black communities.  
 Despite the widespread acknowledgement from city officials and planners of the 
importance of Detroit Receiving following the violence of July 1967, the dedication to 
this hospital and Detroit’s black communities soon became secondary to other concerns 
that officials were more important to the city’s revival. Not until the election of Detroit’s 
first black mayor, Coleman A. Young, did development of a new Detroit Receiving 
become a reality. And even then, poor choices made about its development undermined 
the economic viability of that important medical facility. By 1980, the new Detroit 
Receiving had been sold; it no longer belonged to the people of the city—despite costing 
them one-hundred-twenty-five million dollars to build. This, in turn, meant the health 
needs of Detroit’s black residents remained unmet. 
The next chapter explores the non-profit structure of the DMC more in-depth and 
seeks to understand why such a promising project resulted in so many issues for the city 
throughout its development. 
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Chapter 4 
The Detroit Medical Center as an Academic Health Center: The Problems of 
Regionalism 
 
In a retrospective celebration of the first twenty-five years of the Detroit Medical 
Center [DMC], George E. Cartmill, the president of Harper-Grace Hospital, noted that 
“without neighborhood revitalization” that came because of the urban renewal policies in 
the 1950s and 1960s, the “hospitals [of the DMC] would become simply community 
hospitals without teaching and research capabilities.”484 The “blighted” neighborhoods 
surrounding the Detroit Medical Center in the 1950s and 1960s had been razed and 
residents living within them displaced, making way for the wide streets, large green 
spaces, and reconstructed hospitals within the DMC. Boosters began to herald its 
development in the improved safety and reputation of the neighborhood—and some 
argued—the whole city. With those in control and power seemingly unaware of the 
population loss that began immediately after World War II and increasing racial tensions 
between white and black residents, the fallout of the event that came to be known as the 
Detroit Riots made for a long and difficult recovery. 
The population within Detroit city limits continued to decline while the 
population of the surrounding suburban counties increased dramatically. Between 1960 
and 1970, Detroit lost ten-and-a-half percent of its population while the surrounding 
                                                            
484 George E. Cartmill, “The Dream Takes Shape: The First 25 Years of the Detroit Medical Center,” undated 
(circa 1975-1980—“first twenty-five years” is unclear if it means from inception, from groundbreaking, from the 
development of the MCDC, etc.). Box 10, Folder 10-16. Harper Hospital Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library of 
Labor and Urban Affairs, Detroit, Michigan. 
 160 
 
communities of the metropolitan area had increased twelve percent.485 The population 
changes became even more drastic over the next five years, 1970 to 1975 the city of 
Detroit lost an additional ten percent of its population, while northern Livingston and 
Macomb Counties increased in population by fifty-four percent; population in Oakland 
County increased too by thirty-one percent.486 People were moving not only out of the 
city of Detroit, but also out of Wayne County, meaning that the tax bases of both 
municipalities declined significantly during this period.487 
In addition to a loss in total population, these shifts resulted in areas of greater 
concentration of racial segregation. By 1970, seventy-seven percent of the state’s black 
population lived in Southeastern Michigan, and over eighty percent of this population 
lived within Detroit’s city limits. Detroit’s unemployment at this time was also high at 
nearly fourteen percent, but 25.5 percent of these unemployed were black residents.488 
Over fifteen percent of all of Detroit’s families were living in poverty in 1970.489 These 
demographic and economic changes resulted in an ever-increasing population of indigent 
patients within the city of Detroit. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, Detroit had begun recovering from the violence of 
1967—although its tax base and population continued to decline. Part of that recovery 
was the continued development of the DMC, with plans for a new Detroit Receiving 
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Hospital within the medical center. Continued development of the DMC was supported 
by state and federal policies that favored the development of academic health centers. 
These were centers organized around health professions education, health sciences 
research, and health care delivery through a central university, medical school, and at 
least one other professional schools such as nursing, pharmacy, or dentistry, and the 
university’s teaching hospitals and clinics.490 Planners of the DMC and city officials 
thought of themselves as a growing academic health center, but the continued focus on 
physician training at Wayne State and the hospitals of the DMC (with comparatively few 
resources paid to nursing and pharmacy education) resulted in this development 
functioning more like an academic medical center—one that centered the medical school, 
teaching hospitals, and medical staff.491 
Federal health policies had contributed to the very existence of the DMC from its 
inception. Without urban renewal funds that became available after World War II, it 
would have been impossible for the City of Detroit or the State of Michigan to fund this 
institution. Hill-Burton, the federal program enacted in 1946 that provided funds for rural 
hospital construction, had evolved throughout the following three decades to also provide 
funds for urban hospital renovations. While the DMC greatly benefitted from Hill-Burton 
funding, the original and national focus of this program was the increased provision of 
outpatient care to help manage the rising costs of health care.492 Later passage of other 
health care legislation like Medicare and Medicaid had lessened support for Hill-Burton 
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generally, since they “heightened federal concern with the costs of hospital services.” 
This led to President Nixon’s veto of an extension of Hill-Burton in 1970.493 
While the legislation—and therefore funding priorities—of the 1940s and 50s saw 
an emphasis on health planning through urban renewal, later legislation beginning in the 
1960s focused on “regionalism” and the creation of academic health centers. Scholars 
have suggested that these policies were a natural extension of the “movement” since the 
late 1950s to “make widely available coordinated health facilities and services, especially 
hospitals” available to the wider citizenry.494 But the new emphasis on academic health 
centers and medical regionalism in federal policies entering the 1970s brought with it 
both opportunities and challenges that the DMC had not yet encountered.  
The Heart Disease, Cancer, and Stroke Amendments of 1965 was a “deceptive” 
title pulled from some of the most pressing chronic care issues of the era.495 This 
legislation focused more on the “regionalization of the nation’s health facilities and 
personnel” by granting more authority, and therefore more financial responsibility to 
regional health systems, while working to control the rising costs of medical care by 
encouraging shared planning—and therefore shared costs—of hospital care.496 By 
establishing Regional Medical Programs, the act’s purpose was to “encourage and assist 
in the establishment and maintenance of regional cooperative arrangements among 
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medical schools, research institutions, and hospitals for research and training, including 
continuing education, and for related demonstration of patient care.”497 The establishment 
of fifty-six regions nationwide through this legislation allowed for smaller federal grants 
to be dispersed across the country, encouraging mutual cooperation and participation.498 
These policies were also enforced with the National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974 which solidified the country’s commitment to statewide, 
regional planning by consolidating the Hill-Burton and Regional Medical, and 
Comprehensive Health Planning programs—new programs aimed at treating the whole 
patient through integrated care teams rather than providing just medical care.499 
Regional planning had become popular both because of its cost-containment 
effects, and the inherent support that regional medical planning fostered toward academic 
medicine.500 Proponents of health regionalism believed that medical services were “best 
distributed through regional hierarchies descending from the urban center and its medical 
schools and teaching hospitals,” with services and this knowledge dispersing from the 
city center to smaller communities across the country.501 Health policy scholar and 
former Milbank Memorial Fund president Daniel M. Fox has named this mid-century 
focus on planning “hierarchical regionalism,” citing the belief in medical science as these 
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policies’ chief motivator.502 Regional planning was premised on sharing costs among a 
network of laboratories, academic centers, and practitioners, which in turn, planners 
argued, would allow medical science to prosper, thereby increasing American’s faith in 
personal medical care services and the importance of hospital centers.503  
Congressional legislation also resulted in the proliferation of academic health 
centers during the second half of the twentieth century. The funding of medical education 
had become a national priority by the 1950s, with local spending on medical schools 
increasing more than four hundred percent between 1948 and 1958.504 One reason for this 
was the conflation between offering more advanced medical education and the delivery 
of more technologically savvy medical services—the central ideology of the “medical 
center.” Academic medicine grew virtually unchecked throughout the 1970s as the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) increased its funding to academic research centers for 
biomedicine by fifty-five percent—up from six-hundred-three million dollars to two 
billion dollars from 1971 through 1981—providing proof of the “invulnerability of the 
medical school world.”505 This increase in funding from the federal source responsible 
for maintaining the country’s place as a leader in research and development highlighted 
the social and cultural importance that the biomedical industry held in this country. This 
was only emphasized by the already-existing hospital proliferation that Hill-Burton 
funding brought.  
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Entering the 1960s, “medical centers” had come to mean an institution that 
combined medical education, biomedical research, and employed the latest medical 
technology. However, soon, it became in fashion for hospitals affiliated with universities 
to distinguish themselves from “medical centers” by becoming “academic health 
centers,” emphasizing the allied health professions like nursing and pharmacy in tandem 
to physician training and research.506 Because national health funding priorities were 
focused on academic health centers, these institutions were centered in the national 
discussions on how to fund and deliver medical care at these sites.  
For the DMC, the shift in funding and policy priorities presented another 
challenge. As the DMC endeavored to be southeastern Michigan’s leading academic 
health center, the environment created by these policies that favored regionalism and the 
development of academic health centers increased competition between the individual 
hospitals of the DMC, delaying full integration and ultimately costing the DMC while 
these hospitals tried to act on its directive to consolidate and share costs.  
At the DMC, planners worked toward full consolidation throughout its 
development, until full integration was reached in 1985. In this case, consolidation meant 
centrally organized and shared services, like janitorial, laundry, and communications. 
However, it also meant removing redundancies in the delivery of care. For example, 
rather than a cardiology department at each of the four hospitals of the DMC, cardiology 
would be serviced at Harper for the entire campus. All pediatric services would be 
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offered at Childen’s, all obstetrical services at Hutzel, and so on. This required the 
oversight of a central organizing body responsible for all actions throughout the DMC. 
This vision of full consolidation required complete trust and a cooperative spirit. 
However, the competitive environment that was created in part by changing federal 
legislation and funding priorities eroded trust and the “mutual accommodation” necessary 
for the development of a fully realized academic health center and regional health 
planning to work.507  
This chapter argues that the focus in the 1970s on both the academic health center 
and regional health planning was a contributing factor in the inability of the hospitals of 
the DMC to enter enthusiastically into the nonprofit arrangement necessary for their 
survival in the 1980s; these policies ultimately bred competition rather than collaboration. 
The continued emphasis on advancing technology and biomedical research by the 1960s 
had solidified the ideology of large hospital systems built around teaching hospitals. 
However, by this point, the middle-class and private resources had already begun leaving 
inner cities, where many of these teaching hospitals—like the hospitals of the DMC—
were located.508 While proponents believed that these legislations would curb competing 
construction in the suburbs, hospitals away from city cores had an easier time finding 
support for their new developments.509 This, paired with the continually rising costs of 
medical treatment and research created an environment where centers serving indigent 
populations were not likely to survive.  
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As Detroit residents continued to face economic struggles and the percentage of 
people living in poverty grew, these hospitals faced greater challenges as they sought to 
meet this populations’ needs. Most of this work fell to Detroit Receiving Hospital. 
Fulfilling this responsibility to this growing population further complicated Detroit 
Receiving’s place within the DMC, even after city officials and DMC planners approved 
its incorporation, because of the negative stigma associated with public patients and the 
belief that this association with indigent patients would be bad for business. This 
increased competition among the DMC hospitals made it all but impossible for to build 
trust amongst each other. Any progress made toward consolidation was due, in large part, 
to the centrality of Wayne State University School of Medicine at the core of the DMC’s 
plans for an academic health center.  
 
The DMC as an Academic Health Center 
The DMC defined its plan for an “academic health center” as “an integrated 
program of patient care, education, research, and community service in which each of the 
elements of the program is totally interdependent with all of the other elements…to 
provide a reasonably comprehensive health care program and to serve as a major 
education resource for southeastern Michigan.”510 This project 
“embodie[d]…imaginative and hard-headed planning…” among people from different 
fields, professions, and with different home institutions who were hopeful that it could 
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have “many economic, social, and educational advantages for the people of southeastern 
Michigan.”511 This went along with planners’ ultimate goals for consolidation at the 
DMC, where all of the individual member hospitals would share costs and services like 
laundry and phone services, and eventually phase out duplicative medical services at each 
institution. The intention was to have resources acquired by a specialty care service 
would spread be shared by all partners Wayne State University, the school that the DMC 
had partnered with to realize its goals of becoming an academic health center had schools 
of nursing and pharmacy and a physician assistant program—examples of some of the 
allied health professions in other academic health centers across the country.512 But in all 
planning materials since the DMC’s inception, the focus was always on medical 
education rather than the education of other health professionals.  
The previously discussed regional health planning legislation was bolstered by an 
infusion of federal funds coming from bills aimed at increasing the number of doctors 
practicing in the United States. Congress, convinced by data indicating a serious 
physician shortage over the next two decades, enacted four pieces of legislation between 
1963 and 1971 that provided taxpayer dollars to fund medical education. These 
legislators did so by providing funds “per head” of each medical student at each program 
to offset the institution’s cost, in addition to the traditional means of support including 
construction grants, loans, and institutional support.513 One of these, the Comprehensive 
Health Planning and Public Health Service Amendments of 1966, stated that “Congress 
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finds…comprehensive health services [including] health manpower…essential at every 
level of government.”514 
In 1971, Congress passed the “landmark” Comprehensive Health Manpower Act 
of 1971, which authorized up to twenty-five hundred dollars per student in funding 
through July, 1974,515 although the Institute of Medicine had estimated the average true 
cost of estimating a medical student to be more than 12,650 dollars (with about three 
thousand dollars annually going to support research at the student’s institution).516 
Schools had been supported previously by “research grants…which everyone knew 
supported teaching but acknowledged as a way around American Medical Association 
opposition to overt federal support of medical education.”517 Total appropriations of this 
bill were approximately half a billion dollars per year.518 At the same time, other federal 
programs like the Nurse Training Act of 1964 saw the development of advanced nursing 
programs at the baccalaureate, Masters, and doctoral levels, with the first nurse 
practitioner training program opening at the University of Colorado in 1965.519 This 
helped in the professionalization of other allied health providers, and federal funding for 
the expansion of pharmacy programs, dental programs, and physical therapy programs 
had similar effects.520 The undercurrent of this funding had two purposes: 1) to grow the 
                                                            
514 Steven Moscow, Ellen Z. Fifer, and Judith Guthman, “Changing State Laws Regulating Health 
Manpower,” American Journal of Public Health 61:1, Number 37 (1971): pp. 37-39. 
515 Culliton, “Health Manpower,” p. 447. 
516 Barbara J. Culliton, “Medical Education: Institute Puts a Price on Doctors’ Heads,” Science 183:4131 
(March 29, 1974): pp. 1272-1274. 
517 Peter M. Milgrom, DDS, “Grants to Health Professions,” Change 5:10 (Winter 1973/1974): p. 75. 
518 John Walsh, “Health Manpower Bill: Catch is Distribution of Doctors,” Science 188:4186 (April 25, 
1975): pp. 342-344. 
519 American Association of Nurse Practitioners, “Historical Timeline.” https://www.aanp.org/about/about-
the-american-association-of-nurse-practitioners-aanp/historical-timeline (accessed March 29, 2019). 
520 Barry L. Carter, “Evolution of Clinical Pharmacy in the US and Future Directions for Patient Care,” 
Drugs Aging. 33:3 (March 2016): 169-177; Marilyn J. Field, Institute of Medicine Committee on the Future of Dental 
 170 
 
health care industry to address potential future shortages, especially in primary care and 
in underserved communities and 2) to create adequate training institutions for these 
professions as biomedical research became more important in understanding the chronic 
illnesses facing Americans during the second half of the twentieth century.521 
 It is hard to deny the effectiveness of these policies—the 1970s saw a sixty 
percent increase in people employed in the health care industry due to the increased 
funding that went toward their education. By 1977, forty-three more medical schools had 
opened nationwide than existed in 1970.522 This group included not only physicians but 
also members of the allied health professions like nurses, advanced practice providers, 
dentists, medical techs, and hospital employees, which became more necessary as these 
institutions grew to accommodate these growing industries. One of every seven new jobs 
created between 1970 and 1978 were in the health care field, and over half of these 
workers were in hospitals.523  
Some critics believed that universities were prioritizing academic health centers to 
increase physician output only to increase the money their institutions were receiving 
from the federal government—not only from federal research funding, but also from 
federal reimbursement for medical services.524 In addition to the increasing proportion of 
NIH funding that biomedical researchers received throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the 
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rising costs of medical care helped to increase reimbursement at these institutions. The 
passage of Medicare and Medicaid resulted in reimbursement for services rather than a 
negotiated schedule, which in turn resulted in hospitals raising the costs for their services 
to pad their reimbursement.525 Physicians employed at universities made money for these 
institutions. In many case, this led to “morale-threatening dimensions” between the 
salaries of the faculty of the medical school and other university faculty.526 This was a 
contributing factor to issues not only between faculty between the Wayne State 
University School of Medicine and other departments across the university, but also to  
the increased competition among faculty at the hospitals of the DMC. This fee-for-
service realm also led to a proliferation of specialty medicine as procedure-heavy 
specialties like cardiology and obstetrics brought in more funding (through higher 
reimbursement rates) for the DMC, while primary care and emergency faculty continued 
to cost the institution.527 
While I have found no evidence stating that this increase in medical education 
funding was a direct motivator in encouraging the expansion of the DMC—or more 
pointedly, the audacious goal to make Wayne State University School of Medicine the 
largest medical campus in the nation—these intuitions were certainly taking advantage of 
these policies. In 1969, Harper Hospital received a 14.9 million dollar grant from the 
National Institutes of Health from the Health Manpower Act to build the Webber 
                                                            
525 Graham and Diamond, The Rise of American Research Universities, p. 123. 
526 Ibid. 
527 Ibid. 
 172 
 
Memorial Building addition to serve as a “teaching facility” within the DMC.528 This 
addition was key in making the relationship with the hospitals of the DMC “more 
competitive” with Detroit Receiving for the allegiances of Wayne State University—a 
relationship crucial for the development of the DMC as an academic health center.529  
While all the hospitals of the DMC had a relationship with Wayne State 
University School of Medicine, the strongest and longest-lasting relationship was with 
Detroit Receiving. While historians have argued that the increased funding available for 
regional medical education may have created increased competition between planned 
regions nationwide, this focus on the development of an academic health center also 
created increased competition among the DMC hospitals. This is because all these 
hospitals were all competing individually for the same federal health manpower funds. 
Because specialty care brought in more money for these hospitals, merging as an 
integrated DMC and applying for these funds as one institution was potentially 
detrimental for the hospitals like Harper and Hutzel that provided specialty care. This 
paired with the integration of Detroit Receiving into the DMC (and the negative stigma 
associated with this hospital because of the high number of indigent patients who 
frequented it) created an environment where the consolidation of the DMC was difficult.  
The next section will recount the attempts at this consolidation. 
 
Attempts at Consolidation 
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Since its inception, the DMC had a central, guiding body overseeing and advising 
its development. This group underwent many changes—in name, purpose, and 
composition—since the establishment of the Medical Center Committee in 1955.530 This 
group, formed at the discretion of then-Mayor Albert E. Cobo, was charged with 
presenting the first official DMC plan to City Council. To achieve this goal, Mayor Cobo 
assembled the director and two members of the board of trustees at each of the four 
medical center hospitals—Harper, Grace, Children’s, and Hutzel—as well as the Dean of 
the School of Medicine at Wayne State University. The group was rounded out by the 
inclusion of Detroit city planners and architects.531 It is important to reiterate that while 
the interwar plan for a new DMC was centralized around Detroit Receiving Hospital, by 
the 1950s, the city’s municipal hospital was excluded from the new medical center 
plans.532 By the time the proposal was completed in May 1956, the group had been 
renamed the Detroit Medical Center Committee [DMCC].533 
The DMCC oversaw the early development of the DMC by working to make sure 
that the DMC was a positive for its community, including acting as the intermediary 
between City Council and the Detroit Urban League while that group organized its study 
demonstrating racial bias in hiring practices and patient treatment.534 Another project that 
this group oversaw was the hiring of planning and design consulting firm Crane and 
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Gorwic and the completion of what would become known as The Rourke Report. Dr. 
Anthony Rourke, the medical consultant at Crane and Gorwic, saw within the DMC the 
“rare opportunity…to take advantage of modern and complete planning of health 
facilities and programs…to establish a foundation for another hundred years of health 
care,” and his report demonstrated the strategies by which he thought the DMC could 
make this happen.535 
In March 1960, Dr. Rourke presented his report to the DMCC, where he made 
eighty-nine recommendations for the center’s future. In addition to the physical changes 
in the area (the wider streets, the connected greenways, and the additions to the hospitals) 
the four hospitals of the proposed DMC would have to coordinate and consolidate their 
services to deliver on the promises of the potential of the new medical center. These 
recommendations included: arranging with the city for an “adequate and equitable basis 
of payment for indigent care services rendered” at the four hospitals of the medical 
center, centralized indigent care and pediatric services, relocation of the Wayne State 
School of Medicine to the DMC, and a relocation of “the city of Detroit’s acute, general 
hospital in a new facility of approximately five hundred beds” to the new DMC, complete 
with a new outpatient clinic attached.536 Dr. Rourke was explicit in the need for these 
hospitals to consolidate into one unified and integrated medical center, emphasizing his 
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belief that this would result in the most success for the DMC. In his report, Dr. Rourke 
wrote that: 
“Individual ingredients do not necessarily produce a prescription for 
excellence; neither does land area make a medical center; but rather it is 
the organization and coordination of a total program which produces a 
program of prominence.”537 
 
Dr. Rourke believed that “total program” would be most successful if anchored by a 
thriving medical school. 
Dr. Rourke saw the true power in the DMC as a site of world-class medical 
education. He expressed concern that the city’s plan, as written, would place the 
responsibility of caring for indigent patients onto Detroit Receiving which he feared 
would result in a less effective, less efficient DMC.538 He emphasized that a coordination 
of these hospitals, and a plan for a new Detroit Receiving and outpatient clinic within the 
center, would result in the greatest likelihood of success. This would be, in part, because 
it would create fewer burdens on the medical school because of the inherent cost sharing 
practices that would come with this integration.539 Additionally, by creating a more viable 
Receiving Hospital within the center, the city and medical school would be able to use 
resources elsewhere, enabling them to participate more fully in the growth of the DMC. 
While the DMCC seemed to seriously consider the findings of The Rourke 
Report, conversations between this committee and city officials tended to be focused on 
the recommendations for development and construction rather than operations and 
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coordination. It is important to remember, however, that in 1960, federal legislation 
rewarded urban development, and thus there was more funding and enthusiasm generally 
for construction and development. There were no federal funds at that time specifically 
for coordination and operation of health education and health care delivery. Perhaps 
seeking a second opinion, or perhaps unwilling (or unable) to abide by the findings from 
the Rourke Report, the DMCC hired a second consultant, Greenleigh Associates in 1964. 
Greenleigh was a management firm specializing in health and wellness issues, and their 
study focused primarily on the question of how to manage care for the poor in the new 
DMC since this patient population created the biggest burden on the city currently, and 
projections forecasted a growth in this community, creating larger strains on the medical 
school.  
The Greenleigh Report had three recommendations: 1) that indigent care be 
concentrated under one single department across the four hospitals regardless of medical 
condition and overseen by one physician department and one administration department, 
2) that Detroit Receiving Hospital should be closed and its physicians and staff absorbed 
by the four voluntary hospitals of the DMC, and finally, 3) if the hospitals of the DMC 
could not absorb Receiving’s staff and physicians, Greenleigh suggested that a new 
Detroit Receiving Hospital be built, but not necessarily affiliated with the DMC.540 The 
Greenleigh Report stressed that while the DMC and its leaders should be thinking about 
the medically indigent and the poor, the rumored changes to Title 18 and 19 of the Social 
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Security Act—that would become Medicare and Medicaid—meant that “in effect would 
result in there being no more ‘charity’ cases.”541 Presumably, each would be a paying 
patient and such, accepted in any facility in the community (although this should have 
already been the case both by accepting Hill-Burton funding and the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act in 1964; however, hospitals practiced dumping and other strategies to refuse 
care to indigent populations). The remaining question would be only whether there were 
enough beds in the combined facilities to provide for the anticipated increase in patients 
following passage of Medicare and Medicaid, or whether a new hospital for the indigent 
would be needed.542 
The DMCC seemed to prefer the findings of the Greenleigh Report. City planners, 
and the hospitals, continued to place their faith in the ability to consolidate their 
institutions simply through the physical geography of the new DMC, and the promises of 
Medicare and Medicaid to address the city-wide financial problems with the growing 
number of indigent patients. While even the 1956 initial plan for the DMC spoke of intent 
to coordinate, there was very little—if any—action to move the DMC in this direction 
beyond its proximal built environment. 
In the mid-1960s, as funding for the DMC began to change thanks in part to the 
new emphasis on regional health planning and manpower legislations, the DMC Citizens’ 
Committee realized it would need to adapt to the new policy environment. By 1966, the 
United States spent fifteen billion dollars on hospital care alone, excluding funding for 
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research, construction, or administrative costs for insurance.543 Exacerbating this need 
was that costs were even higher in hospitals that focused on specialty care—like the four 
hospitals of the DMC. Nationally, the per-bed cost in specialty hospitals was 
approximately thirty thousand dollars in 1965, or double what the per-bed cost was in 
community hospitals.544 Further contributing to the cost issue was that in these specialty 
hospitals, even assuming that patients’ insurance and other payments could cover their 
costs during their stay, the number of beds in these hospitals was shrinking; on average, 
beds occupied “less than twenty-five percent” of the space in specialty hospitals, with the 
rest of the space for expensive diagnostic and therapeutic equipment.545 In addition to 
working to secure new opportunities for federal funding through the focus on 
consolidation and medical education, the DMCC worked toward other innovative 
structural changes. 
 
The DMC as a Nonprofit 
For the DMC, one solution to their increased funding troubles was to establish 
themselves as a nonprofit organization so that they would be able to collect philanthropic 
donations. Beginning in the early 1960s, health economists encouraged hospitals to 
establish themselves as nonprofits as a cost-saving measure. Because of the ability to 
accept philanthropic donations rather than continually fighting for limited public funding, 
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some economists argued that nonprofit hospitals, run by their central advisory board, 
would actually be able to offer higher quality, patient-centered care.546 In 1963, The 
DMCC decided to pursue this option. 
Following publication of the Flexner Report in 1910, private philanthropy, 
particularly from groups like the Rockefeller Foundation, had been a major source of 
funding for medical education and research.547 After World War II, governmental 
organizations like the National Institutes of Health were outpacing private philanthropic 
foundations for education and research donations by almost three to one.548 By the mid-
1960s, hospital administrators realized that in a city like Detroit with a decreasing tax 
base and an increasing indigent population, it would be strategic to return to a private, 
philanthropic funding model.   
In 1964, the DMC received its first financial contribution from the Detroit 
Building Fund, a local public organization formed in 1961 made of city planners and 
businessmen providing guidance on some of the city’s larger urban renewal projects.549 
This gift provided the funds necessary for the DMCC to regroup and register as an 
official nonprofit thus avoiding taxes and able to accept charitable donations. To 
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publicize their new status, the group named itself the Medical Center Development 
Corporation [MCDC] in 1965.550 
The development of the MCDC raised the profile of the DMC among some of the 
city’s most charitable donors and was a major step forward for the hospitals of the DMC 
in coming together to form one institution. However, this new funding plan of relying on 
philanthropic donations did not address one of the most pressing issues facing the city in 
the mid-1960s: the issue of indigent care. Following the advice that the DMCC had 
received from Greenleigh Associates the previous year, the MCDC operated under the 
premise that Medicare and Medicaid would assist the hospitals of the DMC in covering 
the cost of indigent care. The hospitals of the DMC and Detroit Receiving billed all-
inclusive daily rates for their care in compliance with reimbursement procedures from 
Wayne County and the local Blues insurance providers.551 After the implementation of 
Medicare and Medicaid, however, this proved problematic; this per diem charge did not 
satisfy the documentation requirements for reimbursement from either Medicare or 
Medicaid, which provided reimbursement for “service rendered to covered patients on the 
basis of actual incurred costs,” or what we understand now as “fee-for-service.”552 
Compliance, the DMC and Detroit Receiving learned, would require a massive overhaul 
of their billing system; an undertaking of this size, the MCDC feared, was one with 
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which the hospital system would be “unable” to comply.553 While perhaps more 
pronounced in the DMC’s problems, adherence to new federal regulations proved 
burdensome for universities across the country, as compliance added to hospital operating 
costs—not only for reimbursement of Medicare and Medicaid, but also through the 
receipt of federal health manpower funds.554  
Further contributing to these reimbursement woes were the state’s rules regarding 
Medicaid reimbursement. In Michigan, only people below the age of twenty-one or over 
the age of sixty-five were eligible for Medicaid.555 Additionally, Wayne County 
continued to refuse to reimburse the care for alcoholics, drug addicts, suicides, minors, 
prisoners, and those hospitalized for fewer than seventy-two hours—the majority of 
indigent patients fell into at least one of these groups.556 In reality, since the county had 
lowered reimbursement amounts in the mid-1960s, this made little difference to hospitals 
within the city of Detroit who were struggling to get any sort of reimbursement for many 
of their patients.557 While the MCDC had assumed passage of Medicaid and Medicare 
would reduce the number of patients receiving care without reimbursement, the state’s 
restrictions on Medicaid and the county’s limits on types of incidents it would reimburse 
meant that there remained large numbers of indigent patients unable to pay for their care. 
Inadequate preparation for Medicare and Medicaid policies’ reimbursement structures 
left the hospitals of the DMC without a solution to its biggest financial strain: the 
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growing number of patients unable to pay for their treatment. Recognizing that their new 
organizational structure, and the newly enacted public health insurance programs would 
not address the deepest funding problems of the DMC, the MCDC worked to enact the 
recommendations from the 1960 Rourke Report, which understood that consolidation 
was an attainable cost-saving measure. 
 
The Return of The Rourke Report 
In November 1968, the MCDC added Fred Kaiser, a management consultant and 
trustee of Grace Hospital, to its organization.558 The MCDC believed that a first, 
attainable step toward consolidation was to develop a plan to equally share amenities and 
services, including food preparation, phone services, and laundry. They believed that the 
management expertise of Fred Kaiser would help the MCDC achieve these goals.559 In 
1968, the MCDC received three million dollars from the Metropolitan Detroit Building 
Fund for this stated purpose, which paid for a consolidated laundry for the hospitals of 
the DMC, as well as the purchase of the land on which the facility was built, meaning 
that the laundry facility belonged to the MCDC, and not to the DMC or the city itself.560  
The consolidated laundry facility was the only progress the MCDC was able to 
make on this front after two years. Hospital administrators expressed concern over a loss 
of autonomy at their institutions and worry that MCDC—a development organization—
would be tasked with making clinical decisions at their respective institutions. However, 
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the DMC hospitals did realize a financial incentive in consolidation after realizing that 
cost sharing a utility like laundry made a difference in the DMC’s bottom line.561  
 By 1970, the MCDC had determined its stated objective was to provide 
collaboratively “the best possible care of the sick and disabled and preventative medicine 
for the healthy” while “complet[ing] training and education of all health personnel…[in 
the] pursuit of excellence in research and scientific development in the healing arts.”562 
Additionally, it sought to become an “organized structure that will attract the finest minds 
and talents in the fields of health services and research so that its ultimate contributions 
will be of outstanding professional stature.”563 Perhaps most importantly, and heartened 
by its consolidated laundry program, the MCDC sought to develop “inter-institutional 
cooperation…allow[ing] the Center to operate as a cohesive whole with centralized 
planning and control under a single governing body while maintaining that degree of 
autonomy of the member institutions as required by the characteristics of each, leading to 
a complete merger of services, facilities, management, and in so far as legal possible, the 
physical plants and assets.”564 
Seeing that they were able to make some headway providing a plan for shared 
laundry but unable to work quickly toward progress in any other shared services, the 
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MCDC again decided to hire Anthony Rourke in December 1970565 to assist in deciding 
“whether [the MCDC] should also become a service organization through which almost 
all central activities flow,” similar to the way they had handled the consolidation of 
laundry services.566 Hiring Dr. Rourke again was done, in part, to allow Detroit 
Receiving, Wayne State, and the city to “engage in informed planning for their future 
facilities in the Medical Center” since these bodies had all expressed concern over losing 
their autonomy should consolidation fully be realized.567 Rourke, in his completed report, 
indicated his continued support for the consolidation of all services at the DMC through a 
single provider—at this point, the MCDC—stating: 
“It is our opinion that the time has now arrived when there should be 
consolidation of the major gains made over the past several years. The 
recommendations provide for this organizational framework within which 
this can be done, and future progress can be made. This is particularly true 
because of the desire for inter-institutional cooperation which continues to 
flourish in the Detroit Medical Center.”568  
 
The 1970 Rourke Study repeated many of the recommendations from the initial 1960 
report, but it also provided specific strategies for the consolidation of ambulatory care, 
medical records, admission and discharge, computer usage, the telephone system Centrex 
with physician registry and paging, security, bill collection, purchasing and stores, 
housekeeping, maintenance, grounds and landscaping, laundry, and nutritional 
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services.569 Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, Rourke’s Report challenged the 
hospitals of the DMC to centralize their Board of Directors to “prevent unilateral action” 
and not take action on matters of development or operations before the centralized board 
had signed on.570  
 
Wayne State University School of Medicine at the DMC 
 As previously discussed, Regional Medical Programs legislation was directed at 
developing comprehensive care coming from consolidated systems rather than 
fragmented programs, which was a significant backdrop to the continued attempts at 
consolidation of the DMC. In 1971, Marvin D. Meltzer, a trade unionist who served as a 
correspondent to the United Auto Workers’ Social Security Department, wrote in an 
article about how the regional medical planning programs were affecting Wayne State by 
forcing the institution to think of itself as a leader in the region, able to address not only 
the city’s pressing issues, but also the state’s. While the hospitals of the DMC had begun 
attempts at consolidation before regional health planning legislation was in practice, 
Meltzer indicated that he viewed this legislations as a motivator for getting the DMC to 
think more creatively about what it could accomplish and challenged Wayne State to rise 
to the occasion.  In it, he wrote that the issues of “highest priority” not only for Wayne 
State but the entire state were  
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“…in descending priority order: increasing the delivery of health care 
services, prevention of disease and is complications, and general 
professional continuing education to improve the quality of treatment 
services.”571 
 
The article went on to state that the intentionality with which Wayne State was working 
to partner with the hospitals of the DMC was an effect of the university recognizing that 
the: 
“medical consumer, particularly the low-income consumer, has found his 
voice with respect to the provision of health services. Access to 
comprehensive, high quality health care is no longer viewed as a matter of 
privilege but as a basic human right, and medical schools geographically 
located in the inner cities of large urban areas are affected with the necessity 
of coming to grips with the growing demands for service placed on them by 
the communities in which they reside.”572  
 
Continuing, he wrote of the importance of the DMC in this scenario, writing: 
“Of particular pertinence for us in that regard is the paradox we see in the 
Detroit Medical Center where we have the best care available in the area 
(and for which even greater concentrations of skill and technology are 
planned for the future), while within walking distance of it lives a large 
population whose medical care needs are the most severe…The task then is 
to develop health care delivery programs which can approximately 
accommodate the university’s primary functions of teaching and research 
while simultaneously making available comprehensive, high quality care to 
the family in need of such care.”573 
 
While Meltzer saw the entire DMC as responsible for addressing these priorities, the bulk 
of the expectations to address the care of vulnerable populations fell to the responsibility 
of Detroit Receiving. Other hospitals within the DMC were not particularly interested in 
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providing accessible care to the poor, which only contributed to continued struggle 
among the hospitals of the DMC as they worked to consolidate into one institution. 
 
Detroit Receiving and the University Clinics Building 
 While the MCDC worked with Dr. Rourke to enact his recommendations on 
consolidation, they also resolved to work on two of the more audacious of the initial 
eighty-nine recommendations: building and integrating a new Detroit Receiving Hospital 
into the DMC and creating an adjoining outpatient clinic. The MCDC began serious 
discussions of this task in 1968—two years before the second Rourke Report—but the 
1970 report accelerated these discussions. 
This was a difficult task for the hospitals of the DMC. Chapter three provides 
more context for the peculiar place that the city’s municipal hospital held in the hearts 
and minds of residents and city officials. Ultimately, DMC leaders feared the negative 
association with the (poor, indigent, sometimes criminal, sometimes violent) patients of 
Detroit Receiving would make the sought-after private paying suburban clientele much 
more difficult to court. However, as federal and state legislations changed operations and 
internal policies at the DMC, pressure was mounting from city officials and activists to 
develop a working relationship with Detroit Receiving. The major reason, beyond even 
patient care, was to preserve the budding medical education at the DMC, which relied on 
Detroit Receiving as the major site of all of its clinical education for both medical school 
students and residents—which Dr. Rourke identified in 1960 as the greatest potential for 
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success at the DMC.574 City officials also realized that it had become more pressing to 
incorporate this hospital into the DMC; it was no longer able to finance this costly 
operation without help from the nonprofit structure set up in the DMC.  
The first step in this process was a reorganization of the planning board, the 
MCDC. Because Detroit Receiving was still, in 1968 when these discussions began, run 
by the city, local officials petitioned to get representation from Detroit Receiving 
administration and from the Board of Health onto the MCDC.575 This allowed the MCDC 
to “explore the role of the Detroit Medical Center Corporation in the planning of the new 
Detroit [Receiving] Hospital buildings in the Medical Center…” and minimize the risk of 
miscommunication with so many stakeholders involved.576 By July 1968, the MCDC 
unanimously expressed their support for a new Detroit Receiving Hospital within the 
DMC, and added it to the third phase of DMC construction.577 They understood that they 
would have to work to resolve issues such as Detroit Receiving’s size, its management 
and organization, financing, and changing relationship with Wayne State as they moved 
forward with planning. This did not progress until Dr. Rourke provided the groundwork 
for this consolidation in his second report.578 But in 1970, a decade after Dr. Rourke 
made his initial recommendation to do so, Detroit Receiving would finally become a part 
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of the DMC. As a new institution within the DMC, the MCDC agreed to operate—as it 
did for other DMC hospitals at this time as part of the consolidation plan—the hospital’s 
parking, traffic control, and telephone and laundry.579 
With their commitment to the incorporation of a new Detroit Receiving Hospital 
seemingly solidified, the MCDC and the city turned their attention to developing an 
outpatient clinic within the DMC—another recommendation from Rourke’s 1970 
Report.580 The purpose of this clinic would be to attempt to relieve some of the demands 
of Detroit Receiving’s emergency room by providing a site of primary care within the 
DMC, but also as an expansion for the medical school, providing direct clinical 
experience for Wayne State trainees. Wayne State funded, and led, this project. 
By 1970, Wayne State was “interviewing a number of medical planning 
consultants to determine the selection of one of them to act as a consultant for the 
planning of the outpatient clinic building.”581 This project was owned by Wayne State 
University, but there was hope of collaboration with the DMC.582 The impetus for this 
project was to provide Wayne State’s growing number of trainees exposure to an 
outpatient population with “interdisciplinary care” as a focus so that trainees would learn 
how to provide care as part of an interprofessional health care team.583  
Crucial to the planning, in the opinion city officials, was to have a physical 
connection between the new Detroit Receiving Hospital and this outpatient center, which 
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was to be called the University Clinics Building [UCB].584 This physical connection was 
so important because it would provide an option for easier hospital admissions to Detroit 
Receiving Hospital—another way that the city was continuing to place responsibility for 
indigent care squarely on Detroit Receiving rather than throughout the hospitals of the 
DMC. Wayne State University School of Medicine faculty, however, was afraid that a 
physical connection from the UCB to the new Receiving would “carry the stigma 
attached to a city hospital, and thus not be able to attract [paying] patients.”585 The 
faculty saw the move to the DMC as a way to alter their national reputation, not only to 
attract more paying patients but also to attract more trainees.586 The faculty was already 
concerned about the ability of Wayne State to attract as many medical students as this 
construction anticipated. This was concerning because a larger medical school without 
students and trainees would not only be a waste of money, but an embarrassment to 
planners. Because of the nature of its patient population, Detroit Receiving had garnered 
a national reputation as a place to see difficult cases (like tertiary syphilis and the end 
stages of a tuberculosis infection) that students and residents may not otherwise see in the 
United States. The medical school faculty were concerned, however, that Detroit 
Receiving also had a reputation of not preparing students for most other practice settings 
precisely because these cases were so different from those American physicians would 
typically see.587 
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Despite the faculty’s concern about the stigma attached to being affiliated with 
Detroit Receiving—nothing different from other racially motivated concerns that had 
plagued the hospital for decades—new medical school Dean Robert Gregg also was 
adamant that the UCB should “serve all segments of society.”588 During these 
deliberations, however, the faculty and the MCDC did not discuss how the UCB would 
meet this charge, resulting in no solid plans to do so. Further confusing the main goals 
and vision of the UCB by Wayne State administration, Dean Gregg wrote to the board of 
the MCDC stating that in order to work, UCB would need to be primarily a service 
clinic—not one prioritizing education—and be staffed with “professionals,” not students 
or residents, believing that making this a teaching institution would make it even more 
difficult to court private paying patients.589 Regardless, the Board of Directors of the 
MCDC endorsed the development of the UCB, connected to the new Detroit Receiving 
Hospital, at their August 30, 1969 meeting. They also developed the Ad Hoc Ambulatory 
Care Committee for “identification of the concerns relating to the construction of Detroit 
[Receiving] and the University Clinics Building” hoping to address its negative 
reputation while working to serve the population that had grown accustomed to care at 
this hospital.590  
 
Conflict at Wayne State University School of Medicine 
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The focus on expanding the medical school did not allow much attention to 
address the changing social dynamics at the medical school, including coordination 
among several strong personalities in order to form a central collaborative board to 
oversee operations at procedures at this medical center. Without an agreement to operate 
as a unit, the DMC’s plans to become a consolidated academic health center would not 
work.  
One of the major challenges brought by these new social dynamics were the 
difficult issues between Wayne State’s School of Medicine and the broader university’s 
administration. As the medical school became more important to the university’s survival 
as it became the best-funded arm on campus, leadership at the medical school and at the 
university administration butted heads; leadership at the medical school wanted more of a 
say within broader university happenings. While discord had simmered for half a decade, 
this conflict came to a head in 1969 as the university began to work on the expansion of 
health professional schools. This conflict was primarily between the Medical School 
Dean Ernest Gardner and University President William Keast.591 A local newspaper 
analyzed this issue as being a disagreement between “medical care” and “health care,” or, 
physicians and allied health professionals.592 Dean Gardner was allegedly leery of 
“…letting other professionals such as nurses and pharmacists take on new roles and 
creating new types of organizations such as group practice, Medicare, and national health 
insurance,” while President Keast saw the expansion and investment in these professions 
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as a way to continue Wayne State’s quest to become a national leader.593 However, those 
within the medical school instead saw the controversy as centered on President Keast’s 
concern that the medical school and its dean had become too powerful.594  
University administrators’ concern about the power of medical schools was a 
national trend in response to the massive funding these schools received. Because of the 
disproportional increase of National Institutes of Health funding received by biomedical 
researchers compared to the other research and development areas, medical faculty got 
paid much higher salaries than did their non-medical colleagues.595 In some cases, this 
affected morale as medical faculty perceived this ability to bring in more funding 
translated to an increase in importance and prominence.596 Regardless of actual cause of 
this conflict, the controversy ended in Dean Gardner’s resignation from the School of 
Medicine.597  
Dean Gardner’s anxieties over what he viewed as the erosion of the status of 
physicians was not necessarily unique. Physicians had enjoyed increasing cultural 
influence and importance since the early 1900s. As biomedical research and medical 
technology continued to provide more favorable outcomes for more patients by the mid-
twentieth century, physicians seemed to be able to maintain professional autonomy and a 
sovereignty unlike any other American profession.598 This was amplified by the 
American Medical Association, which took a strong position against any proposed 
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legislation or regulation that threatened this autonomy.599 However, coinciding with the 
development of academic health centers, allied medical professions began to grow in 
cultural importance, potentially threatening the unchecked power enjoyed by physicians 
for so long.600 On the other hand, President Keast’s concern about the medical school 
overshadowing the rest of the university was also a legitimate concern; in large part 
because of emphasis on biomedical sciences and regional medical planning by the middle 
of the twentieth century, the School of Medicine received significantly greater federal 
funding than any other unit in the university.601 
This conflict and its subsequent outcome influenced the continued development of 
the DMC, since a stated goal was to expand the School of Medicine campus to 
accommodate the large influx of expected students. President Keast reported to the 
MCDC Executive Committee on April 7, 1970 that while the “ultimate goals for the 
enlargement of the Medical School enrollment, the construction of the planned buildings 
in the Medical Center complex, the relationship with the individual hospitals, and with 
the Medical Center Development Corporation” remain unchanged, the “time table for the 
implementation” was changed, citing a delay caused by Dean Gardner’s resignation and 
an uncertain future for the leadership of the School of Medicine. President Keast’s plan, 
then, was to establish a medical school task force to establish priorities and review 
schedules so that the “ultimate goal” was still achievable.602 
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The Blue Book 
By 1971, with plans for incorporation of all the buildings that would form the 
consolidated DMC—and construction on the new campus of Wayne State University 
School of Medicine on the medical center campus—the guiding body of the DMC again 
evolved to achieve the consolidation recommended by Anthony Rourke. In 1971, the 
MCDC changed its name to the DMC Corporation [DMCCo].603 Inaugural President 
George E. Cartmill—who had served as the director and president of Harper Hospital for 
nearly three decades—said that the purpose of renaming this body was to “accelerate and 
strengthen the inter-institutional cooperation which would allow the center to operate as a 
cohesive whole with centralized planning and coordination under a single body” in line 
with regional health planning trends.604 Still able to accept philanthropic donations, the 
name change signified a philosophical change from development to delivery. With its last 
construction projects underway, the organization needed to dedicate its full attention to 
the consolidation of one cohesive DMC, with the DMCCo serving as the unifying, and 
decision-making body—a corporation—acting on behalf of the hospitals.605 In order to 
work toward making this a reality, the DMCCo began to work with Anthony Rourke on 
developing a unifying document that would provide guidelines and strategies for the 
consolidation of the DMC. 
                                                            
603 Cartmill, “The Dream Takes Shape,” 10, 10-16, Harper Hospital Collection, Reuther Library. 
604 Ibid. 
605 Mozena, “The Detroit Medical Center,” p. 89. 
 196 
 
By 1972, the DMCCo, comprised of representation from the original four 
hospitals of the DMC, a new Rehabilitation Institute, Wayne State School of Medicine, 
Detroit Receiving, and the planned UCB, developed the DMC’s Program Utilization 
Forecast, known as “The Blue Book.”606 The Blue Book laid out the objectives of all 
included institutions in the DMC, divided into three categories: health care, staffing, and 
fiscal. The objectives stated that these institutions would share all burdens and profits of 
treating the patients of all hospitals within the medical center.607 This would be 
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 A. Health Care Objectives 
1. To provide the highest quality health services to all persons needing them, within the 
present and future capabilities of the Medical Center institutions, regardless of any person’s religious, 
racial or ethnic identification, or economic status. 
2. To engage in joint planning efforts utilizing the best available skills and information in 
the design of an overall service program for the entire Medical Center. 
3. To concentrate like services; to avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities and personnel; 
and to maximize utilization of available resource. 
4. To coordinate the planning of the service capabilities of the Medical Center institutions 
with the service capabilities of other intuitions outside the Medical Center in cooperation with 
appropriate public and private health planning agencies. To be entirely aware of and committed to the 
concept that the Medical Center shall become a center of coordinated health care system which includes 
specialized, primary and preventative health services through which the health care needs of all in the 
Greater Detroit area will be met. 
5. Within the framework of this coordinated program, and to the limit of their capabilities, 
a. To continue to provide specialized and primary health services. 
b. To continue to serve the teaching and research needs of Wayne State 
University, and 
c. In addition, to focus on the primary health needs of appropriately specified 
geographic areas. 
6. To vigorously support other agencies to obtain similar commitments from other Detroit 
area hospitals so that high quality health services will be accessible and available to all persons, 
irrespective of their religious, racial or ethnic identification, or their economic status. 
B. Staffing Objectives: 
1. Recognizing the legal responsibility of hospital trustees to maintain a balanced staff of well 
qualified physicians to assure the quality of care provided to patients utilizing their institutions, 
a. It is the objective of the Detroit Medical Center hospitals to provide equal opportunity, 
commensurate with the physicians’ abilities, to staff privileges for al qualified physicians…subject 
to the conditions and obligations which accompany such privileges, regardless of religious, racial, 
or ethnic identification. 
b. To develop a mechanism by which the medical staffs of each of the Medical Center 
hospitals will be afforded appropriate privileges enabling them to follow their referred patients into 
other Medical Center Hospitals. 
C. Fiscal Objectives: 
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accomplished by the DMCC acting as the fiduciary body of the DMC, responsible for 
patient billing, insurance negotiations, service contracts, and funding application on 
behalf of all the institutions within the DMC. This was in preparation of not only cost 
sharing for this organization, but also profit sharing.608 This plan was, however, 
controversial. Representatives from the hospitals within the DMC argued against cost and 
profit sharing and sought to retain the fiscal autonomy of each individual hospital. The 
ensuing discussions among hospital representatives on the DMCCo resulted in a delay of 
full consolidation of the DMC until 1985.609 
Members of the DMCCo Executive Committee, who were mostly comprised of 
representation from the four original DMC hospitals, said that the Blue Book was 
incomplete and not forward-thinking, with the DMCCo Executives stating that the 
integration of services it called for—save for the inclusion of Detroit Receiving and 
UCB—had already been done.610 With such animosity brewing over what full 
consolidation would mean, the Blue Book ended up being a convenient scapegoat for 
physicians and administrators who were looking to leave the DMC, with DMCCo 
Executive Robert Mack stating: 
“The Blue Book was used as an excuse by people who left to practice in 
greener pastures in the suburbs. It was a façade used by those wanting to 
escape whatever unfavorable circumstance was already in place.”611 
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Clinical Consolidation of the DMC 
  
Another important aspect of consolidation, which was formalized in the Blue 
Book, was the elimination of all trauma and emergency care—except for pediatric 
emergencies to be treated at Children’s and obstetrical emergencies to be treated at 
Hutzel—at the original four hospitals of the DMC. Instead, Detroit Receiving, which was 
soon-to-be incorporated into the DMC, would provide all trauma and emergency care 
within the medical center.612 The hospitals of the DMC had not yet reconciled themselves 
to Detroit Receiving’s reputation, including ongoing accreditation issues, which included 
a final citation in 1975 about overcrowding and fire safety in the hospital that was not 
remedied until 1978.613 Both its reputation and accreditation issues “cast doubt in some 
minds on the future of the new Detroit [Receiving] then under construction in the 
DMC.”614  
There was disagreement among the institutions of the DMC as to what constituted 
an “emergency.” One of the growing pains of joining these hospitals together was that 
each hospital used different terminology and different clinical criteria to define 
emergency care.615 For example, Detroit Receiving staff actively treated patients using 
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the emergency room for their primary care, while it would not be unusual for other 
hospitals of the DMC to turn such a patient away.616 
The DMCCo Medical Advisory Committee was concerned that Detroit Receiving 
as the only site of emergency care in the DMC, may not allow “assurances of an 
acceptable standard of health care delivery” because of the inability of private physicians 
to “follow private patients.”617 Additionally, critics believed that there were not 
“adequate standards in the operation of the [Detroit Receiving] emergency room.”618 
Furthermore, the advisory committee worried that medical staff would not apply to work 
at Detroit Receiving until they were assured it was a place where private patients could 
receive the type of care in the type of facility at which they had grown accustomed.619 
The fears of the DMCC may have been unfounded, however. By 1976, seventy-five 
percent of admissions to the DMC came from “areas that [were] declining in population,” 
like Detroit’s inner city, while the vast majority of patients still came from a five-mile 
radius.620 The only areas “declining in population” by 1976 in Metropolitan Detroit were 
in the city proper; the DMCCo was still trying to make concessions for suburban patients 
while city residents continued to be the main patient population at the hospitals of the 
DMC. 
Contributing to the struggles of consolidation, the administrators of Hutzel and 
Harper hospitals were concerned about losing the revenue generated by emergency care 
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once Detroit Receiving became the primary site of emergency care.621 The admission of 
patients following evaluation in the emergency room was an important source of revenue 
at these hospitals. Once Detroit Receiving became the only site of emergency care, the 
administrators at Hutzel and Harper, feared that emergency patients requiring admission 
would stay at Detroit Receiving instead of getting admitted to Harper, Grace, or 
Hutzel.622 This very argument demonstrates not only the hospitals of the DMC’s 
unwillingness to fully join together as one institution, but also a grave misunderstanding 
of what the DMCC was attempting to accomplish through its shared financial 
responsibilities and profits. Rather than recognizing that business at Detroit Receiving 
would improve the financial earnings of the entire DMC once these institutions were 
fully integrated, these hospitals still competed, and acted as though they were all 
responsible for their own earnings. This economic anxiety was exacerbated by the 
“obvious reluctance of private physicians to have their [emergency] patients enter the 
DMC system through the Detroit [Receiving] emergency room,” echoing the long-held 
racist and classist perceptions of Detroit Receiving and its patient population.623  
Ultimately, these fears proved determinative. Rather than pursuing full 
consolidation, the DMCCo allowed both Harper-Grace and Hutzel to keep their 
emergency departments, which they called the Ambulatory Reception Center so as to 
distinguish them from the emergency room at the Detroit Receiving Hospital.624 This 
action by the DMCC undermined Detroit Receiving’s ability to succeed and kept the dual 
                                                            
621 Ibid. 
622 Ibid. 
623 Mozena, “The Detroit Medical Center,” p. 127. 
624 Ibid. 
 201 
 
system of care within the DMC. The de facto experience, then, was that the emergency 
department at Detroit Receiving remained the indigent hospital, “seriously affecting 
Receiving’s financial viability,” and helped to “perpetuate the perception of Detroit 
Receiving as a hospital for the poor.”625   
These concerns carried over to the new UCB building “being identified with the 
indigent image of Detroit [Receiving] Hospital.”626 The administrators of Hutzel, Grace, 
Harper, and Children’s hospitals instead thought it would be better to plan for private 
outpatient services at their own individual hospitals rather than to have this service be 
centralized at UCB, essentially nullifying its purpose.627 City officials, Wayne State 
administrators, and the board at Detroit Receiving opposed this plan, stating that it would 
be another decision that yet again perpetuated Detroit’s “two-door system” of care, and 
worrying that only indigent patients would be served at UCB.628 Toby Citrin, a board 
member at Detroit Receiving, continued to emphasize that the new Detroit Receiving 
Hospital was not being planned as an indigent hospital—and in fact, the first Detroit 
Receiving was not intended to serve only this population—since all hospitals of the DMC 
should be taking indigent patients.629 No compromise on this plan was reached (each 
hospital continued taking its own outpatients), but the DMCCo believed it saw a victory 
when an agreement was reached for all three DMC emergency departments—at Harper, 
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Grace, and Receiving—were staffed by the same professional association, sharing 
physicians, nurses, and other providers.630 
All these attempts at consolidation, however, did little to ease the contentious 
relationship of DMC hospitals with Wayne State University. Medical school faculty had 
to fight to be given hospital appointments at Harper, Grace, Hutzel, and Children’s in 
addition to their traditional appointments at Detroit Receiving because there was still a 
concern over any affiliation with Detroit Receiving decreasing a hospital’s reputation.631 
The centralization of the DMC staff, however, was a crucial part of the consolidation of 
the medical center as purported by The Blue Book. Managing the staff through the 
DMCCo and allowing physician and staff privileges across all the hospitals would 
equalize care and provide greater employment opportunities for support staff.632 
While infighting occurred at the DMCCo level, physicians at each hospital 
expressed great concern over this potential arrangement, noting that they had a 
“comfortable situation [and didn’t] want to see it disturbed.”633 Those who were in favor 
of moving toward a centralized staff realized that it would “aid in the development of 
overall medical leadership and provide the impetus to develop clinical programs which 
are reasonably non-competitive within the DMC, while being competitive with programs 
outside of the DMC.”634 What’s more, it was crucial to fulfilling the aims of The Blue 
Book, and the DMCCo more broadly.  DMCCo member Robert Black noted that 
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physicians “typically hate[d] change of the status quo…fearing loss of control and loss of 
income.”635 At the same time, he believed that a centralized staff would allow physicians 
more autonomy and control at the DMC, “deter[ing] the boards and administrators from 
retaining too much self-interest in their institutions.”636  
 By spring 1977, full consolidation of the hospitals within the DMC had failed. As 
DMCCo board members continued to contest the adoption of the policies within the Blue 
Book, the DMCCo decided that the best course of action was to return to each 
individual’s home institution and work on Rourke’s suggestions internally, undermining 
the very intent of the Blue Book.637  
The DMCCo continued to struggle with consolidation for the rest of the decade, 
especially regarding Detroit Receiving and the UCB, which provided the anchor for 
Wayne State’s teaching program. In 1979, the Michigan State Legislature passed a statute 
reaffirming the purpose of both the UCB and Detroit Receiving and finalizing their 
operations by the DMCCo.638 This transfer placed the full control of Detroit Receiving 
and UCB in the hands of the Detroit Medical Center Corporation. This authorized the 
DMCCo to appoint Detroit Receiving’s hospital board and CEO, with the UCB 
supervised by Detroit Receiving.639 
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Conclusion 
 The increasingly competitive environment created by regional medical programs 
and the centralizing of the academic health center served only to create skepticism and 
distrust among the hospitals of the DMC, making the integration necessary for its success 
virtually impossible. These hospitals had identified indigent care as a major source of 
financial turmoil at Detroit Receiving, but an inability to share the responsibility of this 
growing burden within the DMC due to racist and classist fears about these patients 
ruining the reputation of this medical center further contributed to its failure. Difficulties 
with Medicaid and county reimbursements made it impossible for Detroit Receiving to 
recuperate funding for the bulk of its patient population. The continued economic 
struggles of Detroit Receiving as it worked to meet the needs of Detroit’s population 
further contributed to its “bad” reputation among the hospitals of the DMC, and thus, this 
hospital continued to be a liability rather than an asset for the medical center. This 
resulted in a reluctant partnership. The contentious relationships of the institutions of the 
DMC paired with regional medical planning policies which economists and scholars have 
identified as increasing costs by concentrating hospital services and emphasizing 
biomedical research was a significant factor that contributed to the failure of the DMC to 
thrive, and therefore, impeding the renaissance of the city of Detroit more broadly.  
 Whatever strides the DMCCo made during the 1970s and 1980s, it was not as 
consolidated as it outwardly claimed to be. While the DMC faced “many obstacles from 
geography to racism to mundane bureaucratic wrangling,” coordination and consolidation 
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represented the DMC’s biggest challenge.640 Critics had identified that the “key to all of 
its possibilities is a cooperative venture among the hospitals, concentrating individual 
specialties, such a pediatrics, in individual hospitals, and sharing services, such as 
radiology, that all hospitals use.”641 The “byzantine arrangement” of the separate 
hospitals with separate administrations, with “independent doctors who don’t quite trust 
each other” belied the very concept of a centralized medical center.642 Trust was absent to 
the point that hospital administrations had to be “force[d]…to do anything…all 
agreements have to be worked out by mutual consent.”643 And while this distrust came 
from many sources, a contributing factor was the backdrop created by regional medical 
program legislation by the 1970s. 
The policy and funding focus on regionalism and academic health centers 
increased competition between the hospitals of the DMC itself, making the hospitals 
within the DMC more concerned for their own survival rather than for the whole of the 
DMC. In Metropolitan Detroit, this was felt even more strongly as the separation between 
the suburbs and the city continued to grow. From the beginning, DMC planners intended 
the DMC to attract increasing numbers of paying patients from the suburbs. However, the 
growing numbers of suburban patients imagined by the planners never materialized. 
Despite multiple advertising attempts to reach this community, private patients from the 
suburbs never came. The image of the city grew worse throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
prompting one medical center official to sum it up, stating: “I wish it weren’t so, but 
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frankly, how many Oakland County housewives do you know who are willing to drive 
thirty minutes or more to get to the medical center and then have to sit in a waiting room 
full of welfare mothers?”644 
 Once the anchor of the Southeastern Michigan region, Detroit was no longer able 
to attract white suburbanites to visit, live, or receive health care. But throughout its entire 
development, the DMC continued to try to court these individuals. The DMC did 
consolidate fully under the DMCCo in 1985, but that is far from the end of the story. The 
DMC continued to struggle over the next thirty years, often due to many of the same 
factors it has been unable to face since the 1950s. 
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“As I witness and participate in our visionary efforts to revitalize Detroit and contrast 
them with the multi-billion dollars’ worth of megaprojects advanced by politicians and 
developed that involved casinos, giant stadiums, gentrification, and the Super Bowl, I am 
saddened by their shortsightedness. At the same time, I rejoice in the energy being 
unleashed in the community by our human-scale programs that involve bringing the 
country back into the city and removing the walls between schools and communities, 
between generations, between ethnic groups. And I am confident just as in the early 
twentieth century people came from around the world to marvel at the mass production 
lines pioneered by Henry Ford, in the twenty-first century they will be coming to marvel 
at the thriving neighborhoods that are the fruit of our visionary programs.”—Grace Lee 
Boggs645 
 
Conclusion 
The story of the Detroit Medical Center does not end in 1985. Once fully 
integrated, the hospitals of the DMC turned their energy to emphasizing the full range 
specialty care and biomedical research on their campus, even hosting Michigan’s 
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governor, James Blanchard, to tour the labs and see the new equipment that was offered 
at what the city hoped would be one of the premier medical campuses in the country. By 
the late 1980s, this center had grown to eight institutions: the original four DMC 
hospitals, Detroit Receiving, the UCB Outpatient Center, the DMC Rehabilitation 
Institute of Michigan for long-term and step-down rehabilitation, and DMC Sinai-Grace 
Hospital. But the full incorporation of this medical center under the nonprofit DMCCo 
did little to help stem ongoing problems. Officials’ desire to be a world-class medical 
center was in constant struggle with the reputation of both the city and the DMC itself. It 
became increasingly more difficult for the city to maintain adequate standards at the 
hospitals of the DMC. 
 These problems were exacerbated by the increasing costs of health care leading 
up to the DMC’s consolidation in 1985. In Michigan, these health care costs were eight 
percent higher than the national average.646 From 1976-1981, health care costs in 
Michigan doubled, with the state paying eleven billion dollars annually, spending nearly 
half this on hospital care.647 The Michigan Republican Caucus urged in the beginning of 
the 1980s for the legislature to “divert…attention from short-term treatment and solutions 
and toward long-range prevention strategies,” citing that prevention only accounted for 
six percent of the budget went toward prevention and health education was less than one 
percent; less than two-tenths of one percent went toward research.648 Future Michigan 
Governor John Engler urged his colleagues in the early 1980s to focus on prevention as a 
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cost-saving measure at hospitals across the state, since this problem was not going away. 
Engler stated: 
“What legislators and health professionals have not yet accepted is that—to 
some extent—rising health care costs are a product of our era and will 
always be with us. Science and technology have created advancements, 
which for all purposes but the practice, are positive…even the major health 
insurance companies, so often seen as a bottomless pit of funds, are running 
out of money.”649 
 
These rising costs were not helped by local policies that made care for the patient 
populations at the hospitals of the DMC even more difficult. 
 In 1985, the same year that the DMC incorporated under its nonprofit, Wayne 
County expanded the criteria for indigent care, allowing a patient to register as “indigent” 
if their income level did not allow them to pay the hospital their full bill within six 
months.650 This expansion, however, did not assist the DMC; Wayne County continued to 
not service any patient, or any institution, within the city of Detroit well into the 1990s.651 
In the same year, Wayne County rethought its emergency care requirements, stating that 
treatment for emergencies require the patient to be in danger of “immediate…of life or 
other endangerment.”652 Wayne County determined, then, that if the patient was not in 
danger or dying, and was indigent, they would be transferred to “community based 
hospital” like Detroit Receiving or Harper at the DMC.653 Presumably, this policy 
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continued even once Congress passed the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
in 1986 as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act [COBRA], 
which required emergency departments to provide assessment and care to any Medicare 
patients.654 This remains an unfunded mandate, and so while people have the right to 
access this care, hospitals do not have to provide it.655 Thus, transferring patients to the 
hospitals of the DMC if they were not in immediate need of lifesaving care was 
completely legal. 
 Problems at the DMC continued in tandem with continued economic decline and 
demographic shifts within the city of Detroit. Between 1970 and 1980, there was a 29.6 
percent decline in employed residents in the city of Detroit; at the same time, there was a 
27.6 percent increase in employed residents in the city’s surrounding suburbs.656 This 
decline continued, but stabilized a bit, when between 1980 and 1990, the decline in 
employed residents was 14.9 percent. During this same period, the population of 
employed residents in the Detroit suburbs increased 14.5 percent. Not only was Detroit’s 
decline continuing, but the disparities between the suburbs and the city were continuing 
to grow—even once the decline slowed. At the same time, the racial demographics of the 
city of Detroit and its surrounding communities continued to shift. While the overall 
population of Detroit was declining, it was growing less diverse. Between 1980 and 1990, 
the white population of Detroit decreased from 33.4 percent to 20.7 percent, and the 
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black population increased from 62.7 percent to 75.5 percent.657 The suburbs were still 
overwhelmingly white, although it was slowly diversifying; in 1980, the white population 
of the suburbs was ninety-four percent, and by 1990 it had dropped slowly to 92.4 
percent.658 The decades of policies that favored white 
homeownership, and urban developments like the DMC 
that displaced black residents and destroyed black-owned 
businesses had resulted in areas of in the surrounding 
suburbs that were essentially solidly white.   
 The development of the DMC did little, if anything, 
to improve the economic conditions of the city. As this 
dissertation has shown, three solid decades of resources 
poured into the hospitals that would become the DMC 
likely was a contributing factor to the city’s economic 
decline. Adding insult to injury, the DMC had not 
succeeded in any of its planners’ initial goals—to 
transform the Detroit economy, to provide additional 
white-collar labor for Detroit residents, or to improve the 
health of the city and its residents. 
As the city continued to struggle, so did the DMC. 
Set against the backdrop of the declining city, the medical 
campus struggled to overcome the negative image of the 
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city to hire an adequate number of physicians, nurses, and staff. Ads ran in newspapers 
all around the Midwest trying to encourage folks to move to Detroit and work for the 
DMC, emphasizing not only the benefits of employment, but also the opportunity to live 
within a “dynamic, cosmopolitan city.”659 But the city was not the only problem for the 
DMC. Because of the economic and staffing troubles, care itself also suffered. Dangerous 
cases of negligence at the DMC began to make national news, like a four-year legal case 
ending in 1989 when the DMC settled for an undisclosed amount over the “improper 
care” of a man who died after maggots nested in his tracheotomy hole.660 
By the late 1980s, scholars were beginning to look for links between the bad 
economy and health. In 1989, the University of Michigan published The Detroit Area 
Study, which incorporated tools from a “new field within public health,” which had 
begun because researchers, teachers, government workers, and health providers 
determined that studying the socioeconomic status of people was crucial to understanding 
the full effects of epidemiological issues and disease.661 This study found that “no 
progress [was made] toward racial equality in the 1980s” in Metropolitan Detroit.662 The 
report found that thirty-seven percent of black Detroiters lived in households with an 
income of below ten thousand dollars, and the median income of black Detroiters was 
only sixteen thousand dollars—it was 32,500 dollars for white Detroiters.663 Of the 
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findings, Detroit NAACP President Arthur Johnson said: “It is a system which…works to 
continue the exploitation of black [people], and in that sense,  we have our own form of 
apartheid.”664 This echoed the conclusions published in the Kerner Report two decades 
earlier in response to the violence in American cities. This Detroit Study also found that 
there remained marked differences in the health of black and white residents due to these 
differences in living conditions, including in infant mortality.665 
The United States Surgeon General had a goal of lowering infant mortality to nine 
per one thousand by 1990, and Michigan had met that goal—for white infants. The rates 
of black infant deaths were still high—23.5 deaths per one thousand births in 1984—with 
the trend worsening rather than improving.666 In one year, from 1985 to 1986, black 
infant mortality for the state of Michigan increased by 2.2 percent, while white infant 
mortality decreased 3.2 percent during the same period.667 In Detroit, this difference was 
even more prominent: black infant mortality increased by 8.5 percent, and white infant 
mortality declined by 24 percent.668 “The gap between black and white infant death rates 
is a tragedy—an indictment against our society,” remarked Gloria Smith, the director of 
the Michigan Department of Public Health in 1987.669 By 1987, only nine states and the 
District of Columbia had higher overall infant mortality rates than Michigan, and only the 
District of Columbia had a worse infant mortality rate than the city of Detroit, where 
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twenty-one of every one thousand infants born did not live to see their first birthday in 
1990.670  
 A task force assembled by the Michigan Department of Public Health in response 
to the Detroit Area Study determined that the root causes of the increasing mortality rates 
among black infants were poverty, inadequate medical services, and malnutrition.671 
Other cited causes included low birth weight (black babies born under 5.5 pounds 
increased almost ten percent from 1985 to 1986), increasing number of teen births in the 
black population, and increasing number of births to mothers with less than a twelfth 
grade education.672 This task force recommended an expenditure of thirty-one million 
dollars throughout the state to increase health care access, Medicaid expansion, and 
community education programs in the counties with the highest amount of infant 
mortality.673 The state had already approved an expenditure of seventeen million dollars 
in 1987.674  
By 1992, infant mortality rates had dropped overall in Michigan and within the 
city of Detroit, but the infant mortality rates of black babies in Detroit remained double 
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that of white babies.675 The overall drop in infant mortality rates was largely credited by 
both the Detroit and Michigan Departments of Health to the outreach programs which 
sought to increase the number of women receiving prenatal care, but in reality the overall 
percentage of women receiving prenatal care had remained the same—around seventy-
one percent.676 
These gaps between the health of white and black residents in Detroit extended 
beyond infant mortality; the morbidity rate gaps between white and black people were the 
largest in the United States.677 The gaps were most pronounced in heart disease.678 In 
Michigan, the death rate for heart disease among black residents was three percent higher 
than it was for white residents, but by 1985, it was twenty-seven percent higher.679 These 
rates were quickly increasing—in 1975, the death rate for black Michigan residents was 
thirty-eight percent higher than it was for white Michigan residents; by 1985, that had 
increased to forty-eight percent.680 Homicide, however, remained the leading cause of 
death for black male Michigan residents between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four.681 
 These studies cited poor access to care as factors, and a misunderstanding of what 
sorts of health care could help decrease the rates of these illnesses.682 Harold Johnson, 
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dean of the University of Michigan’s School of Social Work and a task force member 
with the state of Michigan wrote:   
“Even though Michigan spends $1.5 billion annually for health care for the 
poor, there are people who are not receiving adequate health care, 
particularly in the area of prevention, which we all know is critical for good 
health.”  
 
He highlighted his assertion that it would be less costly in the long run for the state to 
focus on preventative and primary care.683 Johnson also cited the greater likelihood that 
black residents had lower wage jobs without included health care benefits, making it less 
likely that this population of people would seek medical care early.684 Former head of the 
Detroit Board of Health, Jay Waller, summed it up succinctly: “Being poor is hazardous 
to your health.”685 
Despite scholars citing a lack of access for the poor health of black residents, 
medical and public health students in Southeastern Michigan were being taught that 
addressing these health care inequalities would be more difficult than simply improving 
access. Some in public health taught the long history of racial inequalities in medical 
care, citing the many ways that racially motivated practices affected the ways that black 
patients interacted with the medical profession, including Dr. Marion Sims’s 
gynecological experiments on slaves, medical textbooks instructing X-ray technicians to 
give black patients larger “X-ray doses” because of their “thicker skins” and “denser 
bones,” segregated blood donation, and the inequalities of treatment for black and white 
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patients with the same condition in the same hospitals.686 Even the concept of “flesh 
colored bandages” only matching the flesh of one race contributed to the continuation of 
racist practices in medicine.687  
By the late 1980s, some public health scholars began blaming “the major source 
of these disparities” on “the fact that we live in a racist society,” and saw the true reason 
for the health gaps between white and black residents being the cutback in programs that 
provided assistance to historically underserved populations.688  
For these scholars, racism was described as not necessarily as the conscious 
discrimination present in pre-Jim Crow United States policy, but instead the “structures 
of society which support the dominant position of whites and the subjugation of people of 
color.”689 Even so, one professor conceded, similar to the civil rights activists before him, 
that:  
“We are not likely to do very much about change in our economic and health 
care systems by focusing efforts of change at benefitting the Black 
population or other subordinate groups, Rather, social progress is more 
likely to come about by action which emphasizes benefitting the population 
at large. This means supporting programs like social security and national 
health insurance or a national health service—which can be used by the 
entire population—rather than programs aimed at racial minorities, or even 
the poor more generally.”690  
 
In Detroit, the actions of city officials and planners of the DMC certainly 
contributed to the racist society that supported the continued subpar living experiences 
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for black residents. The slum clearance that led to the initial construction of the DMC 
displaced thousands of black residents and shuttered hundreds of black-owned 
businesses, stunting the economic growth of this community. While the Detroit Urban 
League tried to work with the city to ensure that the jobs that this development would 
create would also benefit Detroit’s black residents, this community was ultimately 
excluded from the DMC’s progress—even the middle-class black professionals on whom 
the majority of the Detroit Urban League’s activism was focused. Black residents were 
underrepresented on staff, in leadership positions at the hospitals, and in advisory 
positions with the city. And over the course of its development, black patients faced 
discrimination and were unable to receive adequate care at the hospitals of the DMC, 
often transferred and dumped to overcrowded and substandard Detroit Receiving.  
The construction of the DMC perpetuated the dual system of care within the city 
of Detroit, contributing to the continued poor health of Detroit’s black communities. By 
not providing adequate health provision for this population, the city all but ensured its 
continued economic decline; health must be present for an individual to be a contributing 
member of his or her neighborhood and city. If a community is perpetually unhealthy, 
there is little energy or additional funds for community members to participate in their 
city’s “renewal.” And, the city’s renewal will be delayed as more resources are needed to 
care for this sick community. The United States never signed onto either the 1948 or 
1966 United Nations’ treaties that identified several basic needs as human rights, 
including access to clean water, sanitation, nutrition, and health care.691 This means that 
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not Detroit, or any other municipality, is obligated to provide health care to its residents. 
But the case of the DMC should perhaps make municipalities contemplate doing so. 
The University of Michigan published a study in 2000 in the New York Academy 
of Sciences that found that the differences in death rates between white and black 
Michigan residents were at the same rates as they were in 1950, citing this outcome as the 
result of deliberate actions that continued to keep black residents a perpetual 
underclass.692 Senior research scientist David R. Williams wrote: 
“This is not an act of God. Neither does it simply reflect racial differences 
in individual behavior or biology. Instead, considerable evidence suggests 
that these striking racial differences in health and their persistence over time 
reflect, in large part, policies and practices that are linked to the historical 
legacy of racism, and that have created adverse living conditions that are 
pathogenic for minority populations…For both Blacks [sic] and whites 
[sic], men and women with higher household incomes have better health 
than those with lower incomes. Moreover, the differences in health between 
high income and low-income persons of each races are often larger than the 
overall differences between Blacks [sic] and whites [sic]...Racism can affect 
health indirectly through institutional policies that reduce employment and 
educational opportunities for minorities. In addition, racism also can affect 
health directly in multiple ways. Residence in poor neighborhoods, racial 
biases in medical care, and the stress of experiencing discrimination can all 
have negative effects on health.”693 
 
Historians like Thomas Sugrue, David M.P. Freund, and Sidney Fine have 
identified several reasons for Detroit’s economic decline, including a lack of a diversified 
economy (focusing primarily on the auto industry), no public transit, shortcomings of 
leadership, and of course, racial tensions and the racist policies that were the outcome of 
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these tensions.694 But the examination of how health provision, or the lack thereof, 
contributed to its decline has thus far been absent in the historiography. A careful 
analysis of how Detroit officials created policies and set funding priorities that did not 
improve health provision for Detroit residents, ultimately leading to the failure of 
Detroit’s largest urban renewal project, is an important factor in understanding the 
decline of Detroit.  
What’s more, in our own field—the history of medicine—scholarship that 
examines health in American cities after World War II is lacking, generally. The works 
that do exist in this area have done admirable work in weaving examinations of how local 
and federal policies affect health access for different urban populations based on their 
racial or class identities.695 This dissertation adds to this historiography by providing a 
case study of a large urban renewal project in a city whose economic decline has been 
more pronounced than any other large American city in the late twentieth century. In 
addition, it furthers the arguments put forth by historians by demonstrating that local 
planners and officials can further contribute to policies that do not provide adequate 
“safety-net” health care services by setting funding priorities intended to benefit white, 
middle-class residents and city visitors. 
This dissertation informs both urban historiography and the historiography of 
medicine by examining how the federal urban renewal project of the DMC, a hospital 
campus that could have provided medical care to the increasing indigent population of 
Detroit, became an albatross. Driven by racism and classism, city officials did not 
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develop resources for the city that existed, instead developing what planners hoped would 
be a draw for people to come back to the city. In doing so, city planners and officials 
drained Detroit of its resources and did little to contribute to the wellbeing of its 
citizens—arguably, this development made health worse. Contemporary planners and 
policymakers should consider this history when working on urban renewal today. Poor 
health—and racism—is costly, and it cost Detroit its renaissance. 
•  
The DMC Today 
 The DMC is continually expanding, now affiliated with institutions all over Metro 
Detroit.696 But it is still recovering from its past. Today, the DMC’s very existence is in 
jeopardy. 
 The DMC never resolved its financial troubles. From 1998-2003 alone, the DMC 
lost three-hundred-sixty million dollars, or seventy-two million dollars annually.697 The 
DMCCo planned to layoff one thousand employees, but an aid plan from the state, 
county, and city of fifty million dollars to the hospitals most in need—Detroit Receiving 
and Hutzel—prevented those layoffs in 2003.698 
 From 2003 to 2010, the DMC continued to grow and work to address its financial 
issues that still existed from the large numbers of indigent patients that the DMC treated. 
It operated without an annual deficit during these seven years, but this was not enough to 
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make up for its years of debt and deficit.699 Reusing its old strategy to save money on the 
salaries of physicians at their hospitals, the DMC added seventy-nine new residency slots 
in affiliation with Wayne State in 2010. In addition to the cost-saving, a spokesperson for 
the DMC hoped that the addition of residents would “continue to impact the underserved 
needs of our community while providing world class healthcare.” These residents would 
be located primarily at Detroit Receiving, Hutzel, and Harper hospitals, spread out among 
various specialties like emergency medicine, surgery, cardiology, and obstetrics and 
gynecology.700  
 But despite the strides that the DMCCo made in those seven years, their historic 
debt was too great a burden to bear. In June 2010, the DMCCo signed a deal with the for-
profit, Nashville-based health system, Vanguard Health Systems Inc. to turn over 
ownership for 417 million dollars.701 Through the agreement, Vanguard also agreed to 
cover the DMC’s still-outstanding 147 million dollars in debt, forgave the DMC’s 
additional 450 million dollars in bond debt, protected the DMC’s 189 million dollars in 
pension contributions, and still provided an additional 350 million dollars for “ongoing 
capital needs.”702 Vanguard also promised 500 million dollars in additional in capital 
investment funds in the first five years of its ownership.703 Despite the move to a for-
profit model of health care delivery, DMC Board Chairman Steve D’Arcy noted that this 
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sale “represents a new model for health care delivery,” and would be “the catalyst to 
creating world-class health excellence in Detroit.”704 
 The Vanguard sale provided DMC and city leaders with hope. DMCCo Board 
Member Roger Penske said that this sale would bring “a Christmas tree of opportunity” 
to the city by providing five thousand construction jobs and more staff once the 
developments were completed. City officials also believed that this sale would create a 
boon for the surrounding neighborhood, and “lure patients back from suburban 
hospitals.”705 This was almost identical language that city planners and DMC boosters 
used in 1956. By this point, the suburban competition was intense. Then-DMCCo CEO 
Mike Duggan said that the DMCCo Board and the City of Detroit has “had to sit by and 
watch while West Bloomfield and Novi and Ann Arbor make huge investments in 
modern new hospitals and we’ve been frustrated we can’t do the same [here],” alluding to 
the massive growth that places like the University of Michigan Medical Center saw over 
the past thirty years.706 But, this time, planners believed they found the right infusion of 
funds and right leadership to meet the goals of the DMC, even though its buyer, 
Vanguard, was already 1.8 billion dollars in debt.707  
Members of the surrounding community expressed concern over the sale of the 
DMC, which ran all the hospitals in the city of Detroit by this point. Community 
members feared that a move to a for-profit institution meant that the DMC would no 
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longer provide treatment for its indigent patients.708 In response to this, CEO Duggan 
added a provision to the sale that Vanguard would promise to provide indigent care and 
“charity medicine” for the next ten years while the city worked to develop alternate 
plans.709 
 In 2013, due to its own financial problems, Vanguard was no longer able to 
operate the DMC, or several of its other acquisitions. In 2013, Dallas-based Tenet 
Healthcare purchased Vanguard for 1.8 billion dollars and assumed its two-and-a-half 
billion dollars in debt.710 
 The optimism that DMC and city leaders expressed after the Vanguard sale was 
absent once their ownership was transferred to Tenet. However, Tenet largely delivered 
on the promises that Vanguard made in its sale, including the provision of 850 million 
dollars in capital investments at the DMC over the five years after purchase; the last 
project of that investment, an addition at Children’s Hospital, was completed in summer 
2017.711 But this came at a cost, most notably, the DMC’s commitment to its 
community’s care. 
 In March 2018, the State of Michigan found that spending at the DMC for 
“charity care” cases had been reduced by ninety-eight percent since its Tenet purchase, 
spending just four-hundred-seventy thousand dollars on “charity care” in the DMC 
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hospitals in 2016.712 In contrast, local competing health care systems Beaumont spent 
twenty-six million dollars on “charity care,” and Henry Ford spent nineteen million.713 In 
2013, before the Tenet sale, the DMC was spending close to twenty-two million dollars 
on care for this population.714  
Labor groups like the Michigan Nurses Association [MNA] noted that this 
decision to “abandon its legal commitment” to indigent patients could have “grave 
consequences” for the 7.4 percent of Detroit residents, or fifty thousand people, who had 
no health insurance.715 The MNA noted that the ninety-eight percent reduction in charity 
care at the Tenet DMC outpaced the sixty-six percent reduction in uninsured Detroit 
residents that came as a result of the Affordable Care Act and Michigan’s Medicaid 
Expansion.716 The MNA were not sure where these patients in need were receiving the 
care they needed—if they were at all.717 
Hospital Name 2013 Charity 
Care Spending 
2016 Charity Care 
Spending 
DMC Sinai-Grace Hospital $8,311,306 $225,206 
DMC Harper University 
Hospital 
$2,756,203 $56,952 
DMC Detroit Receiving 
Hospital 
$11,099,494 $151,799 
Table 1: Charity Care Spending amounts at select DMC hospitals from 2013 to 2016. Data from Michigan 
Nurses Association, “Broken Promises at Tenet DMC.” 
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This revelation came at the same time as Wayne State University School of 
Medicine made its grievances with Tenet known. The school was not used to contracting 
with a for-profit institution, which resulted in conflicts. Wayne State wanted long-term 
commitments so it could promise its trainees viability, while Tenet only provided six-
month commitments.718 Because of this strife, Tenet announced its plans to dissolve its 
affiliation with Wayne State University School of Medicine in May 2018. Wayne State 
doctors represented twenty-five percent of all physicians that worked in the DMC, with 
two hundred physicians working across the hospitals’ intensive care, neonatal, and 
trauma care units.719 
For the University Physicians Group, the professional organization responsible for 
the employment of Wayne State physicians, this dissolution was detrimental. In 
November 2018, this group filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, although this group 
emphasized that this was a “restructuring” rather than a closure or liquidation.720 This 
group also noted that it intended to still pay its workers their 1.6 million dollars in 
salaries. During this time, many physicians left this group due to the “period of 
instability.”721 
However, the lack of affiliation with the DMC was short-lived. In September, the 
DMC and University Physicians entered into five-year partnership.722 At this time, the 
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CEO of the DMCCo reaffirmed the DMC’s commitment to collaboration with Wayne 
State University and the University Physicians Group, and reiterated that the DMC 
valued “the access, expertise, and specialized care that these physicians provide to our 
patients,” continuing that they “shared a longstanding history and mission of serving the 
health care needs of the Detroit community” and would continue doing so.723 Wayne 
State was not enthused about the continued partnership, but spokespeople from the school 
noted that they would “try to make the best of a bad situation,” fearful that the DMC 
would still only be “interested in limited contracts for teaching and clinical administrative 
services.”724 
The uncertainty between Wayne State and Tenet left the DMC short-staffed. Even 
once the affiliation was reaffirmed, the loss of physicians that summer created serious 
issues for the DMC. One way the DMC sought to operate in these shortages was that 
Detroit Receiving and Harper Hospitals stopped monitoring surgical site infections.725 
This resulted in a failed inspection from the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services 
in late 2018 when they discovered dirty surgical instruments and flying insects in the 
Intensive Care Units at these two hospitals.726 This was the second time in only two years 
where the DMC was in jeopardy of losing its Medicare contract.727 Hopeful that their 
medical center would be able to overcome this, the DMC issued a statement, reading that: 
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“The DMC remains committed to providing residents of Detroit with safe, accessible, 
quality care. This commitment is central to our mission and everything we stand for.”728 
Although this problem was remedied in the Spring of 2019, the problems that have 
plagued the DMC since its beginning continue to exist. And its continued inability to 
comply with regulations puts its very existence at risk 
The DMC is still home to most of the city’s hospitals and physicians; if this 
institution closes, there will be irreparable damage to Detroit’s residents and economy. 
But this reality is the result of decades of negligence toward the community that needs 
care from the DMC the most. It is my hope that the case of the DMC serves as a 
cautionary tale—for cities across the country but also Detroit itself—highlighting the 
necessity to provide care for a community’s most vulnerable residents. Beyond a moral 
imperative, this dissertation demonstrates that there is also an economic imperative. 
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Appendix 
 
I. 
 
A Proposal for a Detroit Medical Center 
Submitted to the Detroit City Plan Commission, on May 23, 1956, by the Detroit Medical 
Center Committee 
 
 On behalf of the trustees of all the hospitals involved here today, I want to thank 
the Commission for the opportunity you have given us to present a program which is of 
vital importance to every man, woman, and child in our community. 
 During the past year, a special committee of trustees of Children’s, Woman’s, the 
Grace and Harper hospitals, has investigated the possibilities for developing the area in 
which these hospitals are located into an integrated medical center. 
 It is my privilege today, as chairman of this committee, to place before you, for 
your official consideration, our conclusions and proposals regarding the development of 
this area as a great medical center. 
 The boundaries of the area examined by the committee are as follows: Woodward 
Avenues on the west, Hasting on the east, Mack Avenue on the south, and, on the north, 
Warren to St. Antoine, St. Antoine to Ferry, and Ferry to Hastings again. These 
boundaries were more or less predetermined by the locations of the hospitals and the 
problems related to their locations. 
 This small segment of our City plays a very important dual and contradictory role 
in the matter of our health. The four hospitals located here accounted, last year, for one-
twentieth of the total number of patients admitted to all of Michigan’s more than 200 
general hospitals. Every twentieth hospital admission in the whole State took place in this 
area. And this is the contradiction. The four hospitals doing this tremendous job are 
hemmed in by the words and the most unhealthy slums in Detroit. 
 Operating these hospitals has become increasingly difficult amidst the blight 
which surrounds them. This is their common and urgent problem which led to the 
appointment of the committee. I know that it is not necessary for me to tell the City Plan 
Commission about the terrible slums around our hospitals. A number of the blighted 
areas have been marked for top priority in the redevelopment program worked out by the 
City Plan Commission. The urgent objective of our committee is to try to get this 
neighborhood redeveloped in the shortest possible time.  
 There is also another objective. We want to see the neighborhood developed in 
such a way as will allow Detroit to realize the full potential of the excellent resources for 
health care and medical education that are presently in existence. We want to see this area 
developed as a fully integrated medical center.  
 By the term “integrated medical center” we do not mean simply a harmonious 
grouping of structures, all in one way or another serving the purpose of health care. We 
mean something much more specific and much more important in terms of an active 
relationship. I should like to take a minute to clarify this point, for this goes to the heart 
of the proposed program. 
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 Few lay people realize the intricate and continuous relationship that exists 
between medical practice and medical education. I was not aware of it until after I had 
been a hospital trustee for some time. It takes a great deal of teaching and training to 
develop the knowledge and skills of the practicing physician or surgeon. These highly 
developed skills would die if we did not provide the facilities and the opportunities for 
students and residents to acquire them in turn. We have a cyclical pattern to consider. 
Education, training, clinical practice, education, training, over and over again. This 
cyclical process of education, training, clinical practice, as it also involves research and 
experimentation, is most productive when we have an integrated relationship between a 
medical school and teaching hospitals to carry it on. This is what we have in mind when 
we speak of developing an integrated medical center. 
 The Wayne State University College of Medicine is one of the finest in the 
country. Its present affiliations are sufficient to meet its undergraduate teaching needs. 
But it does not have the integrated teaching arrangement with large hospitals that could 
provide the full scope of practice necessary to meet its postgraduate requirements. This is 
a real handicap. It concerns all of us in these days of serious shortages of every kind of 
doctor. A medical school with a well-established and rounded postgraduate program will 
prove more attractive to students than one that has no such program, or only the 
rudiments of such a program. In addition, hospitals having an integrated relationship with 
medical schools are the ones that hold the greatest attraction for medical internes [sic] 
and residents. 
 The Wayne State University College of Medicine is not located in the immediate 
area we are discussing. However, with modern transportation and the expressways, the 
very short distance involved presents no problem. 
 The four hospitals represented here have everything necessary with which the 
Wayne Medical School could build a rounded and systematic postgraduate program. 
 Let us take a quick inventory of what these hospitals have to offer: 
1. These four hospitals have a total complement of 1,648 bds and 272 basinets. [This 
is more than] The famous Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center. We do not 
have to add a single hospital bed to become a great medical center. 
2. During the year ending September 30, 1955, these hospitals handled 50,000 in-
patient admissions, excluding admissions for births. The patients were provided 
with a total of 440,000 days of hospital care, covering every conceivable type of 
illness and accident. In addition 9,000 babies were born in them and they received 
53,000 days of care. These hospitals, during the calendar year 1955, provided 
nearly 250,000 out-patient and emergency services. This gives us some idea of the 
unmatched opportunities these hospitals offer for postgraduate work. 
3. About 35% of all the physicians listed by the Wayne County Medical Society 
hold staff membership in one or more of these hospitals. 
4. These hospitals have organized medical staffs who are working under integrated 
conditions that have been developed over a span of from two to three generations 
of continuous experience. 
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5. The Grace and Harper hospitals have Schools of Nursing. Children’s Hospital 
maintains an affiliating arrangement with nearly a dozen schools who send their 
student nurses there for Pediatrics instruction. 
6. All of the facilities we have already mentioned will shortly be increased with the 
opening of the Rehabilitation Institute of Metropolitan Detroit, which adjoins 
Harper Hospital. 
We have all of this to offer as the core around which to develop the medical center. 
What does the University think of the program? I should like to read the following 
letter from  
Dr. Gordon H. Scott, Dean of the College of Medicine. 
 
WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
College of Medicine 
College of the Dean 
 
May 14, 1956 
 
Mr. Ray R. Eppert 
6701 Second 
Detroit, Michigan 
 
Dear Mr. Eppert: 
 The Wayne State University College is greatly interested in the plans of Harper, 
Grace, Woman’s and Children’s Hospitals to rehabilitate the area in their vicinity. In the 
past two years we have made every effort to aid in the formulation of these plans to help 
in their activation. It is our deep concern that these hospitals not only continue their 
present high standards, but that they expand their efforts in new directions so that, with 
the cooperation of the College of Medicine, their facilities may become the proving 
ground for even finer teaching, research and service. 
 When we became a state university, we assumed new obligations. We believe that 
the State of Michigan intends that its newly acquired College of Medicine develop its 
resources in all directions so that it will be second to none. We firmly believe that one of 
the first and more important steps in this direction is the working out of definite plans for 
collaborative use of facilities and staff with those private hospitals which are 
geographically and structurally suited to our needs. Since we will increase the size of our 
classes in the near future, these working arrangements must contemplate teaching at all 
levels. We are certain that this can be done when the Boards of Trustees of the hospitals 
understand and appreciate our problems. A working arrangement which will be truly 
cooperative will furnish the teaching, research and service facilities essential to the 
development of a great medical center and the University need not find itself in the 
position of having to build a competitive hospital system to fulfill its function. 
 It follows that the things which affect the midtown hospital group and the Detroit 
Receiving Hospital have a direct bearing on our future planning. The welfare of the 
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hospitals will in no small way determine the future of what must become a great medical 
teaching, research and service center. We believe that any steps which are taken to 
conserve and increase their usefulness will be richly rewarding to the University and the 
State which it serves. 
 
Sincerely,  
Gordon H. Scott 
Dean 
 
OBSTACLES THAT MUST BE OVERCOME 
 What is it that has stood in the way so far, and still stands in the way, of the 
necessary integration? 
 Here are the facts: 
1. Badly needed help in general, and desirable categories of employees, in particular, 
have revealed an increasing reluctance to take employment with these hospitals 
because of the slums which surround them. 
2. The professional and skilled employees of these hospitals have been gradually 
moving away from the area. Such a trend is invariably accompanied by an 
inclination on the part of these employees to consider employment in hospitals 
nearer home, or in hospitals located in more attractive surroundings. 
3. Employees cannot find real relief even by moving out of the area. Two shifts of 
predominantly female employees must come into the area, or leave it, during the 
hours of darkness. Despite the best efforts of the Detroit Police Department, it 
cannot be said that the area is safe for female employees during these hours. 
4. The hospitals cannot hope to find relief by means of possible housing programs 
for their employees because patients, too, are revealing increasing reluctance, and 
even resistance, to being hospitalized in this area. 
5. The patients who do come to these hospitals are worried about their visitors who 
have to come into the area, or leave it, after dark. 
6. The heavy flow of traffic past these hospitals has added another source of 
dissatisfaction and danger. The congestion and lack of sufficient parking space are 
other handicaps. 
Because of these problems, the hospitals have found themselves, for years, on the 
horns of a dilemma. What should they do? They have asked themselves this question year 
after year. If they remain where they are, and nothing is done, their future is not a bright 
one. Such a negative development would be disastrous to the community. These hospitals 
have a book value of $27,000,000. 
Let us suppose that these hospitals considered moving to more attractive areas. It 
is estimated that it would cost more than $50,000,000 to replace these hospitals with new 
structures. The cost is obviously prohibitive. This is an alternative which must be 
rejected, not simply because of its prohibitive cost, but because it is contrary to the 
interests of the community. 
The need for the program we are discussing today is urgent and we hope the City 
Plan Commission will carefully consider the following recommendations: 
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1. The area in which the hospitals are located, and the adjacent areas, should be 
made available for development as a medical center with appropriate residential 
and community facilities. 
2. Parts of the area should be set aside for residential purposes, and should include 
medium-cost apartments for the 3,600 employees of the four hospitals and their 
families. There should be housing facilities for professional people and others of 
the comfortable income groups who may be interested in living quarters that are 
near the hospitals or the other institutions in the medical center. 
3. Provisions should be made for schools, a shopping center, parking and 
recreational facilities in the residential area. 
We hope that the City Plan Commission will help us to get the project down to a 
definitive proposal. And finally, after we have worked this out together, that the 
Commission’s recommendations to the City Council will be affirmative. 
We believe that a tremendous opportunity exists to create in Detroit one of the 
world’s great medical centers. The value of such a center is to all the citizens of Detroit 
and the entire State is, we are certain, obvious to everyone.  
Adequate medical teaching, research, and practice is vital to both the physical and 
economic health of our community. 
The medical profession has been making rapid and remarkable strides in 
researching and developing “less depreciation” and “longer life” in that most important 
product—people. We are on the verge of a break-through in many facets of the health 
problem, which when accomplished will open up new vistas of opportunity for further 
achievement and success. 
Medical brains alone will not do the job. We must provide the tools, the weapons, 
the facilities, the environment to permit the most efficient and effective prosecution of 
this all-out war against disease.  
The proposed medical center would place Detroit in the front lines in this battle 
and would assure for our community the maximum benefits for our citizens. Likewise, its 
potential contribution for better health to our entire country, and, in fact, to the whole 
world is an important and compelling reason for quick affirmative action. 
 
Respectfully Submitted, 
 
The Detroit Medical Center Committee 
 
Harper Hospital: Ray R. Eppert, Chairman 
Richard H. Webber 
George E. Cartmill, Director 
 
The Grace Hospital: John N. Lord 
Arthur W. Winter 
Roger W. Debusk, MD, Director 
 
Children’s Hospital: Jerome H. Remick, Jr. 
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Mrs. Gerard R. Slattery 
Miss Mildred Riese, RN, Administrator 
 
Women’s Hospital: Mrs. John N. Failing, Jr 
Mrs. Benjamin E. Young 
Miss Catherine Maloy, RN, Administrator 
 
